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Thesis Abstract 
Countries rich in natural resources may be deemed to have an economic advantage with 
regards to their economic growth. However, this has been questioned as such countries 
have been found to underperform those that are significantly disadvantaged in terms of 
such resources, leading to what has been termed as the resource curse. The current thesis 
aims to investigate the existence of resource curse for the oil abundant GCC countries as 
well as the remaining OPEC members that share similar characteristics; most notably the 
dependence on oil exports. Oil has a prominent status among all commodities as it acts as 
a barometer to a country's, and perhaps the world's, economic outlook. High oil prices 
may fuel inflation pressure, thereby increasing the cost of production of many goods. As 
such we also investigate the impact of oil on the GCC stock markets. Specifically, we 
investigate whether the oil dynamics have acted as a contagion transmission channel, 
which would have imported the uncertainty pertaining to the Global Financial Crisis from 
the western economies to the, admittedly secluded, GCC stock markets.  
The first chapter of the thesis lays out key background information related to the 
economic and financial environment of the GCC economies, necessary to fully 
comprehend the complexities that over-reliance on a particular resource can generate. The 
second chapter focuses on the economic impact of oil by offering an investigation as to 
whether the resource curse is observed for the GCC and other OPEC members. A system-
GMM method is adopted to account for any omitted variable bias and endogeneity issues. 
Furthermore, classification trees are used to divide the countries based on their oil level 




country differences in terms of the per capita oil reserve and oil rent, the two oil proxies 
used. 
The third chapter examines the role of oil in the financial sector of the GCC and OPEC 
markets. In particular, we rely on the well-established and relevant given the Global 
Financial Crisis, framework of financial contagion to investigate: i) how affected were the 
GCC stock markets; ii) what has been the role of oil in the transmission of the financial 
shocks. We use an asymmetric multivariate GARCH framework which allows for 
dynamic properties of correlations across the financial markets. Our results suggest that 
GCC markets were affected by financial contagion, while the oil has been an important 
transmission channel of varying intensity during the phases of the crisis. The UAE, which 
have the largest and most progressive financial sector in the region, have been the most 
affected, while Kuwait has been the least. 
A fourth chapter provides critical reflections and discussion around the results. In 
particular, it highlights the steps that, particularly the GCC governments have taken to 
ensure that their resource abundance is not a curse over the past couple of years. Most 
importantly, the GCC governments have been diversifying their income streams into 
tourism, manufacturing, real estate and financial services. The impact of oil on the GCC 
financial sector is of particular importance as financial services are one of the main 
business lines that the local governments have been investing and promoting in their 
attempt to diversify their income generating process away from oil and gas. A fifth 
chapter concludes. 
Keywords: Resource Curse, GMM, GCC, Financial Contagion, Oil, GARCH 
JEL Classification: C53; C32; C14; C15; G12; C5; G1; Q
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Energy resources such as oil and its refined components have been essential to the growth 
and integration of the global economy in both the 20th and 21st century. The overall 
situation and importance of the international oil market was shaped significantly by the 
sustained demand for oil after the Second World War, as oil was the main energy 
resource required to rebuild the European and Japanese war-torn economies and that of 
the US, which with only 6% of the world population consumed a third of the total global 
oil production. This increased demand moved the oil production’s centre of gravity of 
from the Western hemisphere to the Middle-East, such that the overall increased 
economic activity across the globe caused the demand for oil from the Middle East to 
grow at a sustained pace.  
Although there proved to be abundant supplies available in the Middle East to replace 
declining US production, the transition from a world petroleum market centred in the 
Gulf of Mexico to the one centred in the Persian Gulf did not go smoothly. This led to the 
creation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which was 
formed in 1960 by oil-producing countries, namely: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela. The organization's purpose was to unify and coordinate its members' 
petroleum policies so that fair and stable prices would be secured for petroleum producers 
and supply to consumers would be efficient and economical. However, the real transition 




had no limit to the amount of oil they could produce. Subsequent to this, Qatar, Indonesia, 
Libya, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria and Nigeria had become members of OPEC by 
the end of 1971.  At July 2016, OPEC has 14 member countries: six in the Middle 
East (Western Asia), one in Southeast Asia, five in Africa, and two in South America. In 
its first ten years of existence, the only major achievement of OPEC was to prevent 
further cuts in oil prices. According to 2015 estimates, almost 73% of the world's proven 
oil reserves are located in OPEC Member Countries, with the bulk of OPEC oil reserves 
being in the Middle East, amounting to 66% of the OPEC total (OPEC, 2016).  
The annual consumption per country, per year has been on the steady increase. Over the 
past 15 years alone the annual global consumption of oil has increased by 10,000 barrels 
per year (See Figure 1).  
[Figure 1 here] 
This increased consumption, along with a decade long of stable high oil prices, has led to 
a substantial increase in petro-dollar income, thereby allowing OPEC member states to 
develop investment programs in their national economies. Some of the OPEC countries 
have been able to implement this investment program to their benefit by using the 
revenue generated from oil to create foundations for sustained economic growth and 
investing in non-oil sectors in order to reduce dependence on oil and so to avoid the 
retrenchment in economic activity due to oil price shocks.  
However, a growing body of the literature has been pointing at the phenomenon that oil, 
which is one of the vital resource commodities for the sustainable growth of modern 
developed economies, can sometimes become a curse for those countries that produce it. 
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This resource-curse syndrome or phenomenon is gaining traction because various studies 
have been able to document that countries that are rich in energy resources such as 
hydrocarbons and other natural resources, witness a slower economic growth over the 
long haul as opposed to countries that are less endowed. The relationship between 
resource abundance and economic and social development is becoming a subject of 
intense debate in recent years. Despite the historically positive association of natural 
resource abundance and industrial growth in many now-advanced countries, the literature 
covering less developed countries since the 1950s has largely drawn the opposite 
conclusion (Gelb, 1988; Auty, 1993; Ross, 1999; Luong and Weinthal, 2001; Bayülgen, 
2005; Luong and Weinthal, 2006a; Di John, 2011).  
Petroleum wealth and the extent to which the abundance of this resource affects the 
overall economic performance via different development indicators is the main subject of 
this study, which has been supplemented by an analysis on the trickle-down effects of oil 
price movements in the financial markets of oil exporting countries. Examining the nature 
of the relationship between the energy markets and financial markets, specifically the 
stock market, is again a challenging issue as it is difficult to gauge the extent to which 
asset prices are sensitive to differing economic events.  Studies show(e.g., Kellogg, 2010; 
Stein and Stone, 2010) that when equity markets are scaled down to sector-level 
elements, the response of the equity index to commodity price movements differs, which 
makes the relationship between oil price movements and equity index response all the 
more important for retail and institutional investors. There is a large body of literature 
which has empirically tested the effects of oil price changes on the economies of both oil 




investment decisions are linked (Bernanke, 1983; Hooker, 1996; Hamilton, 1996; 
Bjornland, 2000; Hamilton, 2003; Barsky and Kilian, 2004; Kellogg, 2010; Stein and 
Stone, 2010). The large consensus of these studies is that the linkage between oil price 
volatility or a surge in oil prices results in a negative outcome for the economies of the oil 
importing countries (Wanga, Wua and Yang, 2013), whereas the same surge in oil prices 
leads to positive economic outcomes for the oil exporting countries (Arouri and Rault, 
2012; Degiannakis, Filis and Kizys, 2014). This notion negates resource endowment as a 
curse. This thesis thus attempts to investigate how oil affects the economic development 
of oil exporting countries from two differing viewpoints, giving a meaningful discourse to 
the oil curse theory.  
1.1 Motivation 
The choice of analysing the presence of oil as a curse or a blessing and its implications 
for the financial and economic development of OPEC countries stems from the following 
main reasons: 
Firstly, the phenomenon of citing oil as a ‘blessing’ or a ‘curse’ remains a conundrum for 
OPEC countries. Several studies have been devoted to ascertain the presence of a 
‘resource-curse’ in resource abundant countries. The last two to three decades have 
witnessed the emergence of a significant body of literature analysing the relationship 
between resource abundance, economic underperformance and other negative effects in 
terms of bad governance and corruption. However, there has been a counter narrative 
argument posed by the critics of the resource curse theory, who point to countries such as 




unresolved debate is one of the main motivations behind choosing oil-curse as the subject 
of this thesis.  
Secondly, oil price volatility in recent times is a reminder that oil might act as a resource 
curse for oil exporting countries – specifically those economies that are overly dependent 
on petro-dollar revenue. Additionally, increased uncertainty with regard to the outlook for 
oil prices in the medium term – due to a slowdown in the Chinese demand as well as a 
major glut in the international oil market – makes it all the more relevant to analyse the 
effect of oil price movements on economic performance and development in the OPEC 
countries.   
This study aims to add to the existing empirical literature, presenting theoretical and 
empirical arguments that will show to what extent the oil curse is present or absent in the 
14 different OPEC countries. The study will be supplemented by an analysis of the 
volatility spill over effect of crude oil prices on the stock markets of oil exporting 
countries. An empirical investigation of the presence or absence of a financial contagion 
of oil price volatility in the OPEC countries will help us ascertain the extent to which oil 
can affect the financial markets in oil exporting countries. It is hoped that the outcome of 
this study will help policy makers determine whether the growth induced by oil revenue is 
sustainable or not and become aware of the imminent need to take steps to reduce overall 
reliance on endowed resources so as to avoid the resource curse. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized into three chapters, of which the first one, this introductory 
chapter, presents an economic review of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) and OPEC 
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countries and an overview of the financial markets in the GCC and Saudi Arabia that is 
relevant to the subject of this study.  
Chapter 2 examines the presence of the oil curse in the GCC and OPEC countries, in 
order to evaluate and gauge to what extent their economic and social development is due 
to the presence of oil. The contribution and objectives of the chapter are three-fold: first, 
the presence of the oil curse is investigated in all GCC and OPEC economies, utilizing an 
extended set of economic and social variables by using both parametric (panel methods) 
and non-parametric (regression trees) approaches. The use of such extended variables and 
various methodologies enhances the robustness of results and aims at shedding light on 
the dynamics of the oil curse in each of the countries under scrutiny. Our results provide 
evidence that refutes the oil curse and this conclusion still holds when different country 
clubs – whether they are countries with a low or medium or high oil level – are taken into 
account in our panel data analysis. In fact, in certain cases oil may be seen as a blessing 
for the 14 countries in the data sample.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the oil price volatility in the GCC and OPEC countries, 
investigating the contagion effects of the oil price movement on the financial markets in 
the countries being studied. The main objective is to assess the spill over impact of oil 
price shocks on the financial markets. The stock markets based in the GCC are compared 
with those of three non-GCC countries who are OPEC members, to identify the spill over 
effects from oil and to gauge the impact of oil price volatility on the financial markets. 
The DCC-GARCH (Dynamic Conditional Correlation) model is used to capture the time-
varying nature of correlations and volatilities of oil prices on the stock market behaviour 




prevalent in the financial markets of the entire sample of the countries under study. It is 
also observed that GCC stock markets show statistical evidence of financial contagion, 
with Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia being severely affected by the oil price shocks. An 
interesting observation is that some of the countries show evidence of decoupling, a 
process where following a crisis, the correlation between the financial markets and the 
change in oil price is minimal. 
1.3 Background Information 
OPEC member countries produce about 40 percent of the world's crude oil and OPEC's 
oil exports represent about 60 percent of the total petroleum traded internationally. 
According to current estimates, more than 80% of the world’s proven crude oil reserves 
are located in the OPEC member countries, with the bulk of OPEC oil reserves being in 
the Middle East, and amounting to 65% of the OPEC total (OPEC, 2016) (see Figure 2 
here). 
[Figure 2 here] 
The rise in oil prices since 2002, which lasted until mid-2014, led to significant 
improvements in the external and fiscal balances of most net oil exporters (see Figure 3 
here). Although the oil exporting countries benefitted the most from this 11-year oil price 
rally, the oil slump in the past two years from mid-June 2014 until now is having far-
reaching consequences for business and economics in those same oil exporting countries. 
The economies of some of the oil exporting countries that rely heavily on oil exports have 
been hit particularly hard, as seen in the comparison between OPEC and non-OPEC 




[Figure 3 and Table 1 here] 
The differences in the major economic indicators between the OPEC and non-OPEC 
economies are explained by the fact that oil exports are a high proportion of the total 
exports of these economies (see Table 1). This is also precisely the reason why a 
significant fall in the current account balances was observed for the OPEC member 
countries. It shows that heavy reliance on the oil and gas sector can be an impediment to 
the growth prospects of the OPEC member countries. However, the oil trade balance as a 
percentage of GDP differs from region to region, hence the economic growth and 
indicators of different regions are likely to have been impacted differently (see Figure 4). 
[Table 1 and Figure 4 here] 
1.4 Macro-Economic Review  
A brief overview of the key macroeconomic indicators of OPEC countries shows the 
extent to which these economies have been able to use oil as a blessing and to their 
advantage. In the light of the current oil crisis, a quick preview of these key indicators can 
show the extent to which these economies can sustain themselves if the new normal of oil 
prices was to remain low given the supply glut by other non-OPEC members. 
The oil exporters in the GCC showed a remarkable increase in the real GDP growth in the 
years 2007 and 2010, which can be attributed to the increasing oil prices leading to the 
global financial crisis in 2008. The global financial crisis only temporarily halted the 
upward trend in the oil prices, which regained their ground within one year. However this 
annual percentage change in real GDP plunged down in 2014 and 2015 due to the oil 
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price volatility (see Figure 5). This signifies that a fall in oil prices has led to a major 
draw-down in government expenditure which is having far-reaching consequences on all 
sectors ranging from banks and services to manufacturing; this inevitably affects the real 
GDP growth, which has gone down significantly. With dwindling oil revenues, the focus 
should move away from government expenditures to the private sector, which should 
harness the non-oil growth and job creation and become the driving force moving it 
forward. 
With the exception of Angola and Nigeria, the oil exporting countries of the GCC have 
been able to sustain low inflation rates (see Figure 6). Low inflation was observed in the 
GCC region, with the exception of 2007, which was largely attributed to the depreciation 
of the US dollar against other major currencies and since most of the currencies in the 
GCC are pegged to the dollar, slight inflationary pressure was seen in these countries. 
They have been using prudent and fiscal and monetary policies and also encouraged 
channelling the petro-dollar income into developing the non-oil sectors.  
[Figures 7 and 8] 
The OPEC countries witnessed huge surpluses on their trade and current accounts from 
2005 to 2014 (See Figure 7). A comparison of the current account balance (CAB) 
between OPEC and non-OPEC developing countries for the period 2014 shows the extent 
to which the OPEC countries have been ahead of the non-OPEC ones in terms of their 
current account balance (for OPEC countries the current account balance was noted to be 
US$ 238.1 billion whereas for non-OPEC developing countries the CAB was US$ -116.8 
billion) (See Table 2). However, after the fall in oil prices the CAB for OPEC countries 




developing countries’ CAB increased by 43%, rising from US$ -116.8 billion to US$ -
66.2 billion in 2015. This is mainly attributed to the fact that oil exports as a percentage 
of total exports in OPEC countries is very high, compared to non-OPEC developing 
countries. Focusing just on the OPEC member countries, the CAB figures during 2005, 
2010 and 2015 depict an interesting trend (See Figure 8). For example, Saudi Arabia, 
which had the highest CAB during the peak in oil prices, has seen a severe plunge in its 
CAB as opposed to Qatar which also had a high CAB during that peak.  This shows that 
although Qatar and Saudi Arabia are based in the same region, their dependence on oil is 
reflected differently when there is a fall in oil prices. This directs attention to the fact that 
oil exporting countries which have the highest exports as a percentage of the country’s 
total exports, or as a share of the total OPEC exports, are likely to show differing trends 
(see Figure 9). This shows Saudi Arabia’s high reliance on its oil exports and indicates 
that it will continue to see the effects of lower oil prices and increasingly a trickle-down 
effect on the non-oil economy as spending on capital projects are reduced and subsidies 
are scaled back. 
[Figure 9 and 10 here] 
1.5 Financial market overview 
1.5.1 GCC, Nigeria, Ecuador and Venezuela  
The stock markets of the OPEC member countries which are under study for this research 
showed moderate economic growth albeit at a decreasing pace. The main impetus behind 
the stock markets in the GCC was linked to the increased economic activity in the private 




Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE have developed, compared to 2010, and the Index 
compiler MSCI upgraded Qatar and the United Arab Emirates from frontier market to 
emerging market status, effective from May 2014. The Qatar and Bahrain stock markets 
showed the highest market capitalization as a share of GDP at the end of 2015 (see Table 
2). However, the S&P indices for all the given countries showed a negative percentage 
change from 2014 to 2015. This can be mainly attributed to the volatility in oil markets 
during that period and signifies the trickle-down effect on the stock markets in the OPEC 
member countries. In 2015, Nigeria and Ecuador, the two non-GCC OPEC member 
countries, showed a dismal performance in terms of turnover and market capitalization as 
compared to 2010. Moreover, the S&P indices in these markets experienced the greatest 
fall, with 23% and 27 % for Ecuador and Nigeria respectively.                                          














Figure 1: The Annual Global Consumption of Oil 
Source: Enerdata (2016) 
17 
Figure 2: OPEC Share of World Crude Oil Reserves, 2015 
18 
Figure 3: Crude Oil Price Evolution, 2015 
Source: Bloomberg (2016) 
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Figure 4: OPEC oil export revenues vs value of total exports (bn $) 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2016) 
20 
Figure 5: Oil Trade Balance for Fuel Exporters--------------------------------------------------- 
21 
Figure 6: Annual Real GDP Growth in OPEC member countries 
22 
Figure 7: Inflation (CPI (%)) Rate in OPEC member countries 
23 
Figure 8: Current Account Balances in total OPEC ($ US billion) 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2016) 
24 
Figure 9: Current Account Balances in total OPEC Members ($ US billion) 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2016) 
25 
Figure 10: Values of Petroleum Exports as a Share of Total OPEC, 2015 (per cent) 
Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (2016) 
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Table 1: Comparison of Macroeconomic Performance of OPEC and non-OPEC Developing Countries 
2014 2015 
OPEC Non-OPEC OPEC Non-OPEC 
Real GDP growth rate (%) 2.9 3.8 2.3 3.1 
Petroleum export value (US $ bn) 956.2 380.9 518.2 243.7. 
Value of non-petroleum exports (US 
$ bn) 
648.4 3,011.2 618.8 2,743.5 
Oil exports as percentage of total 
exports (%) 
59.6 11.2 45.6 8.2 
Value of imports (US $ bn) 1,062.7 3,829.2 970.0 3,361.1 
Current account balance (US $ bn) 238.1 -116.8 -99.6 -66.2
Crude oil production (mb/d) 30.8 9.4 31.8 9.6
Reserves, excluding gold (US $ bn) 1,508.6 2,716.3 1,294.2 2,726.2 
Source: OPEC Annual Report (2015) .. 
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Table 2: Key Stock Market Indicators 
Market Capitalization Market Liquidity 




 Listed domestic     
number 
S&P/Global Equity 
$ millions % of GDP % of GDP % of 
market 
            % change 
2010 2015 2010 2015 2010 2015 2010 2015 2010 2015 2014              2015 
Bahrain 20,060 19,251 78 59.7 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.5 44 44 4.1 -12.3
Ecuador .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 0.7 -23.4
Kuwait 119,620 .. 99.74 .. 13.9 23.2 .. .. 215 0 -8.7 -18.3
Nigeria 50,546 49,974 13.7 10.4 1.4 0.8 10.1 8.2 215 183 -31.9 -26.8
Oman 28,316 41,123 48.3 58.5 5.6 5.1 11.7 8.7 114 116 -3.6 -12.8
Qatar 76,531 142,556 66.4 85.4 14.7 14.5 63 16.9 43 43 23 -18.6
Saudi 
Arabia 
353,410 421,060 67.1 65.2 38.2 67.6 56.9 103.8 146 171 -6.5 -17.7
UAE 131,491 195,874 46 52.9 9.7 15.6 21.1 29.4 104 125 12.7 -18.1
Venezuela, 
RB 
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 55 37 .. ..
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Chapter 2 
Resource Curse in Oil Exporting Countries: Fact or Fiction 
Abstract 
The negative relationship between natural resource abundance and economic growth of a 
country has been termed as the resource curse. One of the most important natural 
resources for a country’s economy has been oil, and consequently is the one resource that 
has been studied the most in this context. However, mixed findings in the literature do not 
offer a solid conclusion as to whether the oil abundance in a country is a “curse” or a 
“blessing”. 
Against this background, this chapter contributes to the current empirical literature by 
examining the presence of an oil curse and exploring the joint impact of oil with other 
factors on the per capita GDP growth, with the focus on 14 oil exporting countries listed 
in both the GCC and OPEC over the period 1980 - 2014. The Arellano-Bond difference 
Panel GMM method is adopted to account for any omitted variable bias and endogeneity 
issues. Traditional random/fixed effects estimators are also considered in the panel data 
analysis to highlight the benefits of adopting the difference GMM approach and also 
maintain a large degree of comparability with the literature. Furthermore, we make use of 
the method of classification trees to divide the countries based on their oil level and re-
consider the association between oil and per capita GDP by accounting for the country 
differences in terms of the per capita oil reserve as well as oil rent.  
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Our results suggest that there is no significant evidence of an oil resource curse in our 
sample. This is robust to alternative specifications, an array of macroeconomic and 
socioeconomic indicators, which have been considered in the literature.  
Keywords:  JEL Classification: C53; C32; C14; C15; G12 
2.1 Introduction and Motivation 
It has been universally accepted that natural resource wealth is not always a blessing. In 
some empirical cases, it goes hand-in-hand with poverty, corruption, environmental 
damage and civil conflict and does not function well in accelerating economic 
development. Among a various range of natural resources, crude oil is undoubtedly the 
most important one and thus attracts substantial interest of researchers and policy makers. 
In general, great poverty and impoverishment in spite of abundant oil resource wealth is 
the so-called paradox of plenty or the oil curse. 
As pointed out by Ross (2012), before 1980, there was almost no evidence for the 
presence of oil curse. Among the developing countries, the oil members are similar to 
their non-oil counterparts in the way that they had authoritarian governments and were 
trapped by civil wars. However, since 1980, non-oil countries in the developing world 
have generally become more affluent, democratic and peaceful, while the oil countries, 
mainly located in the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and Asia, do not seem to 
progress in these aspects and the economic situations in some of the listed areas are even 
worse. It is also worth noting that not all countries with abundant oil resources are found 
to exhibit the oil curse. Examples are Norway, Canada and Great Britain, which have 
extracted amounts of oil but maintain strong economies and high incomes. The most 
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extreme case is the United States, which has been both one of the global leading oil 
producers and the largest economy in the world. Against this background, the most 
complicated impact of this curse is observed in the oil countries in the developing world. 
The regions own more than 50 percent of the world’s recorded oil reserves but they also 
drop behind the other countries not only in terms of economies, but also in terms of 
democracy, gender equality, education and so on. On the plus side, the substantial oil 
resource has helped some countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Oman to make 
dramatic economic enhancements in a short time period; thus promoting development in 
other fields.  
Given the mixed effects of the oil resource, this paper concentrates on the situations in 
countries listed in both the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Organisation of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). In specific, our sample countries include 
Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Venezuela. We examine the presence of 
the oil curse among these countries using different oil proxies, i.e. per capita oil reserve 
and oil rent, for the robustness of empirical results. Based on a panel data analysis, our 
paper applies both the popular random effects estimator and the Arellano-Bond 
generalised method of moments (GMM) technique. The latter dominates the former in 
dealing with the endogeneity problems induced in the procedure we undertake. In 
addition, we exploit the method of classification trees to split the sample countries 
according to their level of oil abundance and account for the differences in countries’ oil 
resources in our panel data investigation, which allows us to further evaluate the effects 
of the oil reserve on economic development. Notably, we also include a range of 
31 
economic variables to measure the effects on economies of education, health, democracy, 
openness, the role of government and so on.  Our paper contributes to the existing 
empirical literature in a number of aspects. First, we look at the most important energy 
resource, oil, for both GCC and OPEC countries over a relatively long time period. 
Second, we investigate the oil curse by employing various panel-data techniques to 
ensure the robustness of the empirical results. As far as we are concerned, this is the first 
paper which employs the method of classification tree to split countries according to their 
oil abundance. Third, this paper selects variables for empirical analysis according to the 
neoclassical growth theory and thus is able to take a closer look at the effect of different 
factors on economic development.  
This chapter consists of 6 sections of which this is the first. Section 2 describes the 
sample data. Section 3 outlines the methodology and the hypothesis to be tested. Results 
are presented and interpreted in section 4. Conclusions are discussed in section 5.  
2.2 Background Information: The Resource Curse 
The resource curse is a well-documented phenomenon in the natural resource-exporting 
economies, whereby economies that are rich in natural resources have been found to 
exhibit low economic growth despite their advantageous situation. Historically, it has 
been documented in studies by Gelb (1988), Auty (1990), Sachs and Warner (1995), and 
Gylfason et al. (1999) that economies endowed with natural resources tend to 
underperform economically relative to expectations. Alongside poor economic growth, 
these economies are in a worse than expected social and political situation. As Ross 
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(2014, p.250) puts it, “The perverse effects of a country’s natural resource wealth on its 
economic, social, or political well-being”.  
In this section, we give a brief historic overview to the resource curse and present the 
most prominent explanations that have been put forward in the literature.  
2.2.1 History of the resource curse 
The interest in the impact of great wealth goes back to the fourteenth century when the 
Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun identifies the fifth stage of the state as one of waste and 
squandering (Gates, 1967). Two centuries later, French philosopher Jean Bodin praises 
the citizens of infertile lands by stating that “Men of a fat and fertile soil are most 
commonly effeminate and cowards; whereas contrariwise a barren country makes men 
temperate by necessity, and by consequence careful, vigilant and industrious.” (Cited in 
Sachs and Warner, 1999, p. 14). 
In the Golden Age of resource-based development between 1870 and 1914, the 
conventional thinking was that natural resource abundance is a benefit for development. 
In fact, many resource-rich countries such as the United States and Germany 
outperformed resource-poor countries (Auty 1993; 2000; 2001a). Rostow (1960) argued 
that large natural resource endowments would enable developing countries to make the 
transition from an underdevelopment stage to that of an industrial ‘take-off’, just as 
happened with countries like Australia, the United States, and Britain. 
Scepticism on the negative impacts of being producers and exporters of natural resources 
on economies emerged during the 1950s and 1960s (Prebisch, 1950, 1964). Singer (1950) 
argued that primary product exporting countries would find themselves disadvantaged in 
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trading with the industrialized countries because of deteriorating terms of trade. 
Furthermore, Hirschman (1958), Seers (1964) and Baldwin (1966) reinforced this 
negative consequence by arguing that linkages from primary product exports would be 
limited compared to manufacturing. In contrast, Roemer (1970) and Lewis (1989) argue 
that primary products could promote growth. In general, natural resources were seen as a 
blessing, not as a curse in developing countries. 
The oil crises in the 1970s shifted the focus to the oil exporting countries. Some of these 
resource-rich countries stagnated as a result of the changes in the world economy 
following the oil crises since the large-scale revenues could not be sustained once oil 
prices plummeted. Naturally this put a halt in the development prospects of these 
countries, while at the same time the academic literature on oil and hydrocarbons 
resources emerged (Mabro and Monroe, 1974; Mabro, 1980; Neary and Van Wijnbergen, 
1986).  
Arguments about the beneficial role of natural resource endowments on a country’s 
industrial development were put forward by Balassa (1980), Drake (1972) and Krueger 
(1980), disregarding the oil crises experience of the oil producing economies. However, 
Gelb et al. (1988) offered an alternative explanation, and were the first to use the term 
‘curse’. The explanation, which was formalized by Auty (1993), was based on a negative 
relationship between the endowment of natural resources and economic growth.  
Since then, a large body of studies employing a variety of methodological approaches has 
examined the link between natural resources and economic growth. In particular, the 
influential research by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 1999, 2001), who were the first to 
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investigate the curse empirically using different countries and periods. These studies 
solidified the existence of a resource curse, while extending its repercussions at other 
parts of an economy with demographic, social and political impacts.  
Despite the evidence surrounding the negative relationship between natural resource 
endowment and economic growth, there has been a lack of understanding on why this 
phenomenon occurs. As a result, several theories have emerged in an attempt to explain 
why the resource curse occurs. 
The interest on the resource curse has reached a wider audience, including non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), who are mainly concerned with the treatment of 
natural resources (especially non-renewable ones) as well as achieving the best use of 
them in promoting economic growth and society welfare (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; 
Collier, 2010). A growing attention on behalf of policy makers is also warranted given the 
oil price volatility between 1998 and 2006 as well as the sustained low oil prices around 
2014 onwards that jeopardise economic planning in the resource rich economies. 
2.3 Explanations of the resource curse 
2.3.1 The Dutch disease 
The term ‘Dutch Disease’ was coined in the 1960s to describe the collapse of the 
Netherlands’ manufacturing sector following the discovery of a Groningen natural gas 
field. This term is used in a narrower meaning, as defined by Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001) 
who state that “a failure of resource-abundant economies to promote a competitive 
manufacturing sector” (In Stevens et al, 2015, p.14), but over time, the term ‘Dutch 
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disease’ was given a broader meaning to involve all negative macroeconomic effects 
related to the resource curse. The classical version of the Dutch Disease was first 
modelled by Corden and Neary (1982). Corden (1984) developed a model that showed 
how capital moves away from non-oil sectors, thus reducing their competitiveness, often 
in conjunction with an exchange rate appreciation.  
Furthermore, existence of the Dutch Disease can be harmful to any economy in many 
different ways. It can slow the competitiveness in industrialization and delay the 
absorption of excess rural labour as argued by Auty (2007), and can be inhibited from 
being the main driving force within the economy (Fosu, 1996). Frankel and Romer (1999) 
argued that the Dutch Disease could slow down economic growth by hindering exports in 
manufacturing and service sectors. Ismail (2010) reported an average fall of 3.4% in 
value added in manufacturing recorded with every 10% oil windfall profits. Herbertsson 
et al. (1999) explained that existence of the Dutch Disease could affect all economic 
sectors based on the results from the domestic supply shocks in Iceland. In addition, 
Gylfason et al. (1999) showed that a natural resource boom is associated with raw-
material exports that can raise real exchange rate and reduce manufacturing and service-
exports; thus reducing investment in the tradable sector as well as goods and services 
imports and exports.   
However, the resource curse is often presented as a symptom of the Dutch disease, 
thereby failing to fulfil its purpose of explaining the resource curse. For example, 
decreasing in savings and physical investment (Gylfason, 2001; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 
2007), restricted entrepreneurship (Sachs and Warner, 2001), as well as lowered 
investment in human capital and education (Gylfason, 2001; Birdsall et al., 2001; Bravo-
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Ortega and Gregorio, 2007) cannot be explained solely by the Dutch disease, yet these are 
fundamental repercussions of the resource curse.  
Mikesell (1997), Leite and Weidmann (2002), and Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian (2003) 
concluded that the Dutch disease was not the major deterrent of economic growth in most 
of the countries investigated. By contrast, Conway and Gelb (1988) and Gelb et al., 
(1988) found an improvement in manufacturing and agriculture sectors in the case of 
Algeria, and an exchange rate depreciation at the same time. In addition, Sarraf and 
Jiwanji (2001) argue that de-industrialization may be the result of adjustment towards a 
new equilibrium in the economy and not because of the Dutch disease phenomena. In 
addition, some countries like Australia, Norway and the United Kingdom managed to 
diversify their economies to prevent the long-term negative effects. Consequently, a 
decline in the level of manufacturing (e.g., in the Netherlands) can neither be attributed to 
the increased level of spending on social services nor any resource curse.  
2.3.2 Rent seeking behaviour 
Rent seeking behaviour refers to a situation where an individual or a firm works towards 
increasing their own share of wealth without necessarily increasing the overall level of 
wealth (Baland and Francois, 2000). Deacon (2011, p.125) defined rent seeking as “the 
process whereby competing political interests expend economically valuable resources to 
obtain government favours”. Krueger (1974) develops the rent seeking concept to explain 
activities that would develop the institutions on the basis of specific rents, and it is a key 
part of the social activity. This type of behaviour can lead a country’s economic situation 
to be worse off (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004). 
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There are a large number of studies on how rent seeking can determine how the economy 
operates (Svennsson, 2000; Torvick, 2002, Mehlum et al., 2006). Torvik (2002), Sandbu 
(2006), and Robinson et al. (2006) argued that the negative impact on economic growth 
caused by activities of rent seeking is linked with abundance of natural resource. Torvik 
(2002) shows that as the number of entrepreneurs involved in rent seeking behaviour 
increases, a decrease in economic growth is expected. In addition, Auty (1998) and 
McMahon (1997) findings indicated that an increase in natural resources would result in 
lowering the welfare of the economy.  
Auty (1998) argued that rent seeking behaviour diverts attention from long-term 
development goals towards maximizing rent creation activities. Tornell and Lane (1999) 
conclude that in the resource rich economies, the rent seeking behaviour will cause the 
growth rate to fall as a result of capital reallocation to less productive sectors that are safe 
from taxation. Meanwhile, Sachs and Warner (1997) added that rent seeking would lower 
growth along the steady state, by lowering steady state income. In addition, rent seeking 
can create a powerful lobby that can hinder the progress of economic reform, and this 
could raise the social costs of development (Wenders, 1987). 
Rent seeking has often been regarded as being inherently linked to perverse fiscal 
redistribution, inefficient capital projects and corruption. The relation between extensive 
rent seeking and corruption in business and government was explained by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1993) who argued that this relationship can distort the allocation of resources and 
reduce both economic efficiency and social equity.  
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2.3.3 Institutions Quality 
Economic development of a country can be affected by the effectiveness of the 
government and its institutions’ merits, such as the level of corruption and the 
applicability of a rule of law (Ross, 2014). In resource-rich economies it is often 
evidenced that the government (often made up by dictators) abuses its power, which 
adversely affects economic performance. In particular, Gelb et al. (1988) argues that 
resource revenues are often committed by national governments to supporting existing 
political and economic institutions. Moreover, a study by Mauro (1995) concludes that 
resource dependence is strongly associated with a high corruption index and lower 
economic growth. In fact, as Lei and Michaels (2014) and Arezki et al. (2015) argue large 
oil discoveries are increasing the incidence of armed conflict by five to eight percentage 
point. A tendency of naturally rich resource countries to become involved in international 
conflict, or indeed to be the target of international conflict has also been highlighted 
(Stijns, 2005). 
The prevalence of non-democratic governments in resource-rich economies has been 
highlighted in Mavrotas et al. (2006) and Ross (1999, 2001a), inter alia. Also, these 
economies will suffer from a wider list of perils including low quality education, rising 
unemployment, income inequalities as well as poor quality health services, public sector 
infrastructure and foreign policy (Gylfason, 2001; Birdsall et al., 2001; Bravo-Ortega and 
Gregorio, 2007; Cao et al., 2015). Many studies have investigated the link between 
institutional efficiency and economic growth in resource-rich countries either focusing on 
a regional/global level, see for example Ades and Di Tella (1999), Treisman (2000), Leite 
and Weidmann (2002), Serra (2006), Ross (2001a), Barro (1999), Aslaksen (2010), 
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Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) or on specific countries including Colombia (Angrist 
and Kugler, 2008), Nigeria (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003), Congo (Acemoglu et 
al., 2003), São Tomé and Cape Verde (Vicente, 2010), Brazil (Caselli and Michaels, 
2013) and the US (Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2007) among others. 
By contrast, Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) document a positive relationship between 
institutional quality, saving/investment rates and per capita GDP. In sum, the resource 
curse can be turned into a blessing with existence of efficient institutions (Atkinson and 
Hamilton, 2003; Mehlum et al., 2006; Robinson et al., 2006; Sarr et al., 2011).  
2.4 Resource curse: Empirical evidence 
It is crucial to understand the nature of the relationship between natural resource 
abundance and economic growth as this will help to understand the determinants of 
economic growth and the measurement of sustainability. Therefore, a large body of 
literature has focused on the causes of the resource curse.  
A large number of studies investigate the negative correlation between natural resource 
abundance and economic growth (for example: Gelb, 1988; Ranis, 1991; Matsuyama, 
1992; Auty 1993, 2001a; Bulmer-Thomas, 1994; Sachs and Warner, 1995, 1997, 1998; 
Karl 1997; Luong and Weinthal, 2006; ODI, 2006; Rosser, 2006; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 
2007; Frankel, 2012; Gylfason, 2001; Bhattacarya and Hodler, 2010; James and Aadland, 
2011).  Most of these studies confirm that a negative relation between natural resource 
abundance (i.e., resource curse) on economic growth is observed.  
The identification of what constitutes a natural resource with regards to the resource curse 
and whether different resources affect economic growth differently has been investigated 
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in Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian (2003), Bulte et al. (2005), Isham et al. (2005), and 
Mavrotas et al. (2006) and Isham et al.’s (2003) for resources including oil, minerals, 
plantation crops, coffee and cocoa. 
Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) were the first to conduct an empirical study of the curse 
using a cross-country analysis, to investigate what they called a ‘puzzle’ and ‘oddity’. 
Their studies’ findings resulted in the confirmation of a significant strong negative 
relationship between the ratio of primary exports to Gross National Product (GNP), as a 
proxy for resource endowment, and the growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per 
capita. In particular they investigated the negative link between resource endowment and 
economic growth in a sample of 95 developing countries over the period 1970-1990. 
They found that only two countries, namely Malaysia and Mauritius, sustained 2% per 
annum economic growth during 1970-1980, while for the rest of the countries considered; 
the results confirm the negative correlation. Since the works of Sachs and Warner (1995, 
1997), the resource curse phenomenon has been confirmed by a vast number of studies 
(Gylfason et al., 1999; Ross, 1999; Auty, 2001a; Papyrakis and Gerlagh, 2004; Mehlum 
et al., 2006; Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2009, 2016) documenting the significant 
negative relationship between resource dependency in the economy and the GDP; thereby 
giving evidence in support of the resource curse.  
The negative effect of the natural resource curse was not a definite in all cases; some 
studies couldn’t identify the direct impact of natural resource on economic growth. Sachs 
and Warner’s (2001) study pointed out that the resource curse has no direct impact on the 
nature of wealth; they added that extensive wealth minimizes the growth of the economy 
particularly through crowding out promoting growth activities. De Ferranti et al. (2002) 
 41 
added that negative economic growth is a reason for dependence on primary commodities 
exports and not as a result of resource effects on government investment, education or 
crowding out effect of manufacturing or entrepreneurship. In addition, Maloney (2002) 
argues that the economic growth process happens across a very long time and cannot be 
summarized and concluded by cross-section regression for a short period of time. 
Furthermore, Larsen (2005) examined the relationship between the richness of Norway 
and the resource curse using structural break techniques and data from 1960 to 2002. 
Results confirmed that after discovery of oil, Norway accelerated its GDP per capita 
growth relatively to GDP per capita of Denmark and Sweden. More studies have 
questioned the existence of the resource curse, including Davis (1995), Gylfason (2001), 
Sarraf and Jiwanji’s (2001), Stijns (2005), Brunnschweiler (2008) and Neumayer (2004) 
for a variety of countries, time periods, measures and techniques. 
Corden and Neary (1982), Neary and Van Wijnbergen (1986), Gelb (1988) and Auty 
(1990) are among the first studies to highlight some of the economic and political causes 
that might be behind the poor economic performance of resource-rich economies. Gelb et 
al. (1988) and Auty (1993) focused on macroeconomic policies, while Mehlum et al.’s 
(2006) results illustrated how failed policies and weak institution can facilitate corruption 
and decrease growth. Relatedly, Yaduma et al. (2013) tested the robustness of the 
resource curse using genuine income measures1 of economic output as an indicator of 
sustainable development, as well as GDP. The existence of an oil curse was investigated 
for 49 OECD and non-OECD oil-exporting economies from 1980 to 2007, by applying a 
dynamic panel growth regression model. Their results suggest that oil abundance is a 
                                                          
1 Genuine Income is defined as Gross National Income (GNI) less physical and natural capital depreciation. 
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blessing rather than a curse but only for the OECD countries. On the contrary, oil 
abundance is a curse in the non-OECD economies. More recently, Papyrakis (2016) 
argues that the impact of the resource curse goes beyond economic growth; hence human 
development indices and sustainability indicators need to be taken into account. 
2.5 The Resource Curse in Oil Exporting Countries 
Boschini et al. (2007) argued that possibility of the curse could be defined by the type of 
resources. Various studies show that mineral-intensive countries (especially the oil-
endowed ones) seem to fail to achieve a high level of economic growth compared to less 
endowed countries. Typically, such are the country-members of the OPEC and GCC 
political unions as well as countries in the MENA region.  
Ross (2014) argued that petroleum has at least three important effects: it makes 
authoritarian regimes more durable, heightens corruption and triggers violent conflicts in 
low and middle-income countries. He stressed that one resource in particular has been 
consistently correlated with corruption, political environment and stability: “petroleum”. 
Studies by Mahdavy (1970), Beblawi (1987), Crystal (1990), Bellin (1994), Yates (1996), 
Chaudhry (1997) Vandewalle (1998), Aslaksen (2010), Tsui (2011), Gassebner et al. 
(2012), Ahmadov, (2013), concluded that oil abundance and prevalence of democracy are 
inversely related, with negative repercussions on economic growth, as discussed in earlier 
sections. 
Badeeb et al. (2016) examined the oil curse in Malaysia, placing emphasis on the indirect 
effect of oil dependence on the finance-growth nexus via the investment quantity and 
efficiency channels. Their findings show a significant direct effect of financial 
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development on economic growth and total factor productivity, and a direct and positive 
effect of financial development and oil dependence on the level of investment. The 
significant negative interaction between financial development and oil dependence 
supported the findings of Doraisami (2004), who argued that Malaysia is affected by the 
oil curse. 
Gelb et al. (1998) study the impact of oil reserves on economic development in six oil-
exporting countries (Algeria, Ecuador, Indonesia, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago and 
Venezuela). Their results show evidence in support of the resource curse in these oil 
exporter countries. Shams’ (1989) results show that “some OPEC countries have a 
negative relationship between oil revenue and GNP in long term and between oil revenue 
and investment in short term” (In Stevens, 2015, p.9). Mikesell (1997) concluded that 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela have lower than average GDP growth rates, while Mexico is 
presented as an example of a country that suffered from the resource curse.  
The Nigeria case is, perhaps, the most dramatic example of a country hit by the resource 
curse (Collier and Gunning, 1999; Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian, 2003). In particular, 
Van Der Ploeg (2011) argues that in spite of the huge oil exports and the increase in oil 
revenues from 33US$/capita in 1965 to 325US$/capita in 2000, Nigeria counted as one of 
the fifteen poorest countries in the world since becoming independent in 1960. Between 
1970 and 2000 part of the Nigerian population has to survive on less than 1 US$ daily. 
Moreover, the Nigerian economy has suffered from a Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
decline of by 1.2% yearly since independence.  
Another example is Venezuela with Agnani & Iza (2011) finding evidence of the resource 
curse over the period 1950 to 2006. When comparing the growth rate of Venezuela with 
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those of Mexico and Norway (major oil exporting countries), the results showed that the 
underperformance characterizing Venezuela has not occurred in other oil-abundant and 
oil-exporting economies such as Mexico and Norway. In addition, the findings of this 
study didn’t support the effect of the magnitude of the oil rents on economic growth, and 
attribute the poor performance of the non-oil sector to bad government policies. 
Escobar and Le Chaffotec (2015) failed to find evidence for a resource curse when 
examining the effects of OPEC membership on economic development. They used per 
capita GDP as the dependent variable, and oil reserves, membership in OPEC, democracy 
index and population as an independent variables. Their results showed that OPEC 
membership exerts a significant and positive impact on the GDP per capita of its 
members. In addition, the findings indicated that the benefits of oil reserve endowment 
are higher for OPEC countries, but these benefits decrease at higher levels of economic 
development.  
Al‐Youssif (1997) examined the relationship between oil exports and economic growth 
for four GCC countries2: Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) for the period 1973‐1993. The findings of this study show that in the short-run 
there are signs of a positive relationship between oil exports and economic growth, but 
this relation disappears in the long run. This study also concluded that the diversification 
of the economies of these four countries was crucial to long‐term economic growth. In 
addition to Al-Youssif’s (1997) study, Harb (2009) found that the oil exports of Kuwait, 
2 The majority of empirical studies focusing on the resource curse did not include the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries as a result of the lack of the data, which became available more recently. Since 
then, various studies emerged in an attempt to investigate the relationship between oil and economic growth 
and the existence of the curse in these countries. 
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Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE did not have a long-run impact on the overall 
performance of the economy. Harb (2009) argued that the oil revenue was not responsible 
for bad economic performance of these countries, but the absence of the relationship 
between natural resources and economic growth. 
Al Awad (2010) examined the role played by manufacturing sector and growth of the 
non-oil economy in the GCC. Results show that manufacturing has strong association 
with non-oil economic growth in GCC over the long run. In the short run, outcomes 
indicated that manufacturing have no significant impact towards stimulating the non-oil 
GDP growth levels, and government spending might be ineffective to obtain non-oil GDP 
growth or stimulating efforts in diversification. At the same time, it was noted that failure 
of industrialization or manufacturing strategies had a strong effect on the growth of non-
oil GDP, and effects of diversification in terms of institutions and policies than income 
availability. Results show that institutions and policies are more significant than 
population and income in promoting the manufacturing sector and differentiate the 
economy away from oil resources. 
Behbudi et al. (2010) examined the relationship between human capital, natural resource 
abundance and economic growth in two groups of oil-exporting countries, namely major 
oil exporters and other oil exporters in the second, using panel data for the period 1970 to 
2004. Their results showed an inverse relationship between natural resource abundance 
and economic growth in both groups. Arezki and Nabli (2012) noted that the resource-
rich nations in the MENA region have experienced low growth of their economy and high 
macroeconomic volatility levels over the past 40 years. They also concluded that major 
reforms in the field governance and institutions are important to achieving economic 
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transformation. In an earlier study, Makdisi et al. (2010) examined the determinants of 
growth in the MENA region and confirmed the existence of the resource curse. According 
to the authors, human capital and institutions’ quality are responsible for lower 
performance of MENA nations. Other studies in the MENA region have found evidence 
in favour of the resource curse, such as Alsayaary (2013), Dreger and Rahmani (2014), 
Driouchi (2014), and Ncube et al (2014). The majority of these studies besides the 
negative link between oil reserves and economic growth, find a negative relation between 
the resource endowment and key social development indicators, such as poverty, rule of 
law and income inequality.  
Some countries have been blessed by the oil. Norway is the world’s third largest oil 
exporter after Saudi Arabia and Russia, but has witnessed remarkable economic growth in 
general, and in manufacturing sector in particular. Furthermore, Norway has well-
developed institutions, market-friendly policies, and it is one of the least corrupted 
countries in the world. Van der Ploeg (2011) argued that with 10% on the world’s crude 
oil and 4% of the world natural gas reserves, United Arab Emirates is one of the GCC 
countries that turned the resource curse into a blessing. Fasano’s (2002) study shows that 
diversity in the economic activities into telecommunications, finance, tourism and light 
manufacturing in Dubai, and concentration in the petrochemical and fertilizers in Abu 
Dhabi made these Emirates have low inflation, modernized infrastructure, job creations, 
free access to education and health care system, and helped them to establish a generous 
welfare system. Apergis and Payne (2014) findings show that after 2003, oil abundance 
became a blessing to economic growth in MENA region, and this can be attributed to 
improvements in institution quality and economic reform strategies implemented. 
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2.6 Methodology 
2.6.1 The resource proxy 
The investigation of the existence of resource curse requires a definition of a measure of 
the resources, i.e., a resource proxy. A large number of studies exist on the topic of 
resource curse, most of which having employed a variety of proxies to capture resource 
abundance. Until today there is no consensus on a universally adopted resource proxy. In 
this section we provide a brief overview of the proxies that have been used, their 
advantages and disadvantages and conclude with our chosen proxies. 
Perhaps the most used proxy for resource abundance has been the share of natural 
resource exports to GDP, first employed by Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997). Many of the 
studies that adopted this proxy support the existence of the resource curse, albeit some 
variation is expected given the variety in independent variables, study period, data and 
econometric techniques. Studies by Davis (1995), Leite and Weidmann (1999), Stijns 
(2000), Lederman and Maloney (2003), Sala-I-Martin and Subramanian (2003), 
Neumayer (2004), Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004), Isham et al. (2005), Brunnschweiler 
and Bulte (2008), Alexeev and Conrad (2009), can be a good example of how the 
variation in variables can yield different results, even though the same resource proxy is 
used. Among the key criticisms of this proxy has been those of Bulte et al. (2005) and 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) who argue that the proxy used by Sachs and Warner 
(1995, 1997) might imperfect in capturing what it is purported to capture and also suffer 
from endogeneity issues. 
Davis (1995) attempted to challenge the results of Sachs and Warner (1995) by using the 
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share of mineral exports in total merchandise exports as the chosen natural resource 
proxy. His results showed a positive relationship between resource abundance and 
economic development; thus contradicting the existence of the resource curse. Other 
studies (e.g., De Soysa, 2000; Stijns, 2000; Gylfason, 2001; Lederman and Maloney, 
2003; Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2008; Alexeev and Conrad’s, 2009), have used the 
Davis (1995) proxy, each failing to confirm the existence of the resource curse. 
Other proxies have been used, such as the worldwide oil discoveries and extractions by 
Cotet and Tsui (2010), the geological variation in oil abundance by Michaels (2011) and 
percentage of rents in government revenue by Herb (2003). The results of these studies 
dismiss the existence of a resource curse. Hence, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) 
showed that the resource curse is detected when using the share of natural resource 
exports to GDP (i.e., the Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, proxy) as the proxy for resource 
abundance. 
Auty (2001a) argued that it is not the different proxy that biases the results, rather what is 
implicitly classified as a natural resource. Auty (2001a) proceeds to distinguish between 
rents derived from “diffuse resources” (e.g., farming) and “point resources” (e.g., 
mining), while stressing that the negative link between resource abundance and economic 
growth is evidenced in the economies dominated by “point resources”; a finding later 
confirmed by Boschini et al. (2007), Isham et al. (2005) and Papyrakis and Gerlagh 
(2004). 
Ross (2014) argues that there is no single best measure that can be used as resource 
proxy. Some of the proxies are biased in poorer countries, for example: oil export 
dependence, representing petroleum exports as a fraction of GDP. “Government revenue 
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from the extractive sector” is one of the important resource endowment measures, yet it is 
one of the most difficult measures to obtain. To overcome this problem, alternative 
measures such as discovery of large oil fields (Caselli and Michaels, 2013; Cotet and 
Tsui, 2013), the value of oil production per capita (Ross, 2008, 2012; Haber and 
Menaldo, 2011), and global price shocks (Besley and Persson, 2011; Ramsay, 2011) were 
used.  
2.6.2 Methodological Approaches 
Early studies in the field of the resource curse typically rely on cross-sectional 
regressions. Such is the case of the Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) studies. Subsequent 
studies employ more alternative techniques aided by the increasing availability of data 
and econometric techniques. Hence, Manzano and Rigobon (2001, 2006) argue that 
investigating the resource curse in a cross-sectional design does not control for 
unobserved country fixed effects and could give inconsistent results. Furthermore, when 
they use Sachs and Warner’s (1995) data but a panel data with country fixed effects 
design they show that the resource curse disappears.  
In addition, Van Der Ploeg (2011) presents additional reasons necessary to move away 
from cross-country designs and adopt panel data approaches. He argues that cross-country 
regressions do not control properly for initial conditions, such as productivity, thereby 
inducing a type of omitted variable bias, especially if resource dependence is expressed as 
a fraction of national income.  
Consequently, most of the recent papers used panel-based techniques as a minimum to 
examine the relationship between GDP and natural resources. Collier and Goderis (2012) 
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use an error correction model to estimate the long-run equilibrium relationship between 
resource-export prices and economic growth and reported a negative long-run effect of 
price increases. Cotet and Tsui (2013) employ a panel specification that evaluated the 
effect of changes in oil rents on different outcomes over 5-year periods; their results 
indicated positive effects on health measures but no significant effect on income. Smith 
(2015) investigated the relationship between GDP per capita and natural resource 
discoveries (oil, diamond, and natural gas) using panel data for a group of countries, 
which became resource rich post-1950. Smith’s paper (2015) was the first paper using the 
Quasi-experimental treatment-control approach that provide plausible test of causality for 
the effect of natural resources on the dependent variable than has been performed in 
former studies. In addition, it is the first paper that examines the resource curse using the 
synthetic control method, which allows for causal analysis for many individual countries, 
and the first to empirically evaluate by direct observation both the short- and the long-run 
effects of resource discoveries on growth. The results of this study showed a positive 
effect on GDP per capita that persists in the long term for developing countries and no 
effect for developed countries. 
In addition, Guilló et al. (2015) employed an advanced empirical mechanism to explain 
the natural resource curse puzzle. They employed the standard dynamic Heckscher–Ohlin 
model that take international output prices as given, they argued that using a novel 
mechanism could provide different results. The findings of this study, show that the 
estimated coefficient sign for a variable in a growth regression doesn’t imply that this 
variable will have the same sign effect on long-run income, i.e. finding evidence of a 
resource curse may not imply that a natural resource do not contribute positively to long-
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run income. 
2.6.3 Sample Data and Methodological approach 
2.6.3.1 Variables of Interest  
The sample data employed in the present chapter is collected from the WorldBank and 
includes a panel of annual observations from 14 countries over the period 1980-2014. The 
countries under investigation are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, Angola, Iran, Iraq and Venezuela. All of the countries 
are members of the OPEC, while the first six are also members of the GCC. 
In our empirical analysis we consider the popular random effects and fixed effects panel 
data estimators. Subsequently and to deal with the problems caused by country-specific 
effects, endogeneity and the dynamic feature, i.e. lagged dependent variables, in the 
economic growth model, we adopt a GMM dynamic panel approach. Finally, to allow for 
the fact that not all countries may be part of the same group in the sense that they give 
evidence in favour or contradicting the resource curse, we employ a classification tree 
approach. This allows us to split the sample in a way that groups the countries according 
to the degree of exposure to the resource curse. 
Our choice for the dependent variable is the growth in GDP per capita, which represents 
the measure of economic growth and is one of the most commonly adopted in the 
literature (See also Appendix Table 1). Alternatively, Boos (2011) argued that using 
genuine saving as a dependent variable alongside GDP could be more informative. Boos 
and Holm-Muller (2013) added that using genuine savings and the rates of change of 
52 
physical, human and natural capital that make up genuine saving as dependent variables 
can explain the curse more comprehensively than GDP growth. 
The second most important variable in the model is the resource proxy. Our choice here is 
dual-natured as we use: i) oil rent and ii) oil reserve per capita. The former represents the 
difference between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of 
production, while the latter denotes the per capita amount of petroleum (oil) discovered in 
any given oil field or nation. 
Other explanatory variables in the model are used in the spirit of the work of Barro (1996) 
and Barro (2003) to account for the economic and social environment in these countries. 
In particular, and in order to account for the effects of human capital, we include 
measures of education attainment. Our choice of metrics here is: i) the tertiary enrolment 
and ii) the literacy rate. The tertiary enrolment is expressed in percentage of the total 
population of the five-year age group following on from secondary school leaving. The 
focus on the higher education is due to the widespread recognition that higher education 
is a major driver of economic competitiveness in the context of knowledge-driven global 
economy (see Hemsley-Brown and Oplatka, 2006 for further details). The other variable, 
adult literacy, is the percentage of people aged 15 and above who can both read and write 
with understanding a short simple statement about their everyday life.3 A study by 
Coulombe and Tremblay (2004) has pointed out that investment in human capital, e.g. 
education and skills training, is three times as important to economic growth over the 
long term as investment in physical capital. They also found that the measures of human 
capital based on literacy dominate the years of schooling in explaining economic growth 
3 Due to data limitations, this variable was only available for a subset of countries. An investigation 
employing it revealed similar results; hence this is not reported. 
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per capita. In practice, we introduce the variables one at a time to observe which 
contributes more significantly to the overall economy and to avoid any multicollinearity 
issues. As these two measures are decomposed for the two sexes, male and female; in a 
robustness check we introduce each sex at a time to ascertain the role of the sex in the 
effects of the human capital on the output. 
Another measure of the human capital is the health capital which is proxied in our 
empirical analysis by the reciprocal of life expectancy at age one. As indicated by Barro 
(2003), if the likelihood of dying does not depend on age, then the reciprocal would result 
in the likelihood per year of dying. As an alternative, we also take the infant mortality 
into consideration, which represents the number of infants dying before reaching one year 
of age. High life expectancy is usually associated with high income per capita. However, 
growth in life expectancy may have mixed effects on per capita income. As noted by 
Cervellati and Sunde (2011), on the one hand, higher life expectancy may help to improve 
per capita income through the increase in productivity of existing resources. On the other 
hand, higher life expectancy or lower mortality may give rise to a growth in population 
size, which tends to decrease per capita income in the existence of fix factors of 
production. 
The fertility rate, which generates large effects on population growth; hence it is also 
related to human capital. Specifically, it has been shown by Barro (2003) that it has a 
negative influence on economic growth. Barro (2003) also argues that the increasing 
fertility suggests more resources spent on child-rearing, which also, to some extent, 
explains why greater fertility is expected to hamper economic growth. More recently, 
Ashraf et al. (2013) make use of a simulation model to examine quantitatively the impact 
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of exogenous reductions in fertility on output per capita. They find that a decrease in 
fertility rates improves per capita income by an amount which some may consider 
economically significant.  
We also include variables related to the government consumption, which measures 
expenditures not directly affecting productivity but containing distortions of private 
decisions. Barro (2003) shows that a higher value of the government consumption ratio 
results in a lower growth rate. This finding is consistent with the seminal work of Landau 
(1983) who suggest a negative relationship between the share of government 
consumption expenditure in GDP and the rate of growth per capita GDP. It is further 
pointed out that this negative relationship holds for all cases considered: full sample of 
countries unweight or weighted by the population; all time duration considered; the major 
oil exporters included or excluded. 
Another variable we take into account is investment, which is represented by the foreign 
direct investment defined as the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other 
long-term capital, and short-term as shown in the balance of payments. The investment 
shows net inflows in the reporting economy from foreign investors, in percentage of 
GDP. Many researchers and policy makers take the position that investment has 
significant positive effects on a host country’s development. Apart from the direct capital 
financing it brings, investment can be taken as a source of precious technology benefiting 
the local companies, which altogether helps to enhance the whole economy. However, the 
advantages of investment have begun to be suspected in the real settings recently. We list 
several representative studies which debate over issue of positive spillovers produced by 
investment for host countries. Hanson (2001) points out that the evidence that investment 
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delivers positive spillovers for host countries is essentially rather weak. Görg and 
Greenaway (2002) find that such effects are mostly negative with the main focus on 
microeconomic data. Lipsey (2002) suggests positive effects in view of the 
microeconomic studies while conclude that there is no consistent relationship between 
investment and growth by investigating the macroeconomic empirical work. Later, Alfaro 
(2003) investigates on this controversial issue by looking at the impact of investment on 
economic growth in different sectors such as primary, manufacturing and services sectors. 
Using cross-country data, she argues that investment tends to generate an ambiguous 
effect on economy. In specific, investment in the primary sector exerts a negative effect 
on growth while investment in manufacturing sector generates a positive one. 
We also take international openness into consideration. International openness is 
measured as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP. It 
is well known that trade openness changes by country size—larger sized countries tend to 
be less open, relative to those small sized countries, since the domestic trade already 
provides a large platform which can substitute effectively and efficiently for international 
trade. To gain a better understanding about the trade-growth relationship, we need to 
consider the channels which international openness may impact a country’s economic 
growth through. There are two main drivers of per capita GDP growth: capital 
accumulation such as physical and human capital and productivity growth. International 
openness may produce effects on both sources. First, physical capital and human capital 
may be accumulated more quickly locally due to the effects of openness to international 
flows of capital. Second, the increasing technological improvement gained by the 
openness may enhance productivity growth rate. Furthermore, it has been found that (1) 
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capital accumulation is not the main driver of economic growth (Klenow and Rodriguez-
Claire, 1997; Hall and Jones, 1999), and (2) international openness affects growth mainly 
through productivity (Frankel and Romer, 1999). Therefore, most subsequent analysis is 
conducted on with the main focus on the impact of international openness on 
productivity. Andersen and Babula (2008) argue that there is likely to be a positive 
relationship between international trade and economic growth. Ulasan (2012) provides 
evidence that man openness variables under consideration have significantly positive 
relationships with long-run economic growth. He also points out the instability of the 
association between openness and growth in the sense that the openness variables become 
no long significant once other growth determinants are involved in the analysis, such as 
institutions, population heterogeneity, geography and macroeconomic stability. 
We also account for the effects of inflation. It is usually considered that inflation hurts 
long-run economic growth. There are a number of reasons to explain this phenomenon. 
First, high inflation is often associated with high volatility, i.e. uncertainty, of inflation or 
future profitability of investment plans. This can further make market participants 
uncertain about what future price will be and become more conservative about the 
investment strategies they may take. As a result, high inflation may lead to a reduction in 
levels of investment and economic growth. Second, high inflation can make a country’s 
exports relatively more expensive and thus reduce its international competitiveness. 
Third, inflation creates distortions in economic decisions with regard to saving and 
investment through the interaction with the tax system. Companies may be forced to put 
more efforts on coping with the problems caused by the inflation (see further details in 
the work of Gokal and Hanif, 2004).  
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To account for the quality of institutions, we include an indicator of the extent of 
democracy, measured by the polity2 index. Among the data set available to researchers 
who study the issues associated with democracy, the Polity data (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; 
Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) is the most widely accepted one. Some reasons for the 
popularity of this index are such as: it covers a broadest range of all democracy 
indicators, including 187 countries from either 1800 or the year of independence up to 
2008. Moreover, it is based on a rather comprehensive definition about democracy, which 
accounts for electoral rules and different measures of the openness of political 
institutions; it also offers details with regard to the aspects of institutionalized democracy 
and autocracy in a country or at a given point of time period. With the switch from the 
Polity III (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995) to the Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002), a new 
polity score, termed polity2, was introduced. Although both polity and polity2 are based 
on the same evaluation procedure and range between -10 and 10, the latter exhibits a 
uniquely distinct advantage: it offers a democracy score for time periods of so-called 
“interregnum” and “transition”. As noted by Barro (2003), the impact of democracy on 
output is fairly ambiguous. On the one hand, in political models, which lay emphasis on 
the incentive of electoral majorities to exploit the political power to move resources away 
from affluent minority clubs. On the other hand, in the presence of great degree of 
democracy, government is forced to commit itself not confiscate the capital achieved by 
the private sector and therefore democracy may help to enhance the economy from such a 
point of view. 
All the variables listed above are taken in natural logs, with the exception of oil rent and 
inflation. All data are obtained from The World Bank. 
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2.6.3.2 Methodology – Panel Data Analysis 
A panel data contains a set of cross sectional units, i.e. countries in our specific case, 
which are observed over some time period. In line with the mainstream of the existing 
literature, we denote the number of cross sectional units by N and number of time periods 
where we observe the individuals as T. The use of panel data helps to account for 
individual differences, or heterogeneity. In a panel data set which is “long and narrow”, 
implying that we have only a few individuals but long time duration, the seemingly 
unrelated regression model is more frequently employed. However, in a situation where 
we have a “short and wide” panel data set, i.e. there are many individuals and relatively 
few time-series observations, the fixed effects model is more useful and can be applied to 
panel data with different features (any number of individuals). 
 Consider a flexible linear regression model as follows 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, t = 1, … T   (2.1) 
By averaging the data across time periods, we obtain the following 
𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2?̅?𝑥2𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3?̅?𝑥3𝑖𝑖 + ?̅?𝑒𝑖𝑖 (2.2) 
The “bar” notation suggests that we have averaged the values of the variable across time 
and thus the subscript time t is discarded. Subtract the second equation from the first one, 
we have 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽2(𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑥2𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽3(𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑥3𝑖𝑖) + (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ?̅?𝑒𝑖𝑖)  (2.3) 
Therefore, the least squares estimates of the parameters 𝛽𝛽2 and 𝛽𝛽3 are equivalent to those 
from the more complicated least squares dummy variable model.  
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The random effects model is constructed on the idea that the individuals contained in a 
panel data set may be chosen randomly from a large population. By contrast, in the fixed 
effect model we introduced earlier, all individual differences are assumed to be measured 
by the differences in the intercept parameter, 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖. By contrast, in the random effect model, 
we make the same assumption that all cross sectional differences are accommodated by 
the intercept parameters, but we treat the individual differences random instead of fixed. 
To achieve this, we let the intercept parameter 𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 to include a fixed component which 
denotes the population average on the whole, ?̅?𝛽1, and random individual differences, 
represented by 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖, given by 
𝛽𝛽1𝑖𝑖 = ?̅?𝛽1 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖    (2.4) 
Where 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 represents the random effect. We assume that 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 has zero mean, is uncorrelated 
across different individuals and has a constant variance, 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2. Having some 
rearrangements, we obtain a familiar regression below 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ?̅?𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + (𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖)        (2.5) 
the term 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 can be further expressed as 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. We assume that the error term 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 has 
zero mean, constant variance 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2, and is uncorrelated over time period. Furthermore, we 
assume the individual effects 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 are not correlated with the error 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. Overall, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 has zero 
mean and a constant variance 𝜎𝜎𝑣𝑣2 = 𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 + 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2. However, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is serially correlated, i.e. the 
errors for each individuals are inter-correlated with the correlation coefficient ρ=𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2/(𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2 + 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2). In such a particular situation, the least squares estimator is still unbiased and 
consistent, however, it is no longer efficient, i.e. the variance is not minimum. Hence, the 
standard errors obtained from the least squares technique are incorrect. To account for 
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this problem, the generalized least squares estimator (the minimum variance estimator) is 
proposed to solve the random effects model. We first apply the least squares to a 
transformed model as follows 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = ?̅?𝛽1𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛽𝛽2𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝛽𝛽3𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗   (2.6) 
Where we have 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑦𝑦�𝑖𝑖  (2.7) 
𝑥𝑥1𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 1 − 𝛼𝛼  (2.8) 
𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑥2𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼?̅?𝑥2𝑖𝑖  (2.9) 
𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑥3𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼?̅?𝑥3𝑖𝑖  (2.10) 
𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼?̅?𝑣𝑖𝑖  (2.11) 




. It can be further shown that 
the transformed 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗  has constant variance 𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2 and is uncorrelated. 
In the previous section we introduced the fixed effects and random effect models for 
panel data. In practice, the latter is more preferred due to several advantages over the 
former. For example, the random effects estimator accounts for the random sampling 
process where the data set is collected; it allows for the variables that are individually 
time-invariant; as it is essentially a generalized least squares estimation technique, in 
large sample sizes, generates a smaller variance compared with the least squares 
estimator. However, a potential difficulty one may encounter in applying the random 
effects estimator is that the random error 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is correlated with any of the 
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explanatory variables on the right hand side of the regression. In such a situation, both 
least squares and generalised least squares become biased and inconsistent and the fixed 
effects estimator, which removes the random effect 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 together with any other time-
invariance components, can provide a good alternative. 
In order to examine the correlation between the error term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 and the explanatory 
variables in a random effects regression and thus to decide on the most appropriate 
estimation procedure to apply, we consider a Hausman test. The test is based on the 
comparison between the regression coefficient estimates obtained from the random 
effects model with those obtained from the fixed effects model. If the error 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is not 
correlated with the explanatory variables 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, both random effects and fixed effects 
estimators show consistency and thus converge to their underlying values in the cases of 
large sample sizes. However, if there is correlation between 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 and 𝑥𝑥𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, then the random 
effects estimator is no long consistent while the fixed effects estimator remains 
consistent. In practice, the Hausman test can be carried out employing the student t test 
with the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 and any of the explanatory 
variables. Consequently, if the null cannot be rejected, one should implement the random 
effects estimator since it tends to have a smaller variance compared with the competitor. 
Correspondingly, if the null is rejected, the fixed effects estimator should be preferred as 
it shows consistency.   
2.6.3.3 Methodology – GMM 
The dynamic generalised method of moments (GMM) method, developed by Holtz-Eakin 
et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) is the second 
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method we utilize in this chapter. Relative to the conventional cross-country method, the 
dynamic panel GMM techniques exhibit several benefits in investigating such a financial 
growth phenomenon. First, it deals with the problem that the regressors may be correlated 
with the error term. Second, it accounts for the correlation of the time-invariant country 
characteristics, e.g. geography and demographics, with the explanatory variables. Third, it 
allows for the autocorrelation in the lagged dependent variable. The potential problems 
that the panel GMM copes with will be further detailed in the following part. 
Consider a structural model below 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝜑𝜑𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  (2.13) 
Where 𝑖𝑖 and 𝑡𝑡 stand for individual country and time periods, respectively. In addition to a 
set of exogenous and endogenous regressors 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 also depends on its own past 
realisations, demonstrating the dynamic nature of the framework. 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  measures the 
country-specific effect independent of time 𝑡𝑡 and 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 represents the random error term. 
Although the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable may be important for having 
consistent estimates of the slope parameters associated with 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 (Bond, 2002), the 
dynamic model of (3.3) is subject to the problems of omitted variable bias and 
endogeneity. Similar to the approach adopted in the recent work of Yaduma et al. (2013), 
we exploit the difference/Arellano-Bond GMM technique, developed by Arellano and 
Bond (1991), to account for these potential econometric issues.  
In equation (3.3), the presence of the unobservable country-specific term 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 is usually 
treated as a component of the residual term, inducing the problem of endogeneity such as 
𝐸𝐸(𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖|𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1) ≠ 0. The difference GMM procedure solves the problems outlined 
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by eliminating 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 and involving an instrument for the lagged dependent variable 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1. 
First, we take the first difference of equation (3.3) and obtain  
𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖 = 𝜑𝜑𝛥𝛥𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽′𝛥𝛥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛥𝛥𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖  (2.14) 
To meet the requirement of strict exogeneity, we follow the method of Arellano and Bond 
(1991) to introduce 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−2 as an instrument, which is, by construction, related to , 1i ty −∆  but 
not correlated to ,i tε∆  provided that the error terms are not serially correlated and the 
covariates are weakly exogenous. Throughout the whole testing and estimation procedure 
described above, of our main interest in the oil model is the sign of the coefficient 
associated with the per capita oil reserve. It is concluded that oil curse is present for the 
negative coefficient while absent for the positive. 
Apart from this, Arellano and Bond (1991) point out the biasedness of asymptotic 
standard errors present in the GMM difference procedure in the case where the number of 
cross sections is small. Relative to the one-stage estimator of the GMM difference, 
estimates of coefficients of the two-stage estimator is considered asymptotically more 
efficient. Furthermore, the standard covariance matrix given by the two-stage procedure 
is robust to panel-specific autocorrelation problems and thus the two-stage difference 
GMM is employed in our empirical applications. We use the Stata command xtabond2, in 
line with Roodman (2009) for our GMM estimations. Further calibrations to the 
command include a limit on the number of instruments, where in all regressions we set 
this equal to 5, following (Yaduma et al., 2013), although as a robustness check we 
 64 
increase this to 8 with the results presented in the Appendix. In the xtabond2 package this 
is achieved by the use of the lag limit command. Furthermore, and in line with (Yaduma 
et al., 2013) we use the collapse option that generates one instrument for each variable 
and lag distance instead of the default option of one instrument for all explanatory 
variables, time periods, and lag distances. We also specify the two step and robust options 
in the xtabond2 package that provide a finite sample correction for the two step 
covariance matrix according to Windmeijer (2005). 
2.6.3.4 Methodology – Classification Tree 
The present chapter employs the non-parametric Classification and Regression Tree 
(CART), proposed by Breiman et al. (1984) and further analysed by Gatu et al. (2007), 
Hofmann et al. (2007) and Shih and Tsai (2004), which has been widely applied for 
constructing prediction models from data. Both the classification tree and regression tree 
are implemented by partitioning the data sample and fitting an estimated model within 
each split. The difference between the two lies in that: classification trees are developed 
for dependent variables which are categorical, e.g. class, group membership, country, etc. 
The prediction error is represented by the misclassification cost; regression trees are for 
dependent variables which are continuous and the prediction error is usually represented 
by the squared difference between the actual and estimated values. For both types of 
trees, predictors can be one or more continuous and/or categorical variables. The purpose 
of our analysis is to see how we can discriminate between different countries based on the 
values of their per capita oil reserve or oil rent. Hence, we choose to employ the 
classification trees and detail the procedure in the following part. 
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The classification trees procedure may be viewed as a union of piecewise linear functions, 
where observations are grouped according to the control variables. The splits are chosen 
with respect to minimising misclassification costs (Breiman et al., 1984). The essence of 
the algorithm is described here; for a full exposition of the classification tree algorithm 
see among others Breiman et al. (1984) and Durlauf and Johnson (1995). Assume 𝑌𝑌 to be 
the endogenous variable of interest and 𝑋𝑋1, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 the control variables. The aim is to find 
a model for predicting 𝑌𝑌 from 𝑋𝑋1, … ,𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗 through binary recursive splits.  
Starting from a club equivalent to the entire population of countries, say = {𝑖𝑖1, 𝑖𝑖2, … , 𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛} 
(this can be referred to as step 0) the algorithm searches for the best binary splits in the 
dataset.  
Step 1. For the data under investigation select a binary split, which is of the form 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 < 𝑟𝑟 
versus 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ≥ 𝑟𝑟. The choice of the binary split consists of two components, the selected 
control variable (𝑗𝑗) and the realisation of the control variable (𝑟𝑟). The binary split creates 
two nodes that are subsequently tested for impurity. Impurity of a node is measured by the 
Gini’s Diversity Index (GDI)4. The GDI of a node is given as 1 −∑ 𝑝𝑝2(𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖  where the sum 
is over the clubs 𝑖𝑖 at the node and 𝑝𝑝(𝑖𝑖) is the observed fraction of clubs with club 𝑖𝑖 that 
populate the node. A pure node has only one club and a GDI equal to zero; otherwise 
positive values of GDI measure the degree of impurity in the node where more than one 
clubs are present. 





�1 − ∑ � 𝑐𝑐1
𝑐𝑐1+𝑐𝑐2
|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑅𝑅1,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗�𝑖𝑖 � + min
𝑐𝑐1
�1 − ∑ � 𝑐𝑐2
𝑐𝑐1+𝑐𝑐2
|𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑅𝑅2,𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗�𝑖𝑖 ��  (2.15) 
4 For a full exposition of impurity metrics used in this context we direct you to (Berzal, Cubero, Cuenca, & 
Martı́n-Bautista, 2003). 
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where the parameter ℎ denotes the splitting level with ℎ = 1 denoting the first level that 
two nodes exist. The variables of interest to the algorithm (𝑗𝑗, 𝑟𝑟) split the realisations of 
the 𝑌𝑌 variable (𝑐𝑐1,𝑐𝑐2)5  into two nodes 𝑅𝑅1,  𝑅𝑅2. The lower the value of the quantity 1 −
𝑐𝑐1
𝑐𝑐1+𝑐𝑐2
 the higher the purity level of the first node.    
Step 2. If one of the resulting nodes has zero impurity score, then this is classified as a 
pure node and the branch is terminated here. Conversely, if one of the resulting nodes has 
a positive impurity score, then a further split may be possible.  
Step 3. For the impure nodes, continue from step 1. 
The algorithm finishes when the resulting nodes are either pure or cannot be broken down 
any further due to observation requirements. 
2.7 Results 
2.7.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports key descriptive statistics of all the variables considered. The large 
dispersion of the GDP per capita is mainly driven by the existence of Qatar in the sample, 
which is among the top countries in that respect. However, most of the remaining 
countries in our sample have an average GDP per capita of around 12,000 USD. It is 
worth noting that we have large amounts of missing values for the variable of adult 
literacy. However, we have two different measures for educational attainment, i.e. tertiary 
enrolment and adult literacy, and thus we can concentrate more on the effects of the 
former if the presence of missing values in the latter causes any problems.  
5 For ease of exposition we assume that the predictor variables are categorical variables. 
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[Table 1 around here] 
Table 2 shows the correlations matrix for the variables used in our study. We find there is 
a statistically significant positive correlation between GDP per capita and Oil reserve 
which gives preliminary evidence that the resource curse will not be supported in this 
study.  
[Table 2 around here] 
2.7.2 Empirical Results based on GMM 
Our results are presented in Tables 3 to 16 for a wide variety of explanatory variables, 
dependent variables and estimation methods. The main layout is that we divide each of 
these tables into 2 sections. The section on the left uses the Per capita oil reserve as a 
resource proxy, while the section on the right uses the oil rent. Each table reports 
estimated coefficients and standard errors, while statistical significance is denoted by the 
use of asterisks next to the coefficient. The lower part of each table shows additional 
goodness-of-fit statistics that relate to the estimation method at hand as well as number of 
observations, groups and instruments used in each regression. As such, the GMM 
estimation present the p-values for the AR(1) and AR(2) lags, where in all the cases we 
reject the null hypothesis for the first lag but not the second. The Hansen J-test is much 
higher than the conventional significance levels indicating that the GMM is an 
appropriate specification. 
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients from the GMM models where the dependent 
variable is the per capita GDP growth, and the proxy for resources is either the per capita 
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oil reserve or the oil rent. In this model, we allow also for human education in the form of 
tertiary enrolment. The variables pertaining to the oil resource curse are statistically 
insignificant, thus indicating no statistical evidence in favour of a resource curse. Our 
results therefore do not support the resource curse for these economies. Moreover, the 
role of education fails to reach conventional statistical levels. Furthermore, in different 
models, there is no serial correlation in the differenced residuals by looking at AR(1) and 
AR(2) test results and the instruments we include in the difference panel GMM are 
considered valid by the Hansen J-test.  
[Table 3 around here] 
A series of robustness checks is conducted to ensure statistical validity of these results. 
First, we use a higher lag limit for the instruments, which is now set to eight instead of 
five. The results, presented in table A1 in the appendix show no qualitative differences in 
the story above. That is, no statistical support for the resource curse is given. 
Furthermore, we allow for heterogeneity across the years by inserting year fixed effects in 
our estimations and these results are presented in table A2. Once again, no empirical 
support for the resource curse is given. In a third robustness check, and to cater for 
potential volatility in the dependent variable, we use a 5-year backward moving average 
to smooth the per capita GDP growth. Table A3 reports the results but once again our 
story is not challenged. Finally, we use an alternative routine to the xtabond2, the xtlsdvc 
which relies on alternative Anderson-Hsiao, Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond 
estimators. The routine has limited functionality compared to the more complex xtabond2 
but from the output, see Table A4, we observe that the statistical insignificance of the 
variables related to the oil curse is not questioned. 
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[Tables A1 – A4 around here] 
Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients from the GMM models where the dependent 
variable is the per capita GDP growth, and the proxy for resources is either the per capita 
oil reserve or the oil rent. In this model, we allow also for human education in the form of 
tertiary enrolment for both sexes. Furthermore, this model includes macroeconomic 
variables, such as consumption, trade openness and investment. These results verify that 
the countries under investigation show, if any, evidence of oil blessing under both the per 
capita oil reserve and the oil rent indicators. In any case, however we don’t observe any 
statistical significance in these variables, so the resource curse claim does not receive any 
empirical support from our analysis. With regards to key macroeconomic conditions, 
consumption is found to decrease the economic growth, while trade openness increases 
growth in per capita GDP. Investment has an ambiguous and very small in economic 
terms effect. In any case, however, macroeconomic variables do not individually have 
statistical significant effects, albeit they are jointly significant in our specifications.  
[Table 4 around here] 
Tables A5-A7 in the appendix present the robustness checks of the previous section, 
namely, Table A5 allows for up to eight lags for the instruments, Table A6 incorporates 
year fixed effects to cater for time heterogeneity and Table A7 utilises a 5-year moving 
average to smooth any volatility in the dependent variable. The main conclusion from all 
these robustness checks is that the lack of empirical support for the resource curse claim 
remains, hence our key findings are not questioned. 
[Tables A5 – A7 around here] 
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Table 5 repeats the analysis of Table 4 but with the inclusion of some social variables, 
namely fertility, mortality and democracy. The results remain qualitatively similar. In 
particular, the oil resource curse is not verified under either of the two natural resources 
measures. If anything, the per capita oil reserve shows a positive, but not significant sign, 
which may be interpreted as slight evidence in favour of an oil blessing. Consumption 
retains its negative influence on economic growth, which however is not significant at 
conventional significance levels under both specifications. Conversely, trade openness 
does not show any definite relation with respect to the influence on per capita GDP 
growth. Investment appears with a positive sign that shows a positive impact on per 
capita GDP growth through increased investment levels. Higher values of fertility are 
associated with lower economic growth in the case that per capita oil reserve is used as 
the natural resource proxy; the opposite being observed when the oil rent is used. 
However, this fails to reach conventional significance levels, suggesting that the effect of 
fertility is not particularly significant on its own. Mortality carries a negative and positive 
sign when the resource proxy is the oil rent and per capita oil reserve respectively, even 
though these do not reach statistical significance levels. Democracy also fails to reach 
conventional significance levels, implying that the effect on per capita GDP growth is not 
clear-cut. Overall, however, the macroeconomic variables add to the explanatory power 
of the model, as suggested by their joint significance from the wald-statistic reported in 
the goodness-of-fit section. 
[Table 5 around here] 
The usual robustness checks are reported in appendix tables A8-A10, with the instrument 
lags increased to 8, allowing for year fixed effects and using a 5-year moving average to 
 71 
smooth the per capita GDP growth. In all cases, our results are qualitatively similar, with 
the resource curse never gaining statistical evidence to its support. 
[Tables A8 – A10 around here] 
Table 6 further adds inflation to the list of explanatory variables of Table 4. The results 
still support the conclusion of no oil resource curse for the sample countries. On the 
contrary, when controlling for the full set of macroeconomic and social characteristics the 
per capita oil reserve carries a positive and significant sign, suggesting that an oil blessing 
may be the case for these countries. However, the oil blessing cannot be verified when the 
oil rent is used. Consumption carries a positive sign albeit this fails to reach conventional 
statistical significance levels. Inflation carries a negative sign that is significant at the 
10% level but only for the case of the per capita oil reserve. In any case the set of 
macroeconomic and social variables added are jointly significant as verified by the wald 
statistic. 
[Table 6 around here] 
Table 7 repeats the analysis of table 6, however this time mortality is replaced by the 
reciprocal of life expectancy. The results are broadly in line with Table 6, without any 
statistical evidence of a resource curse at conventional significance levels. 
[Table 7 around here] 
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2.7.3 Empirical Results based on panel random effects 
To ascertain the benefits of the technique of difference panel GMM, we also consider the 
fixed effects and random effects estimators as introduced in the section of methodology. 
The Hausman test with the null that there is no correlation between the individual error 
term and any of the explanatory variables cannot be rejected in our case and therefore we 
make use of the random effects estimator and report the results in Table 8 and 9. Similar 
results are obtained such as: there is no resource curse no matter which oil proxy is 
considered; tertiary education is significantly positively and affects the economy; 
government consumption has negative but not statistically significant effects on per capita 
GDP growth; inflation hampers the economy significantly when either oil proxy is used. 
However, a serious problem is that strong serial correlation in residuals is identified in 
both cases listed in Table 8 and 9, suggesting that hypothesis tests may not be reliable. 
Consequently, difference panel GMM clearly dominates the conventional estimation 
technique here since the former tacked the problem of the serial correlation in error terms. 
However, an advantage of the panel random effects is that it maintains comparability with 
the majority of the literature on the resource curse as system GMM has not been used 
extensively. 
[Tables 8 and 9 around here] 
2.7.4 Empirical Results based on Classification Trees 
We use the classification trees to account for the fact that certain countries in our sample 
may exhibit the resource curse, while others may exhibit an oil blessing. Similarly, we 
may have evidence that a subset of countries is affected to a larger extent by the oil curse 
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than others. As a result we implement the classification tree algorithm to split the 14 
countries in our sample data into different groups with regards to their level per capita oil 
reserve or oil rent. Figures 3 and 4 present the results. 
[Figures 3 and 4 around here] 
In Figure 3, we classify countries according to the log of per capita oil reserve. At the end 
of the tree, we can split 14 countries into 3 groups based on the criteria (peroil>2.67). We 
term the 3 groups as “HIGH”, “MEDIUM” and “LOW”, which represent the countries 
with high, medium and low level of per capita oil reserve. In particular, the “HIGH” 
group includes UAE (ARE), Kuwait (KWT), Qatar (QAT) and Saudi Arabia (SAU); the 
“MEDIUM” group includes Iran (IRN), Iraq (IRQ), Libya (LBY), Oman (OMN) and 
Venezuela (VEN); the “LOW” group includes Angola (AGO), Bahrain (BHR), Algeria 
(DZA), Ecuador (ECU) and Nigeria (NGA). 
Figure 4 classifies the countries baser on oil rents. Similarly, three groups are defined; 
“HIGH”, “MEDIUM” and “LOW”. The “HIGH” group includes Angola (AGO) and 
Kuwait (KWT); the “MEDIUM” group includes Iraq (IRQ), Libya (LBY), Nigeria 
(NGA), Oman (OMN), Qatar (QAT) and Saudi Arabia (SAU); the “LOW” group 
includes UAE (ARE), Bahrain (BHR), Algeria (DZA), Ecuador (ECU), Iran (IRN) and 
Venezuela (VEN). 
The output of the classification tree analysis is fed back into the panel GMM regressions 
in the form of slope dummies. In particular, we interact the resource proxies – the per 
capita oil reserve and the oil rents – with dummy variables that signify the membership of 
each country. For example, the three groups identified in Figure 3 pertaining to the per 
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capita oil reserve enter the specification as three variables, namely: per capita oil reserve, 
which accounts for the MEDIUM category; per capita oil reserve × LOW and per capita 
oil reserve × HIGH that account for the LOW and HIGH country groups respectively. By 
the same token we construct the oil rents using the information from the classification 
trees depicted in Figure 4. 
Table 10 presents estimated coefficients and p-values for the statistical significance of the 
explanatory variables. Table 10 augments the model presented in Table 7 with the results 
of the classification trees. The results pertaining to the resource curse remain the same 
with no country group verifying the resource curse due to the either the positive and 
statistically significant sign or the lack of statistical significance in the case of a negative 
sign. In particular, the MEDIUM group exhibits a positive and statistical significance sign 
when the per capita oil reserve is used as the resource proxy, which in turn suggests that 
those countries receive an oil blessing. By contrast, the LOW and HIGH groups also do 
not exhibit the oil blessing as the MEDIUM group but at the same time they do not verify 
statistically the presence of resource curse. When the oil rent is used however, no 
statistical significance results are found, which is to some support against the existence of 
the resource curse. The results overall suggest that only the countries with the lowest 
values of oil rents (these are UAE (ARE), Bahrain (BHR), Algeria (DZA), Ecuador 
(ECU), Iran (IRN) and Venezuela (VEN), repeated from a section above) are actually 
capable of evidencing a positive link between economic growth and resource endowment 
(i.e., an oil blessing). 
[Table 10 around here] 
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2.8 Discussion: The resource curse and the GCC 
Our results do not support the contention that a resource curse exists over the examined 
period for the countries under investigation. However, this does not mean that these 
countries never experienced the resource curse. By contrast, it may be more plausible that 
the countries have taken necessary actions to reduce the impact of the curse and turn the 
apparent drawback of large natural resource endowments to their advantage.  
With regards to overcoming the resource curse many scholars have focused on economic 
policy related actions. Usui (1997), Mikesell (1997) and Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001), 
among others, argue that resource abundant countries should avoid large foreign and 
domestic debt., pursue competitive exchange rate, and control inflation to avoid the Dutch 
disease. Auty (1994), Collier (2000), and Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001) added that resource-
rich countries should diversify their economies and adopt investment strategies as a way 
to reduce the dependence on natural resources. Cao et al. (2015) argued that replacing 
traditional development patterns with more balanced development, increasing technology 
adoption, focusing on value-added goods and creating processed materials will help to 
diversify the economy and overcome the resource curse.  
A second group of scholars contributed that direct distribution of a substantial proportion 
of resource revenues to citizens (i.e., income diversification and redistribution) would 
minimize opportunities for corruption and misappropriation (Sala-I-Martin and 
Subramanian, 2003). Ross (2001a) argued that even though resource revenue was 
transferred directly to citizens, the state can still receive a significant share through 
taxation; this policy is still ‘plausible’. Caspary (2012) argued that wealth arising from oil 
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and mining must be distributed in a transparent manner to avoid using this wealth to fund 
corruption. 
A third group of scholars recommended privatization of the natural resource sectors. 
Weinthal and Jones Luong (2001) used Russia and Kazakhstan as good examples of oil 
sector privatization. Rosser (2004) added that this procedure could explain how Indonesia 
overcomes the curse. In a later study, Rosser (2007) argued that the Indonesian economy 
grew strongly between the 1970s and 1980s, although the oil sector counts for more than 
80% of Indonesian total annual exports and 70% of the government annual revenues for 
the same time.    
A fourth group of authors attempted to identify the political and social changes required 
to overcome the resource curse. They argue that it is important to have political and social 
environment transformation in resource abundant countries to overcome the curse. Mitra 
(1994) argued that it is not possible to overcome the resource curse until changes in the 
political elite’s mindset happen. Karl (1997), Ascher (1999), Auty (2001b, 2004), and 
Pearce (2005) have emphasized the need for resource-rich countries to promote capability 
and institutional reform; this action will prevent growth collapse and facilitate policy 
reform and successful economic policy in general. 
The fifth group of scholars added that various actions could be implemented at the 
international level to help overcome the resource curse. Bannon and Collier (2003) 
suggested that World Bank and IMF design new mechanisms to reduce the negative 
effects of price instability in resource abundant countries. Shaxton (2005) argued that a 
revision of the nature of the contracts between oil-endowed countries and international oil 
companies could help to deal with price shocks, while Ross (2001b), recommended an 
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international agreement to control commodity prices as a solution to overcome resource 
curse in global economy. Farhadi et al. (2015) argued that resource-rich countries could 
turn the resource curse into a blessing via three channels. First, by improving the legal 
structure to secure property rights and judicial system efficiency; this will make the 
incentive to invest in resources higher. Second, by simplifying credit and business 
regulations to increase competition and enable efficient allocation of natural resources. 
Third, trade liberalization to encourage creating larger markets and increase the gains to 
all trading partners. 
All these aforementioned policies are particularly relevant for the GCC members who 
were heavily dependent on oil exports during the 1980s and 1990s. During that time the 
strong positive correlation between oil prices and real GDP growth is a key characteristic 
of the GCC economy (IMF, 2011b). However, the rising oil prices of the late 70s and 
early 90s led to significant revenues for the GCC countries, which however could not be 
manifested into sustainable growth after the oil prices reverted to normal levels. Relying 
on a non-renewable and highly volatile source of income, such as oil and gas, can be an 
impediment to the growth prospects of any country. Saudi Arabia and Qatar have the 
largest endowments of oil and gas respectively in the region. By contrast, Bahrain’s 
energy resources are depleted. All these necessitate the need for careful investment 
planning that would diversify the income of these countries away from energy towards 
sources that are non-exhaustible and less susceptible to price fluctuations. To a degree, 
the GCC appears to have seized the opportunity better by taking steps towards all 
directions mentioned above.  
Fiscal balances show increasing surpluses. International reserves soared to a record high 
78 
level of 515 USD billion in 2008, up from 75 USD billion in 2002 (IMF, 2011b). Having 
cut their external debt obligations from 66% to 12% of GDP, national governments now 
have the capacity to invest in projects designed to sustain economic growth (IMF, 2011b). 
Investments in infrastructure and technology at the GCC level increased from 300 USD 
billion in 2004 to 2.5 USD trillion by the end of 2008 (IMF, 2011a). Some countries have 
taken significant steps towards income diversification with Bahrain, which has 
established itself as a financial hub in the region offering exquisite products such as 
Islamic finance. Tourism and transportation are also promoted. The UAE have diversified 
into tourism, manufacturing and financial services (IMF, 2012). Although Kuwait 
recently has engaged with financial services, its dependence on oil remains high. Saudi 
Arabia, by far the largest economy in the region (469.4 USD billion - 44.3% of GCC 
total), has the huge revenues from energy related products (89.3% of total revenue in 
2008); construction and manufacturing are increasingly important as revenue sources 
(IMF, 2011a). As a result of this diversification process, non-oil sectors in the GCC have 
been expanding at 7.3% yearly, while the non-oil GDP represented 65% of total GDP in 
2008, up from about 56-58% in the early 90’s. The UAE (and Dubai in particular) have 
been remarkably progressive despite the non-democratic government. As a results, Dubai 
is well-known hub for conventional and Islamic financial services, tourism and fashion 
industry. Economic growth is no longer entirely energy related in the GCC, as such the 
resource curse is no longer empirically supported. By contrast, Cendrero (2014) 
investigated the changes to Bolivia’s gas policy since 2006 and institutional performance 
to evaluate if these changes helped this country to overcome the resource curse. His 
findings show that Bolivia’s government has not developed or set a sufficient policies to 
deal with the curse, and Bolivian economy still suffer from the curse as a result of this. 
79 
2.9 Conclusion 
Economies rich in natural resources would be expected to be in an advantageous position 
with regards to pursuing economic growth. Indeed, the discovery of oil would have 
appeared to be the basis of good prosperity. However, early empirical evidence suggested 
otherwise with many studies documenting an inverse relationship between economic 
growth and natural resource abundance. Even though the key driving force of this 
relationship does not appear to be the abundance of natural resources per se, rather the 
social, political and institutional level of development surrounding such countries, a large 
part of the literature appears separated into studies favouring the existence of the resource 
curse and those contradicting it. 
In this chapter we revisit the resource curse for countries that are oil exporters. Hence, we 
seek to ascertain whether these countries exhibit the oil curse or the oil blessing. Our 
dataset comprises a panel of annual observations from 14 countries over the period 1980-
2014. The countries under investigation are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
the UAE, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador, Angola, Iran, Iraq and Venezuela. All of the 
countries are members of the OPEC, while the first six are also members of the GCC. 
Economic growth is measured via the growth in the GDP per capita, while the resource 
proxy is in line with the most recent literature and is proxied by per capita oil reserve and 
oil rents. Furthermore, we include the usual socio-economic explanatory variables, such 
as Tertiary Enrolment, Fertility, Mortality, Consumption, Investment, Trade Openness 
and Democracy – a proxy for the quality of institutions. We rely on panel data random 
effects and system GMM for our main estimations. We augment our approach using a 
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novel technique in the field, namely classification trees so as to categorize the countries 
into groups in line with the magnitude of their oil curse (or oil blessing). 
Our results support the notion that the oil curse is not a cause of concern for the sampled 
countries. Indeed, a positive link between oil abundance and economic growth (i.e., oil 
blessing) is evidenced in some specifications. Even when allowing for different country 
groups using the classification trees, we fail to find any evidence in favour of the resource 
curse.  
In acknowledging parts of the previous literature that finds evidence of the resource curse 
we argue that the GCC, in particular, have taken all the steps that the literature has 
identified for an economy to heal itself from the resource curse. Towards that direction 
the governments of the GCC member states have realized the over-exposure to the oil and 
gas sectors during the late 1970s and 1980s which rendered their economic growth not 
only very volatile due to the oil prices but also unsustainable. Hence, they diversified 
their income to manufacturing, construction, financial services and tourism. As such, the 
oil exposure has been reduced and the countries have engaged into a well-paved path of 
sustained growth. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 
Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs 
per capita GDP 12854.730 15855.730 494.239 81788.960 389 
per capita Oil Reserve 8.279 13.569 0.093 60.947 473 
Oil Rent 30.548 14.654 4.222 78.932 446 
Tertiary Enrolment 17.563 13.105 0.013 77.457 286 
Adult Literacy 82.487 12.492 49.631 97.478 69 
Consumption 18.087 9.083 2.332 76.222 415 
Openness 79.219 40.007 0.210 251.139 424 
Investment 1.838 3.878 -13.605 40.467 441 
Fertility 4.278 1.714 1.726 8.352 476 
Mortality 39.867 36.267 5.900 138.300 476 
Life expectancy 67.305 9.700 40.159 78.418 476 
Democracy 2.718 2.524 0 9.330 440 
Inflation 28.222 218.735 -16.117 4145.108 371 
Note: er capita oil reserve has got scaled down by 1000 (barrel). This table reports the 
overall statistics for the full 14 countries in our sample. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix 
Note: this table reports the correlation coefficient between different pairs of variables in our empirical study. Values below the correlation coefficients 
represent the P-value for the significance of the correlation. 
per capita GDP per capita Oil reserve oil rent enlment (both) enrolment (m) enrolment (f) consumption openness investment fertility mortality life expectancy democracy inflation
per capita GDP 1.000
----- 
per capita Oil reserve 0.501 1.000
0.000 ----- 
oil rent 0.213 0.403 1.000
0.002 0.000 ----- 
enlment (both) -0.092 -0.081 -0.226 1.000
0.191 0.249 0.001 ----- 
enrolment (m) -0.339 -0.215 -0.351 0.870 1.000
0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 ----- 
enrolment (f) 0.169 -0.013 -0.246 0.910 0.730 1.000
0.016 0.850 0.000 0.000 0.000 ----- 
consumption 0.173 0.458 0.184 -0.046 -0.140 -0.077 1.000
0.013 0.000 0.008 0.513 0.045 0.273 ----- 
openness 0.319 0.085 0.202 -0.197 -0.412 -0.046 0.215 1.000
0.000 0.225 0.004 0.005 0.000 0.516 0.002 ----- 
investment 0.090 -0.177 -0.092 -0.100 -0.160 -0.020 -0.091 0.199 1.000
0.200 0.011 0.189 0.155 0.022 0.778 0.196 0.004 ----- 
fertility -0.342 -0.103 0.242 -0.563 -0.410 -0.687 0.136 -0.194 -0.057 1.000
0.000 0.145 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.005 0.419 ----- 
mortality -0.466 -0.285 0.100 -0.469 -0.288 -0.597 -0.324 -0.401 0.027 0.815 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.706 0.000 ----- 
life expectancy 0.461 0.225 -0.144 0.469 0.321 0.599 0.283 0.361 -0.017 -0.820 -0.981 1.000
0.000 0.001 0.040 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.806 0.000 0.000 ----- 
democracy -0.390 -0.249 -0.484 0.086 0.364 0.005 -0.484 -0.397 -0.108 -0.017 0.238 -0.162 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.223 0.000 0.946 0.000 0.000 0.123 0.814 0.001 0.021 ----- 
inflation -0.341 -0.280 -0.229 -0.045 0.211 -0.138 -0.462 -0.412 0.028 0.171 0.423 -0.365 0.507 1.000
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.519 0.003 0.049 0.000 0.000 0.695 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.000 ----- 
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Table 3. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.698*** 0.768*** 
0.197 0.097 
Per capita Oil Reserve -0.076
0.153
Oil Rent 0.000 
0.003 




Observations 313 305 
Groups 13 13 
Instruments 19 19 
AR(1) -1.650* -2.540**
AR(2) -0.990 -1.850
Hansen J 7.030 9.270
Wald chi-sq 17.680*** 79.800***
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for the 
null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level 
respectively. All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has been 
rejected for each variable under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. Robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table 4. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.528 0.962* 
0.486 0.503 














Observations 300 300 
Groups 13 13 
Instruments 37 37 
AR(1) -1.630* -1.340*
AR(2) -1.000 -1.560
Hansen J 4.270 8.660
Wald chi-sq 67.180*** 30.820***
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for the null 
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level 
respectively. All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has been rejected 
for each variable under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. Robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table 5. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.469** 1.028*** 
0.237 0.387 
Per capita Oil Reserve 0.029 
0.107 
Oil Rent 0.004 
0.004 
Tertiary Enrolment -0.009 0.071 
0.011 0.128 














Observations 260 260 
Groups 13 13 
Instruments 55 55 
AR(1) -0.980* -0.610*
AR(2) -0.860 0.030
Hansen J 0.940 1.840
Wald chi-sq 206.750*** 59.810***
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. All variables are in natural logs with 
the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has been rejected for each variable under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. Robust 
standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table 6. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.476 0.639** 
0.361 0.269 
Per capita Oil Reserve -0.185*
0.107
Oil Rent 0.000 
0.002 
Tertiary Enrolment 0.115 0.121 
0.083 0.131 
Consumption 0.012 0.004 
0.079 0.081 














Observations 205 205 
Groups 12 12 
Instruments 61 61 
AR(1) -0.040* -1.080
AR(2) 4.560 -0.150
Hansen J 0.950 0.770
Wald chi-sq 27.210*** 24.480***
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. All variables are in natural logs with 
the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has been rejected for each variable under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. Robust 
standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table 7. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 2.196*** 0.481 
0.218 0.622 






















Observations 205 205 
Groups 12 12 
Instruments 60 60 
AR(1) -0.150 -0.890
AR(2) 1.420 -0.320
Hansen J 0.750 0.500
Wald chi-sq 12.010** 220.180***
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for the null hypothesis that the 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. All variables are in natural logs with 
the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has been rejected for each variable under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. Robust 
standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table 8. Panel Data Estimation 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.016 -0.011
0.017 0.014
Per capita Oil Reserve 0.003
0.003
Oil Rent 0.000 
0.000 


















Observations 205 205 
Groups 12 12 
Adjusted R-squared 0.113 0.117 
LM test for random effects 25.14*** 28.44*** 
LM test for serial correlation 8.74*** 7.97*** 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and 
Inflation. Robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table 9. Panel Data Estimation 
 Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.023* -0.018*
0.013 0.010
Per capita Oil Reserve 0.004
0.003
Oil Rent 0.001 
0.000 


















Observations 205 205 
Groups 12 12 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.116 
LM test for random effects 34.74*** 36.47*** 
LM test for serial correlation 9.78*** 9.71*** 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and 
Inflation. Robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
90 
Table 10. Dynamic Panel Estimation 
 Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.942*** 0.663 
0.127 0.819 




Per capita Oil Reserve X Low -0.352
0.452
Per capita Oil Reserve X High -0.332
0.638
Oil Rent X Low 0.004 
0.062 
Oil Rent X High 0.011 
0.037 


















Observations 205 205 
Groups 12 12 
Instruments 61 61 
AR(1) -1.490 -0.990
AR(2) 0.430 0.330
Hansen J 0.000 0.000
Wald chi-sq 335504*** 224716***
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for the null hypothesis that the overidentifying 
restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. 
The null of panel data unit root test has been rejected for each variable under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. Low (high) is a dummy variable which accounts for countries with 
higher (lower) level of per capita oil reserve or oil rent, respectively. Robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table A1. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.802*** 0.871*** 
0.166 0.114 
Per capita Oil Reserve -0.048
0.117
Oil Rent 0.001 
0.001 
Tertiary Enrolment 0.019 0.007 
0.029 0.014 
Constant 1.633 1.065 
1.383 1.018 
Observations 313 305 
Groups 13 13 
Instruments 28 28 
AR(1) -2.040** -2.650***
AR(2) -1.510 -1.790*
Hansen J 7.140 5.360
Wald chi-sq 42.980*** 59.910***
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test 
are for the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
statistical level respectively. All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit 
root test has been rejected for each variable under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 8. Robust standard errors are reported in 
italics. 
 92 
Table A2. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth  Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.994***  1.008*** 
 0.031   
Per capita Oil Reserve 0.032   
 0.136   
Oil Rent   0.002 
    
Tertiary Enrolment 0.017  -0.039 
 0.068   
Constant 0.048  0.062 
 0.177   
Observations 313  305 
Groups 13  13 
Instruments 51  51 
AR(1) -1.300  -1.280 
AR(2) -0.600  -0.570 
Hansen J 0.000  0.000 
Wald chi-sq 59804***  684372*** 
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test 
are for the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
statistical level respectively. All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit 
root test has been rejected for each variable under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. The estimation is also using year fixed 
effects. Robust standard errors are reported in italics.  
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Table A3. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth  Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.956***  0.940*** 
 0.083   
Per capita Oil Reserve -0.020   
 0.055   
Oil Rent   0.000 
    
Tertiary Enrolment 0.000  -0.004 
 0.005   
Constant 0.388  0.550 
 0.767   
Observations 313  305 
Groups 13  13 
Instruments 19  19 
AR(1) 0.220  0.190 
AR(2) -0.210  -0.800 
Hansen J 6.020  8.030 
Wald chi-sq 1262***  598*** 
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are 
for the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% 
statistical level respectively. All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit 
root test has been rejected for each variable under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. The dependent variable has been smoothed 
using a 5-year moving average. Robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table A4. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.861*** 0.844 
0.073 0.051 
Per capita Oil Reserve 0.020 
0.013 
Oil Rent 0.001 
0.000 
Tertiary Enrolment 0.009 0.012 
0.006 0.005 
Constant 0.388 0.550 
0.767 0.428 
Observations 313 305 
Groups 13 13 
Instruments 19 19 
Notes: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. All variables are in natural logs with 
the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has been rejected for each variable under analysis. This is 
the analysis based on the xtlsdvc routine of stata. Robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table A5. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth  Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.775***  1.079*** 
 0.235  0.361 
Per capita Oil Reserve -0.053   
 0.104   
Oil Rent   0.003 
   0.003 
Tertiary Enrolment 0.000  0.026 
 0.029  0.032 
Consumption -0.186  0.072 
 0.174  0.113 
Openness 0.175  -0.004 
 0.136  0.244 
Investment -0.001  -0.001 
 0.002  0.003 
Constant 1.826  -1.047 
 2.072  2.515 
Observations 300  300 
Groups 13  13 
Instruments 55  55 
AR(1) -1.740*  -1.710* 
AR(2) -0.440  -1.290 
Hansen J 6.200  5.800 
Wald chi-sq 90.490***  814.890*** 
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for 
the null hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical 
level respectively. All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has 
been rejected for each variable under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 8. Robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table A6. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 1.023*** 0.976*** 
0.050 0.075 
Per capita Oil Reserve -0.008
0.053
Oil Rent 0.003 
0.003 










Observations 300.000 300 
Groups 13.000 13 
Instruments 69.000 69 
AR(1) -1.440* -1.650*
AR(2) -0.230 -0.120
Hansen J 0.000 0.000
Wald chi-sq 108418*** 183533***
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for the null 
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. 
All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has been rejected for each variable 
under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. The estimation is also using year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table A7. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth  Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.935***  0.985*** 
 0.067  0.018 
Per capita Oil Reserve 0.019   
 0.038   
Oil Rent   -0.001 
   0.001 
Tertiary Enrolment -0.003  -0.003 
 0.010  0.022 
Consumption -0.048  -0.018 
 0.047  0.124 
Openness 0.053  0.023 
 0.071  0.034 
Investment 0.000  0.001 
 0.001  0.001 
Constant 0.489  0.108 
 0.565  0.448 
Observations 300  300 
Groups 13  13 
Instruments 37  37 
AR(1) -0.910  -0.140 
AR(2) -0.410  -1.030 
Hansen J 4.520  6.290 
Wald chi-sq 1521***  4747*** 
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for the null 
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. 
All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has been rejected for each variable 
under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. The dependent variable has been smoothed using a 5-year moving average. Robust standard errors 
are reported in italics. 
98 
Table A8. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.682** 1.272*** 
0.283 0.311 
Per capita Oil Reserve 0.021 
0.114 
Oil Rent 0.002 
0.003 
Tertiary Enrolment -0.103 0.186 
0.081 0.187 
Consumption -0.369* 0.224 
0.216 0.335 












Observations 260 260 
Groups 13 13 
Instruments 82 82 
AR(1) -1.180* -1.880*
AR(2) -0.820 -0.430
Hansen J 2.890 3.410
Wald chi-sq 42.760*** 93.940***
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for the null hypothesis 
that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. All variables are in 
natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has been rejected for each variable under analysis. Instrument lag 
limit is set to 8. Robust standard errors are reported in italics. 
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Table A9. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth  Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 1.011***  0.990*** 
 0.010  0.008 
Per capita Oil Reserve 0.055   
 0.063   
Oil Rent   0.002 
   0.002 
Tertiary Enrolment -0.039  0.025 
 0.032  0.030 
Consumption -0.369*  0.224 
 0.216  0.335 
Openness -0.250  0.305 
 0.204  0.465 
Investment 0.001  0.002 
 0.002  0.003 
Fertility -0.010  -0.670 
 0.915  0.790 
Mortality -0.216  0.446 
 0.628  0.582 
Democracy 0.130  -0.047 
 0.116  0.038 
Constant 0.042  0.043 
 0.030  0.046 
Observations 260  260 
Groups 13  13 
Instruments 85  85 
AR(1) -1.480*  -1.750* 
AR(2) -1.000  -0.520 
Hansen J 0.000  0.000 
Wald chi-sq 4660000***  2250000*** 
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for the null 
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. 
All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has been rejected for each 
variable under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. The estimation is also using year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are reported in 
italics. 
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Table A10. Dynamic Panel GMM 
Dependent Variable Per capita GDP growth Per capita GDP growth 
Lagged Dependent Variable 0.963*** 0.896*** 
0.075 0.150 
Per capita Oil Reserve 0.007 
0.022 
Oil Rent 0.000 
0.001 
















Observations 260 260 
Groups 13 13 
Instruments 55 55 
AR(1) 0.430* -0.160
AR(2) -0.220 -1.110
Hansen J 2.330 3.900
Wald chi-sq 26.990*** 5881.19***
Notes: AR(1) and AR(2) test are for the first and second order tests of serial correlation in the differenced residuals. Hansen J-test are for the null 
hypothesis that the overidentifying restrictions are valid. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% statistical level respectively. 
All variables are in natural logs with the exception of Oil rent and Inflation. The null of panel data unit root test has been rejected for each variable 
under analysis. Instrument lag limit is set to 5. The dependent variable has been smoothed using a 5-year moving average. Robust standard errors 
are reported in italics. 
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Figure 3. Classification Trees Based on the Level of Per Capita Oil Reserve 
Note: PEROIL represents per capita oil reserve. Different colours stand for different 
countries specified on the left-hand side.  














































Figure 4. Classification Trees Based on the Level of Oil Rent 
Note: OILRENT represents oil rent. Different colours stand for different countries specified 
on the left-hand side 





























Oil Price Volatility and Financial Contagion in Oil 
Exporting Countries 
Abstract 
In this chapter, we examine the oil’s role in the interconnectedness of the Arab Gulf 
financial markets with the global system. Specifically, we use the financial contagion 
framework and the Global Financial Crisis to assess: i) how affected were the six 
GCC nations stock markets; ii) what has been the role of oil in the transmission of the 
financial shocks, given that the six GCC nations are amongst the largest oil-producing 
countries in the world. Our data span from 2004 to 2015; thus giving us good 
coverage of the Global Financial Crisis and the recent Oil Crisis with the persisting 
low oil prices. We adopt a DCC-GARCH framework which allows for dynamic 
properties of correlations across the financial markets. We find that all GCC stock 
markets show statistical evidence of financial contagion, with Abu Dhabi and Saudi 
Arabia being the ones that were affected the most, as evidenced by the higher change 
in the correlation levels. By contrast, Kuwait has been the least affected, since 
financial contagion is only verified at the 10% significance level. Our findings could 
be of practical importance to investors and policy makers, particularly in the GCC 
area. 
Keywords: Oil  DCC-GARCH  GCC  Financial Contagion  Oil shocks 
JEL Classification: C5; G1; Q4 
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3.1 Introduction 
Volatility transmission across capital markets has increased due to the high financial 
interconnectedness of the global financial markets, often aided by trade and political 
unions, such as the European Union, the GCC and the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN). Therefore, volatility transmission becomes increasingly 
relevant to the financial community, policy makers, investors and regulators 
throughout the world. If, for example, there is evidence of stock market return and 
volatility spreading across markets, investors and policymakers would need to adjust 
their exposure and actions so as to prevent contagion risks following a market crisis.  
This issue has received much attention in the context of international asset markets 
(Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Syriopoulos, 2007 for stock markets; Barassi et al., 2005; 
Wang et al., 2007 for monetary markets; and Skintzi and Refenes, 2006; Johansson, 
2008 for bond markets). Most of these previously mentioned studies uncover evidence 
of important spill overs of return and volatility across financial markets. The 
respective authors argue that the intensity of the spill over is highly dependent on 
economic and financial integration and also on how aligned the monetary policies are. 
Market situations and geographical proximity also seem to play a crucial role in 
explaining the intensity of shock spill overs since the latter are found to be more 
important during crisis periods than during normal (or tranquil) ones, and more 
pronounced at the regional level than at the international level.  
The link between financial and commodity markets is also of great importance. For 
example, the link between oil prices and stock market performance has attracted a 
significant attention over the recent years, mainly driven by the oil crises and their 
repercussions on both the global economy and the local ones (that is, of the oil-
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producing countries), economies. Indeed, there is considerable transmission of 
volatility shocks across these markets due to cross-market hedging and changes in 
common information, which may affect the expectations of market participants. 
Therefore, any empirical investigation of the spill over intensity between the 
respective markets offers insights into building accurate asset pricing models and 
forecasts of the return and volatility, and therefore accurate predictions of the reliance 
of the economy on stock market and commodity market movements and co-
movements.  
3.2 Oil Price Dynamics 
The interrelation between oil and stock markets can be observed from Figure 1, which 
clearly shows why the studies on shock transmission between the two markets are 
needed. Furthermore, it demonstrates that all investors should be aware of the risk of 
important fluctuations of oil prices affecting the value of their portfolios, especially in 
recent years. 
[Figure 1 around here] 
The price dynamics of the markets being considered differed largely between 
November, 2005 and May, 2006, as the WTI oil price rose by around 30%, while the 
GCC market index experienced a sharp decline of around 25%. Afterwards, both 
indices shared some common trends, with a notable exception, in that the spectacular 
increase of oil barrel prices during the first half of 2008 was not closely followed by 
the stock market index. The rapid swings in oil prices would normally lead to 
significant adjustments in energy risk management and policies, as oil is a pricing 
benchmark for various financial instruments and plays a crucial role in international 
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asset hedging strategies. However, the swings in the oil price are not only a result of 
the Global Financial Crisis. Figure 2 presents the WTI crude oil prices, in dollars, 
from January 1987 to March 2016. 
[Figure 2 around here] 
Oil price movements show important peaks and troughs during this period. Significant 
peaks are observed around October 1990, with oil prices doubling within a year. 
Another peak is observed in September 2000, due to a continuing increase in oil prices 
since 1999. During 1992 and 2008, a continuing increase in oil prices is observed, 
with some disruptions (e.g., during 2007). A final peak is observed in June 2009, with 
prices climbing more than 60% with regards to the January 2009 price levels. The 
main troughs are observed in the early part of 1999, with prices dropping by 50% 
since 1997, and then in December 2001, where oil prices fell by 50% since September 
2000. In January 2007, prices dropped by almost 40% compared to the mid-2006 
prices, while in early 2009, a drop of about 70% vis-à-vis the June 2008 levels is 
observed.  
Demand-side oil price shocks have been driving the majority of oil price changes. One 
occurred during the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis, while a second took place in 
2000, with interest rates decreasing significantly; thus, creating pressure on the 
housing and construction industries (Filis et al., 2011). A third took place in the period 
2006–2007 due to the rising demand of oil from China, whereas a fourth demand-side 
oil price shock occurred in the most recent global financial crisis of 2008. Factors like 
the demand growth in emerging economies (e.g., China and India), and supply 
disruptions due to the US invasion of Iraq and related geopolitical risk, and a 
weakening dollar coupled with rising speculation in the oil market were responsible 
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for these shocks. More recently, another factor was the recession in the US and other 
OECD countries, triggered by the global financial crisis in the wake of the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (Hamilton, 2009).  
3.3 Oil and Financial Market Indices 
Following the major oil price shocks of the 1970s, a large body of literature finds 
significant effects of oil price shocks on the US economy6 and on other economies 
around the world (see e.g., Cologni and Manera, 2008 on OECD countries, and 
Cunado and Perez de Garcia, 2005 on Asian countries). Given the importance of oil to 
the world economy, a large body of research has investigated the effects of oil price 
shocks not only on output but also on stock markets. 
An early strand of the literature has investigated the link between oil prices and 
economic activity. In this context, the studies of Gisser and Goodwin (1986) and 
Hickman et al. (1987) confirm an inverse relationship between oil prices and 
aggregate economic activity, while Burbidge and Harrison (1984) and Bruno and 
Sachs (1982) generalise this finding in a cross-country setting. The study by Hamilton 
(1983) is the one that links the previously documented inverse relationship to events 
of crisis, finding that oil price dynamics are able to predict economic crises. 
Explaining the fundamental reasons for this inverse relationship typically rests upon 
the classic supply-side model, which proposes that rising oil prices slow GDP growth 
and stimulate inflation (Rasche and Tatom, 1977, 1981; Barro, 1984; Brown and 
                                                          
6 See for example, seminal studies on the relationship between oil prices and macro-economy 
(Hamilton, 1983). Other studies establishing the relationship between oil shocks and real economic 
activity are provided by (Hamilton, 2003), Balaz and Londarev (2006). Recent studies in this area 
include Lee and Chang (2007), Kilian and Park (2007), and Kilian (2008). 
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Yücel, 2002; Gronwald, 2008; Cologni and Manera, 2008; Kilian, 2008; Lardic and 
Mignon, 2006;, 2008; Lescaroux and Mignon, 2008). 
A separate strand of the literature is focused on the effects of oil shocks on stock 
market returns in the US, Canada, Japan, and the UK (Jones and Kaul, 1996), 
Australia (Faff and Brailsford, 1999), Emerging Markets (Basher and Sadorsky, 
2006), the Asia–Pacific region (Nandha and Faff, 2008), and in a combination of 
US/European stock markets (Park and Ratti, 2008).  
In our study we use the asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation (ADCC)-
GARCH framework using data over the 2004-2016 period for the GCC countries: 
namely, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
The ADCC-GARCH model can be successively estimated for large time-varying 
covariance matrices, while it requires the estimation of a lesser number of parameters 
than other multivariate models, such as BEKK. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first attempt to examine the stock market – oil relationship allowing for 
asymmetries in the conditional correlation process, and thus, this paper significantly 
adds to the methodological aspect of this research area. A separate contribution, this 
time to the field of financial contagion, is that our study visits the stock market – oil 
relationship from a perspective of a shock transmission channel, whereby correlations 
increase during periods of financial crisis (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). Therefore our 
study asserts that even though GCC markets may be financially segmented from the 
international markets, they are still vulnerable to financial contagion through the oil 
transmission channel. 
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3.4 Globalization, Market Integration and Shocks Propagation 
3.4.1 Definition of Contagion 
In an early contagion definition by Eichengreen and Rose (1999), contagion is defined 
as a situation where a country experiences a crisis, given that a crisis has hit another 
country. Yet, no single contagion definition exists. Relatedly, Pericoli and Sbracia 
(2003) have summarized the five most used descriptions. According to these authors, 
contagion may be defined as: i) a significant increase in the probability of a crisis in 
one country, given that a crisis has hit another country; ii) a volatility spill over on 
asset prices from the crisis country to other countries; iii) cross–country co-
movements of asset prices over and above those explained by fundamentals; iv) a 
significant increase in co-movements of price quantities across markets, conditional 
on a crisis occurring in one market; v) an intensification or more generally a creation 
of a transmission channel after a shock occurs in a market (shift-contagion). 
Shift-contagion, introduced by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), is one of the most widely 
used definitions in the recent literature. Correlation coefficients are utilized to identify 
contagion, but because they are conditional on market volatility, when markets are 
volatile, for example during periods of crisis, the coefficients present an upward bias. 
Therefore, an adjustment for heteroscedasticity is necessarily implemented; hence 
contagion evidence can change dramatically, as for example in the cases of the 1997 
East Asian and the 1987 US market crises. The underlying cause for this change lies 
in the fact that strong linkages that exist even in calm periods may carry on during 
periods of turmoil. By contrast, an actual increase in those linkages is the subject of 
investigation under contagion (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). In the first case, where 
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contagion does not exist, the term interdependence is used in order to describe the 
constantly high correlations between the markets. 
Much research has been executed based on the pioneering work of King and 
Wadhwani (1990), who use correlation coefficients; albeit without adjusting for 
heteroscedasticity. The idea presented by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) as an extension 
of the research conducted by King and Wadhwani (1990) is more representative of the 
reality of contagion and will be used throughout this research dissertation as the base 
for empirical examination. 
3.4.2 Channels of Contagion 
Desai (2003) identifies two channels for contagion: trade and fund withdrawal. The 
former would usually materialize due to an economic crisis affecting the amount of 
trade of goods between countries. The latter is more related to financial destabilization 
with investors withdrawing funds from highly distressed and risky countries in an 
attempt to reduce their exposure. Glick and Rose (1999) suggest that an examination 
of international trade patterns is more pertinent, as currency crises, and consequently 
withdrawal of funds, tend to have a regional character. On the other hand, Van 
Rijckehem and Weder (2001) provide evidence that fund withdrawal explains 
contagion more accurately. In reality, both channels are interrelated and usually cause 
each other. As financial problems in a country unveil, investors start withdrawing 
funds, thereby reducing liquidity, which deepens the original crisis and as a 
consequence the amount of business conducted with that country reduces, based on 
fears of counterparty risk.  
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Bekaert et al. (2014) provide an extensive analysis of six potential contagion channels. 
The first two, banking sector links and domestic financial policies, are closely linked. 
With a crisis starting from the banking sector, the financial crisis spreads mainly 
within the sector and as a result financial policies and capital injections are introduced. 
The result effect of these policies is to transfer any potential risk from banks to 
governments thus initiating possible contagion. 
The remaining four contagion channels of Bekaert et al. (2014) are more closely 
related to the fund withdrawal theory of Desai (2003), and are also supported from 
Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) and Coudert and Gex (2010). The first one refers to the 
globalization hypothesis and is based on the fact that a crisis mostly affects economies 
that are highly integrated on a global scale, as the shock from one country can easily 
be transferred to another. The second channel, information asymmetries decrease, 
refers to the preference of investors relying on cheap public information during a 
crisis, increasing correlation on fund flows.  
The wake-up call is another important channel, according to Bekaert et al. (2014). 
During a crisis event, investors re-assess their exposure to vulnerable countries that 
pose a high risk to their portfolios; as a result, they tend to withdraw investments from 
those countries, thereby initiating a contagion effect. The wake-up call phenomenon 
has been one of the main reasons for the European Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC) in 
2010. The last channel is attributed to, the herding behaviour of investors, and is 
closely correlated with the wake-up call. As some investors start to withdraw funds 
from a country, all the investors will follow this strategy. According to Bekaert et al. 
(2014), the wake-up call and the financial policies are the two main channels that have 
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affected the global economy for a number of years but the remaining channels are 
treated as equally important.  
However, the GCC countries have a certain peculiarity: their reliance on oil revenue. 
As such it may be expected that abrupt oil price changes could be used to transmit any 
instability from other parts of the globe into the region. It has been suggested that 
shocks in oil prices can affect the economic conditions (see, for example, Wu and 
Cavallo, 2012, for an investigation on the US economy and oil-related events over the 
period 1984 – 2006. A focal point in oil-related studies is to disentangle whether oil 
shocks are demand or supply driven, which is not always clear-cut (Melolinna, 2012).7 
In this paper we are more interested in the way oil price shocks, irrespectively of their 
origin, affect the financial markets. A CAPM application for the Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) oil and gas sectors is offered in Mohanty, Nandha and Bota (2010) 
over the period from 1998 to 2010 period. They did not find any significant 
association between oil prices and stock returns for the full period but their analysis 
supports the contention that an oil risk factor is in place during a global financial 
crisis. In the context of emerging stock markets, the effect of oil shocks is generally 
found to be significant over both the short and long run (Papapetrou, 2001; Basher and 
Sadorsky, 2006; Maghyereh and Al-Kandari, 2007). The study by Malik and Ewing 
(2009) employs a bivariate GARCH model and finds evidence of volatility 
transmission among several US sectorial equity indices and oil prices. However, some 
of the smaller emerging markets, especially in the GCC, have not received the proper 
attention, given the importance of oil in these economies. One of the reasons may be 
7 For a more detailed overview of demand and supply oil shocks and how they affect the 
macroeconomic environment we direct you to Killian (2009, 2010). 
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the fact that the GCC stock markets are largely segmented from the international 
markets and are highly sensitive to political events (Arouri et al., 2011).  
Zarour (2006) employed a VAR model to study the oil-stock market short-run links in 
Saudi Arabia and Oman, finding evidence that encompassing oil price changes in a 
stock market return model can enhance its predictive power. In a similar setting, 
Arouri and Fouquau (2009) used a nonparametric method to investigate the short-run 
relationships between oil prices and stock markets and showed some evidence of 
nonlinearities for the cases of Qatar, Oman, and UAE. 
Arouri and Rault (2010) evaluate the sensitivity of GCC stock markets to oil prices 
over the period 1996 to 2007, using monthly data and a Granger causality approach. 
The authors verify the presence of a causal relationship for the case of Saudi Arabia 
between stock markets and oil price changes. Therefore, the authors conclude that 
investors in the GCC stock markets should look at the changes in oil prices. Causality 
and co-integration tests have been adopted by Hammoudeh and Aleisa (2004) and 
Hammoudeh and Choi (2006) that also show a long-run bidirectional relation between 
the Saudi Arabian stock market and oil price changes that persists when controlling 
for the global market sentiment and macroeconomic environment. Lescaroux and 
Mignon (2008) investigate long-run and short-run relationships between oil and stock 
prices and find evidence of positive causality from oil prices to stock prices in some 
GCC countries. 
The seminal paper by Maghyereh and Al-Kandari (2007) shows evidence of a 
nonlinear impact of oil prices on stock prices, which affects the course of future 
research towards models that allow for non-linearities.  A VAR-GARCH approach has 
been used in the study by Arouri et al. (2011) to investigate the return links and 
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volatility transmission between oil and stock markets in the GCC over the period 2005 
to 2010. The findings are in support of the contention that oil prices carry an 
influential power over the return and volatility of the GCC stock markets. Fayyad and 
Daly (2011) examine the relationship between oil price and stock market returns for 
the GCC, the UK and the US, adopting a VAR framework over the period from 
September 2005 to December 2010. Their findings suggest that during periods of 
crisis the predictive power of oil price changes over stock market returns increases, 
with Qatar and the UAE being the most responsive to oil shocks.  
Filis et al. (2011) use a DCC GARCH set up to investigate time-varying correlation 
between the stock market prices and oil prices of oil-importing and oil-exporting 
countries, albeit the GCC countries are not included in their sample. The authors fail 
to find significant differences between the two types of countries; they do find, 
however, that global business cycle fluctuations affect the oil demand-side and 
consequently the correlations with the stock market. Therefore, oil prices can work as 
a transmission channel for economic instability across countries. 
3.4.3 From Market Integration to Contagion 
All empirical work on contagion focuses on one important characteristic, the 
integration of financial markets. Potential market integration is one of the main 
reasons for contagion, as the shocks can be transferred easily from one market to the 
other (Bekaert et al., 2005; Cappiello et al., 2006). As expected, most of the literature 
around the concepts of stock market integration and financial contagion is focused on 
the European Union. At the same time the link between stock market integration, 
financial contagion and oil prices has not received the proper attention it deserves. 
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Hardouvelis et al. (2006) examine the stock market integration among 11 EU 
countries over the 1992-1998 period, based on the initial assumption that market 
integration occurred before the adoption of the Euro, while these countries were 
converging towards a common currency. Using weekly data and an empirical asset-
pricing model based on the model of Bekaert and Harvey (1995), they observe 
significant market integration between the EU countries, with the exception of the 
UK. The evidence of integration within Europe is straightforward prior to the 
introduction of the Euro, which resulted from the efforts of EU countries to satisfy the 
Maastricht criteria and converge towards German levels (Hardouvelis et al., 2006). 
In addition, Baele and Inghelbrecht (2009, p.2) argue that globalization – and as a 
consequence, integration – “have led to a gradual convergence of country to industry 
betas, especially in Europe”, and this results in a gradual decrease in country- specific 
risk.  The reasons that market betas vary is based on three facts. First, as markets 
become increasingly integrated, global factor exposure tends to increase. Second, 
changes in industry and regulations will lead to changes in betas over time. Third, 
country and industry betas usually fluctuate over a business cycle even if no structural 
changes are observed. Based on this approach of betas they use the two factor model 
of Bekaert et al. (2005), extending it by including a regime-switching intercept to 
capture cyclical variation in betas or structural changes. Their study of 21 countries 
and 18 global industries evaluates the superiority of country to industry diversification 
strategies, but as a side result offers insightful observations on integration. Baele and 
Inghelbrecht (2009) observe that while global industry betas are mostly unaffected by 
structural changes, European market betas have converged towards one as an effect of 
the introduction of the Euro, which reduced the home bias of European 
investors (Baele et al., 2007; Gérard and De Sandris, 2006). This provides evidence of 
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substantial market integration within Europe and, to a smaller extent, within the global 
economy.  
One other main result of this study is the apparent importance of geographical 
diversification to industry diversification. Industry diversification is important, as 
presented in other studies (Baur, 2012), while geographical diversification will ensure 
the minimization of investors’ risks. Industry diversification is also very topical in the 
GCC countries, where over-exposure to the oil industry has caused economic 
recessions during the oil crises of the 1970s and 1980s, thereby forcing the 
governments to invest in diversifying their industries into manufacturing, financial 
services and tourism, so as to withstand any future impact on economic growth due to 
oil price fluctuation. 
The results from Baele and Inghelbrecht (2009) are reinforced from the study 
performed from Bekaert et al. (2009) on stock co-movements. The widely used two-
factor CAPM model from Bekaert et al. (2005), alongside an arbitrage pricing theory 
(APT) model, examines the correlations of portfolio returns from 23 developed 
countries from 1980 until 2005. Market integration appears to be significant between 
European markets, followed by a global integration to a smaller extent. This increase 
in return correlations, which is likely to be permanent, results from trade openness 
(Baele and Inghelbrecht, 2009) and erodes potential diversification. Nevertheless, the 
main findings of this study agree with the results from Baele and Inghelbrecht (2009) 
that international diversification is superior to industry benefits.  
Similarly, Bley (2009) examines the degree of market integration, focusing on Europe. 
The author follows a sectorial approach that is similar to that used by Phylaktis and 
Xia (2009), but extends the data from 1998 to 2006, incorporating six industry sector 
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indices for 11 European countries. It is evident from this study that significant market 
integration occurred in European markets after 1992 but that the monetary policy 
convergence has led, possibly temporarily, to a decline in market integration. 
Following the same approach of sector and industry examination, Bekaert et al. (2013) 
study the impact of the European Union and Eurozone on market integration. This 
approach is based on industry expected earnings, growth and valuation differentials 
from 1990 until 2007. Based on their analysis, the researchers conclude that EU 
membership contributes towards financial integration regardless of whether a country 
adopted the Euro; these results support the previous studies by Engel and Rogers 
(2004), Goldberg and Verboven (2005), and Hardouvelis et al. (2006). 
Through the examination of the related literature it is observed that the studies above 
present clearly the increasing integration of the global markets. However, the financial 
integration during this time poses significant contagion threats. Interestingly, early 
contagion studies precede market integration studies, focusing on significant market 
crashes in the 1980s and 1990s. However, due to the primary focus of these studies in 
terms of country composition, the oil channel has not received the proper attention. 
Hamao et al. (1990) offers one of the early studies on contagion, focusing on stock 
return variances based on trading information and volume, and the study of Barclay et 
al. (1990), who examine stock returns on international markets. King and Wadhwani 
(1990) are the first to coin the term contagion, though, for their study related to the 
October 1987 market crash. Correlation coefficients were used in order to search for 
volatility transmission, setting the first step for the subsequent studies. 
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While the remaining decade studies focused mostly on a more theoretical approach 
using simpler CAPM models (Glick and Rose, 1999; Van Rijckehem and Weder, 
2001), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) examine the 1997 Asian crisis, 1994 Mexican 
devaluation and 1987 US market crash using correlation coefficients. After correcting 
for the heteroscedasticity criticism, it has become clear there is no risk contagion or 
“shift-contagion”. The results observed indicate a high level of market co-movement 
known as interdependence.  
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) use the 24 largest markets in terms of market 
capitalization and another four markets (Argentina, Chile, Philippines and Russia). 
Their results are consistent with other studies (Basu, 2002; Corsetti et al., 2005; Bordo 
and Murshid, 2006). However, the correction proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002) 
was criticized by Corsetti et al. (2005) on the basis that if the data include a common 
factor (such as oil prices or changing interest rates), the bias adjustment is not 
allowed. 
Based on the work of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), Serwa and Bohl (2005) investigated 
contagion between Western European stock markets (already sufficiently integrated) 
and Central and Eastern European markets, related to seven financial shocks from 
1997 to 2002. They find that contagion hardly occurred between the two regions 
during the crises examined. Some of the results presented directly contrast with the 
study by Glick and Rose (1999), which suggests that geographical proximity is a 
driver for contagion. One of their main findings is that Western markets are more 
globally integrated compared to markets such as Greece, Ireland or Portugal, because 
the former are more mature and larger markets compared to the latter. 
 121 
Bekaert et al. (2005) examine data of on 22 countries across Asia, Europe and Latin 
America from 1980 until 1998, in order to uncover evidence of market integration and 
contagion. They criticize the approach of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) according to the 
view of Corsetti et al. (2005). For this reason, they use a version of the conditional 
CAPM model where two factors are defined as the US market and a regional market. 
The variance of the idiosyncratic return shocks is then examined using a GARCH 
model similarly to that of Coudert and Gex (2010). As a result, even though increases 
in residual correlations are found, no contagion from the Mexican crisis is observed.  
The study of contagion performed by Phylaktis and Xia (2009) investigates the equity 
market co-movement and contagion at the sector level in Europe, Asia and Latin 
America from 1990 until 2004. It is recognized that shocks propagate through some 
sectors of the economy while other sectors offer diversification benefits despite the 
contagion the market experiences. According to Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and 
Tai (2004), sectors such as banking may constitute a major channel of contagion. 
Even though Phylaktis and Xia (2009) recognize that the correction on biased 
correlations is sensible, they do not neglect the critique by Corsetti et al. (2005). The 
model used in this study is based on the study of by Bekaert et al. (2005), along with 
an examination of the residuals based on a GARCH model with asymmetric effects in 
conditional variance. 
Phylaktis and Xia (2009) focus their analysis on 10 industry sectors in 29 smaller 
markets and observed a sudden shift from regional beta to universal beta dominance. 
This shift indicates that contagion may be persistent at the sector level and while they 
observed global contagion through several sectors during the Mexican crisis (in 
contrast to Bekaert et al., 2005), no such result was observed during the Asian crisis.  
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Coudert and Gex (2010) assess contagion in the credit default swaps (CDS) market, 
examining the automotive industry crisis in the US in 2005 and whether it affected 
other sectors of the economy. Correlation in the CDS prices was adjusted for a 
possible bias (Boyer et al., 1997; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). The use of 
Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA) and Dynamic Conditional 
Correlation (DCC) GARCH models was considered important in order to verify the 
results, as the limitation of the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) calculation is that it 
provides correlations without analysing the underlying dynamics, while these 
techniques can achieve that (Beltratti and Morana, 1999; Lopez and Walter, 2000; 
Ferreira and Lopez, 2005). Coudert and Gex (2010) conclude that there is evidence of 
a significant rise in correlations from the strong interdependence in the industry that 
influences the financial sector through counterparty risk and the slight “shift 
contagion” that is observed. 
Albeit early examinations of crises had concluded that contagion was rare or did not 
exist (Forbes and Rigobon 2002; Bekaert et al. 2005), an increasing number of studies, 
using more advanced techniques, have concluded that there are several instances of 
contagion – particularly during the global financial crisis of 2007. 
More recently, Baur (2012), following partly the model of Bekaert et al. (2005), 
examines 10 sectors in 25 developed and emerging economies from 1979 until 2009. 
This study examines the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 (GFC hereafter) by setting 
the crisis period according to both the economic events and the statistical results, and 
observes significant contagion among stock markets and sectors. Even though strong 
contagion is observed and the effect of the financial sector is significant, there are 
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sectors in the different economies that are not significantly affected. Sectors like 
Healthcare, Telecommunications and Technology still provide diversification benefits. 
Bekaert et al. (2014) analyse the potential contagion transmission of the GFC to 415 
country industry equity portfolios across 55 countries. Even though they accept the 
definition of contagion from Forbes and Rigobon (2002), they use a factor model very 
similar to the one proposed by Bekaert et al. (2005): volatility that exceeds the 
estimate of the model is considered to be contagion. Based on their model analysis, it 
is realized that contagion exists during the financial crisis but their model has to allow 
for shifts in factor exposures that have not originally been taken into account. One of 
the most interesting conclusions after their analysis is that the contagion experienced 
is mainly domestic and not global.  
So far the research has focused on integration and contagion worldwide, revealing 
presenting a lack of evidence of contagion during the early studies. However, as 
globalization and consequently integration increase, more instances of contagion are 
likely to be observed. One of the most profound examples of an integrated economic 
union, and therefore a workhorse for contagion studies, is the European Monetary 
Union (EMU). Important research has been conducted on the integration of the EMU 
countries and the possible instances of contagion experienced during recent financial 
crises. 
3.4.5 The EMU Case: Market integration and contagion 
Yang et al. (2003) examine the market indices for 11 EMU countries and the US from 
1996 until 2001 in one of the earliest studies on EMU integration. Using vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models, the authors present the correlation coefficients and 
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observe that EMU markets are have become significantly more integrated after since 
the union formation. Non-member countries (UK) show reduced integration compared 
to the member countries. 
Kim et al. (2005) extend the study of by Yang et al. (2003). First, they take in all the 
pre-enlargement EU-15 member countries. Secondly the data collected span over a 
larger time period. While Bley (2009) has not taken into account the view of Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002), Kim et al. (2005) realize the presence of heteroscedasticity in the 
market returns and examine the data using a bivariate GARCH model. Their results 
indicate that spill overs in returns and volatility from one country to the other have 
significant effects to on the recipient; thus confirming contagion. As stock market 
integration increases, it poses a danger to potential diversification strategies within the 
EMU. However, smaller member states are not fully integrated so diversification 
opportunities still exists (Kim et al., 2005). 
Cappiello et al. (2006) introduce a new variation of the dynamic conditional 
correlation (DCC) GARCH model of Engle (2002), (the asymmetric generalized (AG) 
DCC-GARCH model), in order to examine linkages between countries. Based on a 
sample of 21 countries, the authors conclude that conditional equity correlations have 
increased within the EMU after since the introduction of the single currency, even for 
the UK (thus contradicting part of the results of Kim et al., 2005).  
Syllignakis and Kouretas (2011) use the DCC-GARCH model to examine seven 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) equity markets from 1997 until 2009, and the US 
S&P500 and German DAX as factors. The results suggest that increased market 
integration and the partaking participation of foreign investors have reduced the 
diversification benefits. According to the authors, the contagion observed in the 
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results is an outcome of the herding behaviour in the financial markets of CEE around 
the financial turmoil of 2007-2009, when international investors started liquidating 
their positions. 
Pappas et al. (2016) examine the financial market integration and contagion effects in 
the EU during the recent financial crisis. A wide range of countries was selected and 
the stock market data examined spans from 2001 until 2011. The authors follow the 
definition of contagion proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), and use the DCC-
GARCH model of Engle (2002) to examine the correlations. The results indicate 
contagion effects in several countries but the Markov-Switching regime model used to 
indicate the initiation of different crises shows clear results of varying financial 
market integration. It is evident that contagion within the EU was not only observed 
but also showed a varying synchronization pattern across the countries concerned.  
Olbrys and Majewska (2014) examine the potential crisis period on the eight CEE 
stock markets from 2004 until 2013. Following the work of Pagan and Sossounov 
(2003), they divide the markets into bullish and bearish periods, and then execute the 
test to conclude that the period of the GFC (2007-2009) coincides with the CEE crisis 
and that Slovenia and Slovakia have been considerably influenced from by the ESDC.  
On the other hand, Claeys and Vašíček (2014) focus their study on the ESDC that 
started in 2010 with the bailout reform package issued for Greece. Their approach is 
focused on EU sovereign bond markets and examines the magnitude and direction of 
linkages by proposing an original approach based on the VAR approach of Diebold 
and Yilmaz (2009). The analysis suggests that there was significant contagion from 
Greece to the other EMU countries, followed by sudden spikes in the spill over index 
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that originated from Portugal and Ireland, especially due to the uncertainty created 
from by financial assistance packages.  
The studies presented above recognize the increased integration in the EMU and the 
contagion experienced as a result, yet they focus only on the financial sector, without 
looking at other factors that could be related to the transmission of the crisis. Albeit 
the EMU and the GCC have several commonalities in terms of a union (i.e., the GCC 
have proposed the introduction of a common currency) they have important 
differences too. Most importantly, the GCC are reliant on oil export income which, 
given the highly volatile oil prices, can severely destabilize their economies. As a 
result, a financial contagion study for the GCC needs to take into account the role of 
oil prices, similarly to the studies of Filis et al., (2011) and Fayyad and Daly (2011). 
3.5 Methodology 
In modelling the interactions between oil prices and stock markets the literature has 
followed a variety of approaches. Most of these studies can fall into two broad 
categories according to their focus. The first category uses approaches that focus on 
modelling the mean process (e.g., VARs, Granger causality), while the second (and 
more recent) focuses on the volatility (e.g., multivariate GARCH models). Volatility 
modelling supersedes chronologically the approaches dealing with the mean process, 
while it has certain advantages over its older counterpart. Most importantly, the 
volatility is more responsive (i.e., more informative) with respect to crisis events. In 
addition, recent multivariate volatility models (e.g., DCC) are easy to estimate and 
interpret, whereas multivariate modelling of the mean process is still subject to the 
dimensionality curse.    
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3.5.1 Studies modelling the mean process 
Jones and Kaul's (1996) initial study tests the reaction of advanced stock markets 
(Canada, UK, Japan, and US) to oil price shocks, using a standard cash-flow dividend 
valuation model. Their finding is that for the US and Canada stock markets, reactions 
can be predicted by the scale of the oil shocks.  
Huang et al. (1996) use unrestricted vector autoregressive (VAR) to confirm a 
significant relationship between a set of US oil company share prices and oil price 
changes, while no link was established between the market proxy and oil price 
respectively. When Sadorsky (1999) introduced GARCH effects to an unrestricted 
VAR he documented a significant relationship between oil price changes and 
aggregate stock returns. The method used by Miller and Ratti (2009) focuses on the 
long-run relationship between oil price and international stock markets during the 
1971 – 2008 period. Their findings support the well-documented inverse relationship 
till the early 21st century, when stock markets may have been subjected to bubble 
events. 
Zarour (2006) apply a VAR focusing in on the Gulf Countries and finding evidence in 
support of the response of the stock markets to oil price shocks, particularly during oil 
crises. Maghyereh and Al-Kandari (2007), allow for nonlinearities in the stock market 
– oil price relationship in the GCC countries and their results supported the statistical 
analysis of a nonlinear modelling relationship between oil and the economy, which is 
consistent with Mork et al. (1994), and Hamilton (2000). Arouri and Rault (2010) 
adopt a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach coupled with Wald tests and 
Granger causality to analyse the sensitivity of GCC stock markets to oil prices over 
the 1996 – 2008 period. The authors find evidence of a bi-directional causal 
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relationship between stock markets and oil prices for the case of Saudi Arabia only. 
The remaining GCC markets show evidence of a uni-directional relationship where oil 
prices Granger-cause stock market price changes. 
3.5.2 Studies modelling the volatility process 
Studies investigating the relationship between stock market and oil prices using the 
volatility channel are increasing. An early approach by Ewing and Thompson (2007) 
in this field uses the cyclical components of oil prices and stock prices when 
modelling the dynamic co-movements, and their findings support the procyclicality of 
oil prices and stock prices by around 6 months.  
Bharn and Nikolovann (2010) use a bivariate EGARCH model to account for 
asymmetries in the volatility spill overs between oil prices and stock markets in 
Russia. They identified three major events (i.e. the September 11th, 2001 terrorist 
attack, the war in Iraq in 2003 and the civil war in Iraq in 2006) which gave rise to 
negative correlations between the Russian stock market and the oil prices.  
A univariate regime-switching EGARCH model is applied by Aloui and Jammazi 
(2009) to crude oil shocks and the UK, French and Japanese stock markets. The 
authors provided evidence that common recessions coincide with the low mean and 
high variance regime. Lee and Chiou (2011) use a similar framework to examine the 
relationship between WTI oil prices and S&P500 returns. Their conclusion during 
periods of crisis verifies that oil price changes, particularly negative ones, lead to 
negative impacts on the S&P 500.  
Cifarelli and Paladino (2010) use a multivariate constant conditional correlation 
(CCC)-GARCH model and their analysis shows evidence of a negative link between 
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oil price changes and stock price/exchange rate changes. Choi and Hammoudeh 
(2010) utilise a dynamic conditional correlation (DCC)-GARCH model to study 
fluctuations in a variety of oil price measures (Brent, WTI) and their relationship to 
commodities (e.g., gold, copper, silver) and stock markets. Their findings are in 
support of the negative relationship between oil price and stock market changes, albeit 
the finding does not hold for the commodities. Chang, McAleer, and Tansuchat (2010) 
further verify the same negative relationship while allowing for a variety of US stock 
market indices. The study of by Filis et al., (2011) uses a DCC-GJR GARCH model in 
an attempt to consolidate the multivariate framework with asymmetric effects in the 
volatility process, with and their findings are in line with earlier studies. 
The extensive use of the DCC-GARCH (Dynamic Conditional Correlation) model and 
its ability to capture the time-varying nature of correlations and volatilities make it an 
appealing candidate for use in our context as it can provide robust results. Our 
analysis uses a similar approach to those of  Billio and Caporin (2005),  Pelletier 
(2006), and Chiang et al. (2007) and summarized by Pappas et al. (2016).  
3.5.3 DCC-GARCH 
The DCC-GARCH was developed by Engle (2002) as a direct generalization of the 
Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) GARCH model of Bollerslev (1990). As 
GARCH models can be used to deal with the problem of volatility bias presented by 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) they can be useful in financial contagion studies. The 
DCC-GARCH model has the flexibility of the univariate GARCH model but not the
complexity of VEC models (Engle and Kroner, 1995) or of the conventional 
multivariate GARCH. In addition, it eliminates the restricting assumption of a CCC-
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GARCH on time-invariant correlations. As DCC allows combination with univariate 
GARCH it has the potential to capture asymmetric or long-memory effects.  
In the first stage of the analysis, univariate GARCH models are fit for the daily returns 
on each of the equity indices. Following a demeaning process  (Engle and Sheppard, 
2001), the residual returns are obtained according to the following regression model:  
 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 (1) 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 is the returns of the equity index. 
In the second step, the parameters of the variance model are estimated using the 
residual errors (𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖) from the first step and a simple GARCH model is utilized such 
that: 
 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 ~ 𝛮𝛮(0,𝛨𝛨𝑖𝑖) (2) 
where 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 is a m x 1 column vector of the residuals from equation (1), m is the number 
of time series (countries) considered and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 is a m x 1 column vector of standardized 
residual returns. 𝛨𝛨𝑖𝑖 is the m x m conditional covariance matrix:  
 𝛨𝛨𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 (3) 
Where 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑(ℎ1𝑖𝑖1 2⁄ , … . ,ℎ𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖1 2⁄ ) 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is a m x m matrix of correlations differing from CCC-GARCH in the sense that the 
correlations in the latter are constant while in DCC they are time-varying. 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 is the 
diagonal matrix of the standard deviations of the time-varying residual returns, of size 
m x m, obtained from univariate GARCH (1,1). More specifically,  
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 ℎ𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖−12 + 𝛽𝛽2ℎ𝑖𝑖−12  (4) 
The model is estimated via a log-likelihood function assuming conditional normality. 
Even though the distribution is often misspecified, the quasi-maximum likelihood 
estimator exists, resulting in consistency and normality (Engle and Sheppard 2001). 
According to Engle (2002), the log-likelihood function that helps determine the 
parameters in Equations (4) and (6) is:  
 
𝑟𝑟 = − 12�(𝑛𝑛 𝑟𝑟𝑙𝑙𝑑𝑑(2𝜋𝜋) + log(|𝛨𝛨𝑖𝑖|) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖′𝛨𝛨𝑖𝑖𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖)𝑇𝑇
𝑖𝑖=1
 





 Since, εt′Dt−2εt = εt′Dt−1Dt−1εt = (Dt−1εt)′Dt−1εt = νt′νt, 
 
l = − 12�(n log(2π) + 2log(|Dt|) + εt′Dt−2εtT
t=1
−











From equations (6) and (7), it is observed that the log-likelihood function is separated 
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into parts for variances and correlations. Variance parameters are determined without 
determinations of the correlation parts by maximizing (6).  
In the final step, correlation coefficients at 𝑡𝑡 are determined between equity index 𝑖𝑖 
and 𝑗𝑗 from the following equation: 
𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡]
�𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1[ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 ]�𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1[ 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡2 ] = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1[�ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜈𝜈1𝑡𝑡�ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝜈𝜈𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡]�𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1[ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 ]�𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1[ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 𝜈𝜈𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡2 ] = 𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1[𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝜈𝜈𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡]�𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1[ 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡2 ]�𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑡−1[ 𝜈𝜈𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡2 ] =
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1[𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜈𝜈𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖] 
where: 
𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1[𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 ] = 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1[ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 ] = ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1[𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2 ] = 1 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 matrix is constituted from the correlations ρijt and its diagonal elements are unity. 
So: 
 Let 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖−1[𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖′𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖]. Then, 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 = (𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖))−12𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖(𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑(𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖))−12 (8) 
It is assumed that Qt follows an autoregressive process in order to parameterize the 
correlation coefficient ρt. 
𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼𝛼 − 𝛽𝛽)𝑆𝑆 + 𝛼𝛼𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖−1𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖−1′ + 𝛽𝛽𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖−1 (9) 
Where 𝛼𝛼 and 𝛽𝛽 are scalar parameters and the following restrictions need to hold. 
𝛼𝛼 > 0,𝛽𝛽 ≥ 0 
𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽 < 1 
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where 𝑆𝑆 is the unconditional correlation coefficient matrix comprised of the residuals 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. The correlations are estimated in the second stage of the analysis and are used as 
predetermined values in this stage. The parameters of the time-varying correlations are 
estimated by maximizing equation (7). 
3.5.4 Statistical analysis of DCC behaviour 
Following the approach used by Kenourgios (2014), four dummy variables are created 
which are equal to one for each period of the crises and zero otherwise according to 
the period identification above. Using various dummy variables allows identifying one 
to identify which of the phases, across the stable and turmoil periods, exhibit a 
statistically significant contagion (rise in conditional correlations) for the indices 
examined. This approach is based on: 
where 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is the pairwise conditional correlation (DCC) between different indices 
and the dummy variable 𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖(k=1….7) corresponds to the four phases of the global 
financial crisis. 
3.6 Data 
The data compromises daily stock market equity indices of ten stock markets 
denominated in USD, in line with similar financial contagion studies, see for example, 
Baur (2012) and Pappas et al. (2016), among others. The data has been acquired from 
Datastream and covers the period from 1st January 2004 until 2nd March 2016, leading 
to a sample size of 3,175 observations per sector per country. We also include the 
 
𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 = 𝑐𝑐0 + �𝑟𝑟𝑘𝑘𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖7
𝑘𝑘=1
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 (10) 
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S&P 500, a benchmark for the global economy and two oil price series Oil WTI and 
Oil Brent. The reason for selecting this range of years is to avoid any missing 
observations that occur for several stock markets before 2004. At the same time our 
range gives us a good coverage of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007.  
The main stock markets in our study are located in the following countries: Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE (Abu Dhabi and Dubai), Ecuador, Nigeria 
and Venezuela. The first six countries comprise the GCC and share similar 
characteristics, such as, common history and language, fixed exchange rates to the 
USD, heavy reliance on oil exports (apart from Bahrain) and a high income with 
respect to other developing economies. The latter three oil exporting countries do not 
belong to any organization, apart from OPEC, and serve as a benchmark. 
3.7 Results 
3.7.1 Dataset and Initial Analysis 
For each stock index the continuously compounded return is estimated as 𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 =ln (𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖−1)⁄ , where 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 is the price at the end of the day 𝑡𝑡.8 Tables 1-4 report key 
descriptive statistics for the full, pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. For the 
definition of the crisis we have used the official timelines provided by the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS, 2009) and the Federal Reserve Board of St. Louis 
(2009), which separate the Global Financial Crisis into four phases. Phase 1 starts on 
the 1st of August 2007 and ends on the 15th of September 2008 and is termed the 
“initial financial turmoil”. Phase 2, spanning from 16th September 2008 until 31st 
8 To remove excessive spikes, we winsorise at the 99.9% of the return series, a standard practice in this 
field. 
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December 2008, is a period of “sharp financial market deterioration”. Phase 3 is 
termed as “macroeconomic deterioration” (1st January 2009 – 31st March 2009) and 
Phase 4 as “stabilization and tentative signs of recovery” from 1st April 2009 
onwards. Therefore, the crisis can be defined as running from August 2007 until 
March 2009 covering the first three phases. In our analysis, we term this period as 
“Crisis”, while every observation preceding and following this period is termed as 
pre-crisis and post-crisis respectively  
All stock markets featured gains during the pre-crisis period, with most markets 
exceeding the S&P 500 global benchmark. This finding is in line with the risk-return 
doctrine whereby developing markets compensate investors that are willing to take on 
greater risk. For example, Dubai recorded the highest daily gain (0.156 %) in the pre-
crisis period but also the second largest loss during the crisis period (-0.230%). 
Interestingly, Bahrain shows the lowest volatility across all sub-periods. This is quite 
important, given that the Kingdom relies mostly on financial services. 
Financial returns of all stock market indices exhibit the usual characteristics of excess 
kurtosis and skewness across all periods. Interestingly, autocorrelation is strongly 
present for most of these developing markets but at a varying extent. For instance, the 
GCC countries show lower coefficients than the remaining oil exporting economies, a 
potential sign of a more developed financial system. The US, as proxied by the S&P 
500, does not show any evidence of stock returns predictability across all periods but 
the post-crisis. Lastly, the two commodity prices remain unpredictable across all 
market periods. In terms of volatility in the financial markets of the respective 
countries, there are a few cases, namely Kuwait, Dubai and Bahrain, which are more 
stable than the S&P 500 over the full sample and during the crisis period. Others, such 
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as Saudi Arabia and Qatar are either of comparable or of slightly higher volatility 
during the same periods. In terms of stock market development, the efficient market 
hypothesis holds for the S&P 500 across the full sample and the pre-crisis period, 
while it collapses under crisis and post-crisis. In the GCC the findings are mixed. 
Some of the most developed financial markets (in terms of market capitalisation and 
openness) such as Bahrain and Dubai are not weak form efficient pre-crisis. However, 
Dubai shows evidence that the weak form efficiency holds during the crisis and post 
crisis times. Conversely, for the Bahraini stock market, the efficient market hypothesis 
holds only in the post-crisis period.  
[Tables 1 – 4 around here] 
Figures 3-4 show the evolution of the stock market price and returns for the sample 
under investigation. As most of these are either developing or frontier markets, the 
existence of pronounced spikes or evidence of a stock market developing in the last 
few years is evident. For all stock markets the impact of the global financial crisis is 
clear around the 2007-2009 period with an upward trend leading to the start of the 
crisis and a sustained price drop onwards. Some countries show more than one crisis 
experiences. For example, Saudi Arabia experienced a stock market crisis from 
around the late 2005- to early 2006, which is evident in the specific graph. Similarly, 
the stock market in Venezuela reflects the dire economic situation in the country 
where the local currency (bolivar) has collapsed and rampant inflation (above 100% 
annually) has been recorded. As a market response, investors are using the stock 
market to hedge their risks, as it is preferable to hold stocks than bolivars. As a result, 
the main equity index (which also consists of just 11 stocks) has been recording 
phenomenal growth (around 600% in 12 months). However, this growth should be 
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reflective of the fear in the Venezuelan economy rather than promising investment 
opportunities. Likewise, the US in the early 2001-2002 shows evidence of the dot.com 
bubble (see Figure 3-4). However, to understand how oil may affect the financial 
sector of these countries it suffices to compare the spikes in the oil prices with the 
evolution of the Nigerian stock exchange.  
[Figures 3-4 around here] 
Table 5 presents the bi-variate correlation coefficients for the full sample. A quick 
inspection of the figures gives evidence of positive interrelations across all the stock 
markets. For example, in the GCC, correlation between Kuwaiti and Bahraini stock 
markets is around 0.22, while correlation between two of the oil exporting countries 
(e.g., Venezuela and Nigeria) is much lower at around 0.012. Most countries are quite 
unrelated to the US stock market, as evidenced by the very low correlations to the 
SP500. The only exception is Saudi Arabia, with a correlation coefficient around 
0.142. Correlation with the oil is also quite low, particularly for the non-GCC oil 
producers. Still Saudi Arabia shows the largest correlation coefficient, at 0.142, 
possibly due to the large reliance of the country to on oil exports and its size (as a 
producer) among both the GCC and the OPEC.  
[Table 5 around here] 
3.7.2 The ADCC-GARCH estimates 
Table 6 reports the estimated coefficients, standard errors and goodness-of-fit 
statistics for the univariate GARCH models for all the stock markets of the sample. 
The estimated coefficients are highly significant, providing giving evidence of the 
time-varying volatility dynamics. Table 7 presents the estimated coefficients of the 
138 
ADCC model, which are statistically significant. The significantly positive estimate of 
the asymmetric term, the information criteria and a likelihood ratio test suggest that 
the ADCC has a slightly better fit than the standard DCC, as it captures asymmetric 
effects in the conditional correlations. Naturally, the dynamic correlations for all pairs 
exhibit fluctuations over the entire sample period, suggesting that the assumption of 
constant correlations is not appropriate in our context. In addition, the dynamic 
correlations for the majority of the stock market indices and oil pairs show 
downward/upward spikes and decreased/increased volatility across the relevant sub-
periods (i.e., pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis). A direct consequence of this is that 
investors change their risk appetitive appetite according to the prevailing market 
conditions, but also the relationship between stock markets and the oil commodity is 
not unaffected by the prevailing market sentiment. The latter relationship is analysed 
in greater detail in the following section. 
[Tables 6 and 7 around here] 
3.7.3 Stock Markets and Oil: Correlation dynamics 
This section tests for changes in the estimated varying correlations across the periods 
of stability and turmoil. Furthermore, it assesses the role of oil across the identified 
periods. Specifically, we estimate the following regression model: 
where 𝜌𝜌𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is the pairwise dynamic conditional correlation estimate from the previous 
section for each of the stock markets vis-à-vis the US stock market and 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is the 
usual normally distributed stochastic error term. A dummy is used to identify the three 
𝜌𝜌�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 = �𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘3
𝑘𝑘=1
𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + �𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘3
𝑘𝑘=1
𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 (11) 
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periods of interest, namely the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis (k=1, 2, 3 respectively). 
The dates for these are defined in an earlier section. Oil denotes the volatility of oil, as 
estimated from the ADCC-GARCH of the previous section, while the dummy×Oil 
denotes the respective interaction term.  
As the model implies, the significance of the estimated coefficient on the dummy 
variables indicates structural changes in the mean process of the correlation across the 
three identified sub-periods; namely pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis.  
Hence, the estimated parameters in models I-V for each country in the sample have 
their own unique contribution to our story. In particular, the estimated coefficients on 
the period dummies (pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis) would show with their statistical 
significance the existence (or not) of financial contagion for the respective country. 
Specifically, a positive and statistically significant coefficient would, according to 
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) provide evidence of financial contagion. The coefficients 
on the Oil Volatility would provide evidence whether the volatility in oil prices affects 
the interconnectedness of each country’s stock market with the US. Statistical 
significance on this variable would denote that the oil volatility channel is used to 
transmit shocks between these economies. The interaction terms between the period 
dummies and the oil volatility are used to show whether this channel has 
increased/decreased in importance during the Global Financial Crisis. 
Table 8 reports the estimated coefficients and standard errors for the conditional 
correlation regressions. Each panel assesses the bivariate conditional correlation 
between the stock market of each oil producing country against the US. Five models 
are estimated, each with an increasing number of explanatory variables. The first only 
140 
includes the sub-period dummies, the second adds the oil related volatility, while 
models 3-5 further add each add one of the three interaction terms. 
[Table 8 around here] 
First we analyse the existence of financial contagion, which according to the Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) definition is defined as a statistical difference in the bi-variate 
correlation measure. All GCC stock markets show statistical evidence of financial 
contagion, with Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia being those that were affected more 
severely as evidenced by the higher change in the correlation levels. By contrast, 
Kuwait has been the least affected, since financial contagion is only verified at the 
10% significance level.  
Even though the Kuwaiti stock market was not affected by financial contagion per se, 
the financial crisis saw certain Kuwaiti banks recording unexpected losses. For 
example, the third-largest bank lost around $1.4 billion (Sharma, 2014). Amidst these 
developments the response from the regulator has been fast, with customer deposits 
guarantees, financial-stability laws and the establishment of a stock-market 
stabilisation fund with assets amounting to 3% of GDP. Overall, Kuwait has had the 
most timely and efficient response to the global financial crisis among the GCC 
countries (IMF, 2009).   
As far as the remaining three oil producing countries are concerned, only Ecuador 
shows evidence of financial contagion, while Nigeria and Venezuela are on the one 
hand affected significantly but the correlation drops during the crisis. This could be 
evidence of negative financial contagion, a situation which could plausibly be 
attributed to the low degree of financial integration of those countries’ financial 
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systems with the rest of the world. Table 9 summarises the contagion evidence for the 
countries under investigation. 
Turning now to the role of oil volatility, we assess the statistical significance of the 𝛾𝛾 
and 𝛿𝛿 coefficients (see Equation 11). The statistical significance of the former would 
suggest that there is a feedback relationship between conditional correlations and the 
volatility of the oil. This is the case for Dubai, Kuwait Saudi Arabia and Oman from 
the GCC group of countries and Ecuador and Venezuela from the remaining oil 
producing economies. For these countries the stock market shows a significant 
exposure to the fluctuations in the oil prices.  
For some countries, the magnitude of this relationship is time-varying, as evidenced 
by the statistical significance of the interaction (𝛿𝛿) terms. Specifically, during the 
crisis period we observe that certain countries show an even larger exposure to oil 
price fluctuations (e.g., Kuwait) while for others a relationship between conditional 
correlations and oil volatility emerges during the crisis (e.g., Nigeria). Finally, there 
are countries which maintain the same level of exposure to oil volatility (e.g., Saudi 
Arabia). For the two former cases, regulation and policy measures should focus on 
alleviating the exposure of the economy to the oil cycles. This may be achieved by 
economic planning where emphasis is placed on other business lines (e.g., tourism, 
manufacturing) so that the economic output of the country is not heavily reliant on the 
oil industry. This is the case of the UAE, where diversification of GDP away from oil 
and into tourism and financial services is proving to be beneficial. This may be 
supported by the fact that the two stock market exchanges of the country show 
opposite reliance on oil volatility: when during a period of crisis the oil-dependent 
Abu Dhabi shows higher exposure to oil volatility, Dubai shows a counterbalancing 
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behaviour. Venezuela is an interesting case as the coefficient on the interaction terms 
has changed sign between crisis and post-crisis periods, while it records one of the 
largest changes in magnitude as well. This may be plausibly linked to the economic 
situation in the country where the low oil prices towards the end of our sample, have 
greatly affected the stability of the local economy, with deterioration in all 
macroeconomic variables and also a shunning of international investors in the local 
stock market.  
[Table 9 around here] 
3.7.4 Stock Markets and Oil: Volatility Dynamics 
Figure 5 shows the percent annualised volatility for the oil prices, as this is estimated 
from the DCC-GARCH model discussed in Section 4. Observing the graph, the spike 
in oil volatility around the GFC and the ESDC crises is quite dominant around the 
2008 – 2010 period. Recent developments post 2014 show a rising volatility for this 
particular commodity, indicating potential trouble for the oil exporting economies. 
[Figure 5 around here] 
In the earlier sections we examined how the oil exporting economies performed 
during key crisis events of the early 21st century, namely the GFC and the ESDC. 
However, on-going developments in the oil price dynamics could have a minimal 
impact on the European or the US economy but could substantially affect these oil 
exporters. Hence in this section we firstly identify breakpoint in the oil volatility 
which could demonstrate causes of concern primarily for the oil exporting economies. 
Secondly, we use these breakpoints as crisis timelines to gauge how the 
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interconnectedness of these countries’ stock markets to the global financial system 
changes.  
Table 10 reports the Bai and Perron (2003) structural breakpoint test on the annualised 
oil price volatility series. The estimated breakpoints define the following six periods. 
First, 1/1/2004 – 8/11/2005, second 9/11/2005 – 19/2/2008, third 20/2/2008 – 
16/12/2009, fourth 17/12/2009 – 10/1/2012, fifth 11/1/2012 – 6/5/2014 and sixth 
7/5/2014 – 2/3/2016. Of these six periods, the first is largely dominated by the 2nd Iraq 
war and the instability caused in the area. The third and fourth correspond broadly to 
the GFC and the ESDC crises. The sixth identifies the recent developments in the oil 
industry with record-low prices (even falling below $30 a /barrel), the reluctance of 
OPEC to reduce the oil supply, and the lifting of the sanctions on Iran, which allows 
the Iranian oil to be sold internationally. The second and fifth periods are periods of 
relative tranquillity between crisis events. 
[Table 10 around here] 
Table 11 shows the estimated coefficients and standard errors for a modified version 
of Equation 11 that is shown here. Specifically, we estimate the following regression 
model: 
where 𝜌𝜌�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is the pairwise dynamic conditional correlation estimate from the previous 
section for each of the stock markets vis-à-vis the US stock market and 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 is the 




𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑦𝑦𝑘𝑘,𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑𝜌𝜌�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜂𝜂𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖 (12) 
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periods of interest, as these have been identified by the Bai and Perron (2003) 
breakpoint test of the previous section.  
The estimated coefficients represent the average conditional correlation change during 
each period where a positive value indicates an increase in correlation between the 
two financial markets.  
Of particular interest is the magnitude of the recent oil crisis. A comparison of the 
estimated coefficients between the recent oil crisis (d6) and the calm period that 
precedes it (d5) shows a significant increase, and hence evidence of financial 
contagion. This is quite important in the context of these economies as the oil crisis 
does not appear to have any documented impact on the developed economies of the 
US and Europe. Nevertheless, it shows that the oil exporting economies are 
significantly affected. Amongst the most affected are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the 
UAE, but with varying intensity and duration. Bahrain, Dubai and Kuwait show 
evidence of de-contagion during this 2015-onwards sustained low oil price crisis; thus 
they present themselves as less interconnected to the financial markets. By contrast, 
Abu Dhabi and Qatar have become more interconnected; thereby showing evidence of 
financial contagion. Saudi Arabia remains largely unaffected during the oil crisis.  
[Table 11 around here] 
3.8 Conclusions 
In this chapter we examine the impact of oil shocks and financial crisis on the 
financial sector of the GCC vis-à-vis three other key oil exporters with regards to the 
exposure to financial contagion during the global financial crisis through the oil 
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transmission channel. Our data span from 2004 to 2015 covering the period before the 
GFC, the GFC itself and the period that followed with the European Sovereign Debt 
crisis, as the EU is one of the most important markets for the GCC exports. Our 
methodology builds on the popular multivariate dynamic conditional correlation 
models which we apply to the equity indices. In a follow-up stage the estimated 
conditional correlations are regressed on the phases of the GFC to identify financial 
contagion according to the Forbes and Rigobon (2002) definition of significant 
increase in the bi-variate correlation measure. Following this, we account for the 
volatility of oil to act as a transmission channel throughout the period. Furthermore, 
we allow for a varying contribution across the phases of the GFC. We find that all 
GCC stock markets show statistical evidence of financial contagion, with Abu Dhabi 
and Saudi Arabia being those that were affected more severely as evidenced by the 
higher change in the correlation levels. This may be plausibly related to the 
relationship of these economies to oil production, where Saudi Arabia is the largest 
economy in the region and largest exporter of oil. Abu Dhabi, the ruling emirate of the 
UAE, is the one most dependent on oil exports.  
By contrast, Kuwait has been the least affected, since financial contagion is only 
verified at the 10% significance level. The response to the global financial crisis of the 
Kuwaiti government has been the most timely and efficient, as the IMF (2009) have 
noted, which could in part explain the lack of statistical evidence of financial 
contagion in this case.  
For the remaining three non-GCC oil exporters, there is no verification of financial 
contagion. Some of these countries show evidence of de-contagion, a process where 
following a crisis, correlation with the rest of the world drops. This could be explained 
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by the lower integration of such countries with the financial system and the reliance 
on external funds (e.g., FDI) whose flows decreased following the GFC. The measures 
that the GCC countries have taken with respect to diversifying their income away 
from oil and gas sectors haves paid off. Specifically, we document that oil reliance for 
the UAE, a country whose two largest emirates are collectively dependent on oil 
exports and financial services and tourism, shows a countercyclical behaviour, with 
Abu Dhabi being affected by oil volatility during a crisis but at the same time Dubai 
not being affected. In addition, Saudi Arabia maintains the same level of exposure to 
oil volatility across the different phases of the country, and this is an important finding 
for further planning and stabilization of the economy against future crisis events. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Returns) – Full Sample. 
 Abu 
Dhabi 
Bahrain Dubai Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
Ecuador Nigeria Venezuela S&P 500 Oil WTI Oil Brent 
Mean 0.033 0.003 0.045 0.002 0.028 0.038 0.024 0.033 0.028 0.187 0.021 0.015 0.022 
Std. Dev. 1.610 0.578 1.854 0.947 1.056 1.475 1.662 0.785 1.349 1.463 1.216 2.318 1.987 
Skewness 1.095 -0.451 -0.100 -0.301 -0.919 0.053 -0.606 0.551 0.024 -0.634 -0.340 -0.032 0.087 
Kurtosis 221.779 9.533 8.789 12.801 18.933 10.862 14.524 172.230 5.273 28.727 15.148 8.270 6.729 
Minimum -0.3649 -0.0492 -0.1216 -0.0752 -0.0870 -0.0985 -0.1168 -0.1667 -0.0557 -0.2065 -0.0947 -0.1283 -0.1113 
Maximum 0.3982 0.0361 0.1220 0.0746 0.0804 0.1420 0.1640 0.1746 0.0848 0.1056 0.1096 0.1641 0.1350 
              
JB stat 5863969 5328 4111 11812 31514 7573 16449 3508401 633 81276 18134 3402 1707 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q(10) stat 5.03 32.99 11.65 24.68 18.02 27.20 13.21 7.85 230.20 20.39 13.71 17.55 7.53 
p-value 0.889 0.000 0.309 0.006 0.055 0.002 0.212 0.644 0.000 0.026 0.187 0.063 0.675 
ARCH 
LM 
409.03 44.02 139.45 76.67 293.08 96.37 115.89 251.88 242.23 52.17 174.78 95.10 55.66 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ADF Stat -20.21 -18.45 -18.23 -20.11 -21.56 -19.96 -20.70 -21.04 -19.99 -18.24 -22.56 -22.12 -19.82 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Notes: Mean and Std. Dev. are expressed in percentages. Q stands for the Ljung-Box Q test for autocorrelation. The ARCH LM test utilizes 4 lags. We have employed ADF test with automated lag 
selection, where the optimal lag length is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion. AIC selected lag length between 5 and 10 lags for the series we consider. 
148 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics (Returns) – Pre-Crisis Sample. 
Abu 
Dhabi 
Bahrain Dubai Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
Ecuador Nigeria Venezuela S&P 500 Oil WTI Oil Brent 
Mean 0.073 0.070 0.156 0.087 0.092 0.073 0.056 0.072 0.124 0.069 0.029 0.094 0.101 
Std. Dev. 1.426 0.578 1.839 0.915 0.793 1.592 2.076 0.740 1.246 1.582 0.667 2.048 2.023 
Skewness 0.130 0.791 -0.050 -0.076 0.407 0.052 -0.429 1.297 -0.089 -2.851 -0.286 -0.201 -0.058
Kurtosis 10.275 8.177 7.967 8.905 9.157 4.423 11.522 27.223 4.803 43.464 4.240 4.775 4.477
Minimum -0.0865 -0.0231 -0.1216 -0.0474 -0.0477 -0.0627 -0.1168 -0.0523 -0.0480 -0.2065 -0.0353 -0.1225 -0.0848
Maximum 0.0825 0.0361 0.0844 0.0588 0.0480 0.0631 0.1640 0.0644 0.0452 0.0840 0.0213 0.0841 0.1030
JB stat 2062 1140 960 1358 1501 79 2855 23097 128 64986 73 129 85 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q(10) stat 95.94 73.21 49.87 952.42 114.48 85.89 74.18 10.71 280.94 203.32 18.80 14.66 16.82 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.381 0.000 0.000 0.043 0.145 0.078 
ARCH
LM 104.22 66.77 64.74 1310.61 370.44 198.59 376.45 0.53 231.05 436.89 319.42 122.67 111.23 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.970 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ADF Stat -14.75 -28.46 -29.15 -11.46 -44.76 -23.67 -21.17 -57.96 -21.08 -23.87 -62.14 -62.74 -62.46
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs 934 934 934 934 934 934 934 934 934 934 934 934 934 
Notes: Mean and Std. Dev. are expressed in percentages. Q stands for the Ljung-Box Q test for autocorrelation. The ARCH LM test utilizes 4 lags. We have employed ADF test with automated lag 
selection, where the optimal lag length is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion. AIC selected lag length between 5 and 10 lags for the series we consider. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics (Returns) – Crisis Sample. 
 Abu 
Dhabi 
Bahrain Dubai Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
Ecuador Nigeria Venezuela S&P 500 Oil WTI Oil 
Brent 
Mean -0.077 -0.110 -0.230 -0.178 -0.075 -0.094 -0.107 -0.004 -0.240 0.008 -0.138 -0.104 -0.117 
Std. Dev. 3.111 0.749 2.369 1.518 2.005 2.194 2.237 1.350 1.620 1.045 2.288 3.731 2.915 
Skewness 1.122 -0.984 0.137 0.096 -0.707 -0.447 -0.689 1.060 0.032 1.163 -0.030 0.161 0.321 
Kurtosis 106.479 6.701 7.168 8.042 8.007 6.257 7.846 120.239 4.451 8.454 7.097 5.832 5.613 
Minimum -0.3649 -0.0372 -0.0881 -0.0752 -0.0870 -0.0985 -0.1033 -0.1667 -0.0490 -0.0398 -0.0947 -0.1283 -0.1113 
Maximum 0.3982 0.0262 0.1022 0.0746 0.0804 0.0794 0.0909 0.1746 0.0489 0.0642 0.1096 0.1641 0.1350 
              
JB stat 194172 319 316 461 491 207 460 249207 38 637 304 147 131 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q(10) stat 32.73 34.59 14.45 23.85 35.44 28.70 17.83 73.29 290.80 35.77 29.06 33.14 10.52 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.154 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.058 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.396 
ARCH 
LM 158.36 45.37 116.68 30.54 118.92 79.70 31.80 158.17 170.76 51.08 58.26 41.33 29.38 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ADF Stat -26.86 -16.57 -20.02 -17.30 -16.61 -17.51 -18.27 -17.20 -9.87 -17.33 -18.47 -9.57 -19.91 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Obs 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 435 
Notes: Mean and Std. Dev. are expressed in percentages. Q stands for the Ljung-Box Q test for autocorrelation. The ARCH LM test utilizes 4 lags. We have employed ADF test with automated lag 
selection, where the optimal lag length is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion. AIC selected lag length between 5 and 10 lags for the series we consider. 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics (Returns) – Post-Crisis Sample. 
Abu 
Dhabi 
Bahrain Dubai Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
Ecuador Nigeria Venezuela S&P 500 Oil WTI Oil 
Brent 
Mean 0.039 -0.007 0.056 0.001 0.019 0.054 0.040 0.021 0.045 0.307 0.061 0.001 0.013 
Std. Dev. 0.981 0.516 1.687 0.728 0.774 1.108 1.106 0.569 1.317 1.479 1.024 1.925 1.613 
Skewness -0.303 -0.879 -0.205 -0.818 -0.614 1.330 -0.425 -2.718 0.178 0.778 -0.400 -0.154 -0.039
Kurtosis 15.673 10.943 9.620 13.170 15.372 25.421 16.988 73.626 5.675 16.240 6.964 6.255 6.061
Minimum -0.0868 -0.0492 -0.0962 -0.0573 -0.0641 -0.0664 -0.0755 -0.0984 -0.0557 -0.1347 -0.0690 -0.1113 -0.0915
Maximum 0.0763 0.0200 0.1220 0.0464 0.0537 0.1420 0.0904 0.0494 0.0848 0.1056 0.0463 0.0990 0.1009 
JB stat 10536 4332 2879 6946 10118 33368 12855 328438 477 11632 1070 700 614 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q(10) stat 34.25 20.76 20.34 32.32 91.45 13.72 25.68 19.40 244.54 113.29 52.21 20.43 10.72 
p-value 0.000 0.023 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.186 0.004 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.379 
ARCH
LM 169.01 34.71 220.37 123.50 267.33 24.54 171.54 6.18 271.29 178.59 264.64 83.07 28.33 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ADF Stat -35.98 -37.58 -37.70 -36.05 -32.31 -25.90 -37.34 -41.17 -24.27 -23.04 -25.25 -41.73 -38.37
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571 1571
Notes: Mean and Std. Dev. are expressed in percentages. Q stands for the Ljung-Box Q test for autocorrelation. The ARCH LM test utilizes 4 lags. We have employed ADF test with automated lag 
selection, where the optimal lag length is determined using the Akaike Information Criterion. AIC selected lag length between 5 and 10 lags for the series we consider. 
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Table 5. Unconditional correlation coefficients for the full sample 
 Abu 
Dhabi 
Bahrain Dubai Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 






Bahrain 0.169 1.000            
 (0.000)             
Dubai 0.514 0.219 1.000           
 (0.000) (0.000)            
Kuwait 0.186 0.223 0.219 1.000          
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)           
Oman 0.273 0.251 0.341 0.218 1.000         
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)          
Qatar 0.302 0.210 0.370 0.218 0.364 1.000        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
Saudi Arabia 0.252 0.077 0.282 0.129 0.185 0.205 1.000       
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)        
Ecuador 0.003 0.015 0.016 0.013 -0.013 -0.002 0.020 1.000      
 (0.887) (0.414) (0.385) (0.472) (0.496) (0.899) (0.285)       
Nigeria 0.019 0.002 0.056 -0.024 0.030 0.032 0.010 0.021 1.000     
 (0.296) (0.914) (0.002) (0.193) (0.104) (0.082) (0.597) (0.253)      
Venezuela -0.004 0.018 -0.016 -0.021 -0.014 -0.003 -0.014 -0.001 0.012 1.000    
 (0.837) (0.338) (0.389) (0.254) (0.452) (0.862) (0.457) (0.950) (0.518)     
S&P 500 0.041 0.011 0.107 0.034 0.049 0.060 0.142 -0.035 -0.004 -0.002 1.000   
 (0.026) (0.553) (0.000) (0.067) (0.008) (0.001) (0.000) (0.061) (0.844) (0.934)    
Oil WTI 0.045 0.019 0.085 0.027 0.086 0.074 0.101 -0.003 0.015 -0.008 0.286 1.000  
 (0.015) (0.295) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.879) (0.426) (0.676) (0.000)   
Oil Brent 0.090 0.033 0.122 0.025 0.124 0.095 0.136 0.021 0.025 -0.012 0.185 0.584 1.000 
 (0.000) (0.071) (0.000) (0.184) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.262) (0.184) (0.513) (0.000) (0.000)  
Notes: Table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for the stock market and oil returns. Numbers in brackets are p-values for the statistical significance test of zero correlation. 
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Table 6. ADCC-GARCH Estimation Univariate Results. 
 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
Abu Dhabi Dubai Oil WTI S&P 500 
Mean Equation 
μ 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 
 (0.091) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.499] [-18.061] [2.936] [3.177] [6.192] [2.342] [2.654] [1.346] [3.860] 
 {0.618} {0.000} {0.003} {0.002} {0.000} {0.019} {0.008} {0.178} {0.000} 
AR(1) 0.120 0.108 0.240 0.145 0.095 0.212 0.047 -0.046 -0.058 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.034) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) 
 [4.834] [7.103] [10.350] [5.861] [4.373] [6.206] [2.105] [-2.200] [-3.132] 
 {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.035} {0.028} {0.002} 
Variance Equation 
ω 1.834 0.000 0.014 0.003 0.034 0.032 0.076 0.026 0.018 
 (0.897) (0.000) (0.005) (0.004) (0.013) (0.011) (0.029) (0.014) (0.005) 
 [2.044] [0.011] [2.745] [0.908] [2.638] [2.767] [2.632] [1.774] [3.611] 
 {0.041} {0.992} {0.006} {0.364} {0.008} {0.006} {0.009} {0.076} {0.000} 
α 0.148 0.093 0.160 0.091 0.137 0.232 0.138 0.052 0.092 
 (0.047) (0.002) (0.025) (0.027) (0.020) (0.047) (0.025) (0.014) (0.013) 
 [3.165] [46.666] [6.418] [3.327] [6.905] [4.944] [5.582] [3.844] [7.022] 
 {0.002} {0.000} {0.000} {0.001} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} 
β 0.807 0.902 0.842 0.919 0.861 0.795 0.848 0.944 0.890 
 (0.064) 0.001 0.023 0.027 0.017 0.025 0.028 0.015 0.014 
 [12.670] [1027.769] [37.370] [33.520] [50.450] [31.850] [29.930] [62.490] [62.610] 
 {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} {0.000} 
Log-Likelihood 11264.015 13227.070 10333.910 9075.236 8824.196 9299.284 8076.494 7341.991 9650.361 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Notes: Table reports estimated coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, t-statistics in square brackets and p-values in curly brackets for the univariate GARCH models of the ADCC-GARCH estimation. 
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Table 7. ADCC-GARCH Estimation Multivariate Results. 
ADCC DCC 
a 0.006 0.007 
se (0.001) (0.002) 
t-stat 4.323 3.689 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
b 0.981 0.983 
se (0.008) (0.007) 
t-stat 130.200 131.100 





Log-Likelihood 87726.28 87718.31 
Obs 3,175 3,175 
Notes: Table reports estimated coefficients, standard errors in 
parentheses, t-statistics in square brackets and p-values in curly 
brackets for the multivariate part of the ADCC-GARCH 
estimation. See equation 9 in the main text. 
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Table 8(a). Correlation Regressions 
Model I II III IV V 
Abu Dhabi 
Pre-Crisis 0.005 0.004 0.038*** 0.009*** 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003) 
Crisis 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.045** 0.049*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Post-Crisis 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.080*** 0.076*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Oil Volatility  1.929 4.152*** -10.412** 2.410 
  (1.581) (1.467) (4.354) (1.565) 
Oil Volatility×Pre-Crisis   -78.931***   
   (12.130)   
Oil Volatility×Crisis    15.563***  
    (4.552)  
Oil Volatility×Post Crisis     -2.688 
     (4.829) 
      
R2 60.23% 60.29% 63.40% 61.00% 60.29% 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Dubai 
Pre-Crisis 0.060*** 0.058*** 0.046*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Crisis 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Post-Crisis 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Oil Volatility  4.723** 3.982* 3.260 5.968*** 
  (2.163) (2.188) (6.305) (2.089) 
Oil Volatility×Pre-Crisis   26.311***   
   (7.725)   
Oil Volatility×Crisis    1.845  
    (6.601)  
Oil Volatility×Post Crisis     -6.965 
     (6.732) 
      
R2 59.43% 59.84% 60.19% 59.84% 59.97% 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Notes: Estimates are based on Eq. (11) in the text and standard errors are given in brackets. Pre-crisis, 
crisis and post-crisis refer to the three dummy variables that identify the periods of the global financial 
crisis as explained in the test. Oil Volatility refers to the conditional volatility estimate for the oil 
commodity. ***, **, *: denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 8(b). Correlation Regressions 
Model I II III IV V 
Bahrain 
Pre-Crisis 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.037*** 0.028*** 0.024*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.002) 
Crisis 0.037*** 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Post-Crisis 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.019*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Oil Volatility 2.557 3.415 -6.051 3.713 
(2.161) (2.218) (4.454) (2.459) 
Oil Volatility×Pre-Crisis -30.447*
(16.007)
Oil Volatility×Crisis 10.855** 
(5.154) 
Oil Volatility×Post Crisis -6.460
(5.224)
R2 6.55% 6.83% 8.02% 7.73% 7.09% 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Kuwait 
Pre-Crisis 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Crisis 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Post-Crisis 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Oil Volatility -2.234*** -2.474*** 2.708*** -3.195***
(0.621) (0.618) (0.858) (0.635) 




Oil Volatility×Post Crisis 5.376*** 
(1.081) 
R2 1.38% 6.30% 8.24% 12.60% 10.48% 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Notes: Estimates are based on Eq. (11) in the text and standard errors are given in brackets. Pre-crisis, 
crisis and post-crisis refer to the three dummy variables that identify the periods of the global financial 
crisis as explained in the test. Oil Volatility refers to the conditional volatility estimate for the oil 
commodity. ***, **, *: denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 8(c). Correlation Regressions 
Model I II III IV V 
Qatar 
Pre-Crisis 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.044*** 0.042*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
Crisis 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Post-Crisis 0.092*** 0.093*** 0.093*** 0.095*** 0.094*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Oil Volatility -2.668 -2.042 -6.744 -2.382
(1.756) (1.749) (4.597) (1.805)
Oil Volatility×Pre-Crisis -22.232
(16.146)
Oil Volatility×Crisis 5.140 
(4.916) 
Oil Volatility×Post Crisis -1.602
(5.287)
R2 44.69% 44.86% 45.20% 44.96% 44.85% 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Saudi Arabia 
Pre-Crisis 0.075*** 0.061*** 0.076*** 0.059*** 0.062*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
Crisis 0.142*** 0.100*** 0.099*** 0.102*** 0.104*** 
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Post-Crisis 0.161*** 0.148*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.143*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Oil Volatility 32.893*** 33.870*** 38.074*** 30.430*** 





Oil Volatility×Post Crisis 13.770* 
(8.356) 
R2 50.54% 61.90% 62.24% 61.96% 62.18% 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Notes: Estimates are based on Eq. (11) in the text and standard errors are given in brackets. Pre-crisis, 
crisis and post-crisis refer to the three dummy variables that identify the periods of the global financial 
crisis as explained in the test. Oil Volatility refers to the conditional volatility estimate for the oil 
commodity. ***, **, *: denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 8(d). Correlation Regressions 
Model I II III IV V 
Oman 
Pre-Crisis 0.049*** 0.053*** 0.114*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004) 
Crisis 0.062*** 0.073*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.077*** 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Post-Crisis 0.079*** 0.082*** 0.081*** 0.085*** 0.077*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Oil Volatility -8.936*** -4.959** -15.458** -11.998***
(2.398) (2.009) (7.253) (2.972) 
Oil Volatility×Pre-Crisis -141.224***
(15.609)
Oil Volatility×Crisis 8.225 
(7.586) 
Oil Volatility×Post Crisis 17.121** 
(6.791) 
R2 14.78% 16.82% 30.94% 17.08% 17.91% 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Ecuador 
Pre-Crisis -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.039*** -0.038***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) 
Crisis -0.053*** -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.060*** -0.060***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Post-Crisis -0.036*** -0.038*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.040***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Oil Volatility 6.265*** 6.316*** 9.070** 5.497*** 





Oil Volatility×Post Crisis 4.293 
(5.630) 
R2 4.68% 6.24% 6.21% 6.29% 6.32% 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Notes: Estimates are based on Eq. (11) in the text and standard errors are given in brackets. Pre-crisis, 
crisis and post-crisis refer to the three dummy variables that identify the periods of the global financial 
crisis as explained in the test. Oil Volatility refers to the conditional volatility estimate for the oil 
commodity. ***, **, *: denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 8(e). Correlation Regressions 
Model I II III IV V 
Nigeria 
Pre-Crisis 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.044*** 0.020*** 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
Crisis -0.001 -0.004 -0.007* -0.012*** -0.008** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Post-Crisis 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Oil Volatility  2.874 5.126** -19.072*** 5.743*** 
  (2.145) (2.062) (6.129) (1.823) 
Oil Volatility×Pre-Crisis   -79.954***   
   (13.752)   
Oil Volatility×Crisis    27.676***  
    (6.375)  
Oil Volatility×Post Crisis     -16.037** 
     (6.834) 
      
R2 15.06% 15.31% 21.18% 19.52% 16.55% 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Venezuela 
Pre-Crisis 0.008*** 0.013*** -0.002 0.024*** 0.009*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) 
Crisis -0.004* 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Post-Crisis 0.004** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Oil Volatility  -10.154*** -11.107*** -36.345*** -2.423 
  (1.927) (2.006) (5.875) (1.786) 
Oil Volatility×Pre-Crisis   33.858**   
   (13.491)   
Oil Volatility×Crisis    33.028***  
    (6.137)  
Oil Volatility×Post Crisis     -43.226*** 
     (7.754) 
      
R2 2.06% 6.71% 8.10% 14.81% 19.14% 
Obs 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 3,175 
Notes: Estimates are based on Eq. (11) in the text and standard errors are given in brackets. Pre-crisis, 
crisis and post-crisis refer to the three dummy variables that identify the periods of the global financial 
crisis as explained in the test. Oil Volatility refers to the conditional volatility estimate for the oil 
commodity. ***, **, *: denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
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Table 9. Contagion Evidence 








Abu Dhabi Yes Yes Yes 11.455 0.000 
Dubai Yes Yes Yes 3.871 0.000 
Bahrain Yes Yes Yes 2.525 0.012 
Kuwait Yes Yes Yes 1.875 0.061 
Qatar Yes Yes Yes 6.652 0.000 
Saudi Arabia Yes Yes Yes 8.604 0.000 
Oman Yes Yes Yes 2.301 0.021 
Ecuador Yes Yes Yes 5.031 0.000 
Nigeria Yes No No 2.688 0.000 
Venezuela Yes No No 3.433 0.000 
Panel B: Oil Relevance 
Overall Pre-Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis 
Abu Dhabi No Yes Yes No 
Dubai Yes Yes No No 
Bahrain No Yes Yes No 
Kuwait Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Qatar No No No No 
Saudi Arabia Yes Yes No Yes 
Oman Yes Yes No Yes 
Ecuador Yes No No No 
Nigeria No Yes Yes Yes 
Venezuela Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Panel A presents the summarized conclusion on the existence of financial contagion for each of the 
examined countries. Panel B assesses the impact of oil volatility in each of the sub-periods for each country 
where crisis refers to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.396 
Observations 3,175 
Notes: estimated coefficients and standard errors in brackets. Estimated 
breakpoints (Ds) are discussed in section 5.4. ***,**,*: denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level. 
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Table 11. Estimation results for within-country, cross-sector financial contagion. 
SP500 Abu 
Dhabi 
Bahrain Dubai Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi 
Arabia 
Ecuador Nigeria Venezuela Oil 
d1 2nd Gulf War 0.0614*** 0.0206*** 0.1159*** 0.0526*** 0.0810*** 0.0973*** 0.1514*** -0.0290*** 0.0123* 0.0062 0.2515*** 
(0.0183) (0.0055) (0.0195) (0.0106) (0.0163) (0.0209) (0.0313) (0.0081) (0.0071) (0.0058) (0.0895) 
d2 Calm period 0.0609*** 0.0244*** 0.1165*** 0.0531*** 0.0843*** 0.0981*** 0.1489*** -0.0292*** 0.0137** 0.0031 0.2518*** 
(0.0182) (0.0054) (0.0195) (0.0106) (0.0163) (0.0208) (0.0312) (0.0079) (0.0070) (0.0057) (0.0895) 
d3 GFC 0.0616*** 0.0238*** 0.1173*** 0.0538*** 0.0846*** 0.0989*** 0.1495*** -0.0289*** 0.0146** 0.0026 0.2497*** 
(0.0182) (0.0054) (0.0195) (0.0105) (0.0162) (0.0208) (0.0312) (0.0079) (0.0069) (0.0057) (0.0894) 
d4 ESDC 0.0621*** 0.0235*** 0.1178*** 0.0555*** 0.0853*** 0.0996*** 0.1494*** -0.0291*** 0.0159** 0.0023 0.2482*** 
(0.0181) (0.0054) (0.0194) (0.0105) (0.0162) (0.0207) (0.0311) (0.0078) (0.0068) (0.0058) (0.0894) 
d5 Calm period 0.0633*** 0.0238*** 0.1190*** 0.0605*** 0.0827*** 0.0846*** 0.1512*** -0.0290*** 0.0192*** 0.0047 0.2484*** 
(0.0180) (0.0055) (0.0193) (0.0105) (0.0161) (0.0207) (0.0310) (0.0078) (0.0068) (0.0060) (0.0892) 
d6 Recent Oil Crisis 0.0708*** 0.0182*** 0.1166*** 0.0567*** 0.0824*** 0.0858*** 0.1512*** -0.0277*** 0.0173** 0.0064 0.2476*** 
(0.0180) (0.0055) (0.0193) (0.0105) (0.0161) (0.0207) (0.0310) (0.0078) (0.0068) (0.0061) (0.0892) 
φ 0.9962*** 0.9880*** 0.9965*** 0.9932*** 0.9961*** 0.9965*** 0.9976*** 0.9915*** 0.9907*** 0.9906*** 0.9991*** 
(0.0014) (0.0030) (0.0014) (0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0007) 
LM(2) statistic 1.989 9.292*** 0.866 4.997* 15.25*** 2.633 4.658* 0.164 5.322* 4.430 1.200 
t-statistic (d5-d6) 16.12*** 7.10*** 5.09*** 4.07*** 0.54 -2.06** 0.12 -1.51 3.14*** -1.68* 6.40*** 
t-statistic (d3-d6) 8.10*** -2.52*** 0.63 -1.09 1.77* 9.50*** -2.43** -0.61 -1.20 -1.99** 5.85*** 
Observations 3,174 3,174 3,174 3,174 3,174 3,174 3,174 3,174 3,174 3,174 3,174 
Notes: The table reports estimated coefficients and standard errors in brackets for equation (12) in the text. LM(2) denotes the Breusch-Godfrey LM test statistic for 
autocorrelation allowing for up to two lags. ***,**,*: denote statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% significance level. 
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Figure 1. Dynamics of Oil prices and GCC stock markets. 
Notes: Figure shows the evolution of the WTI oil prices and GCC stock market index around the 
period of the Global Financial Crisis. 
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Figure 2. WTI crude oil price, in US dollars, from January 1987 to April 2016. 










































































Figure 3a. Stock Market Indices (Prices) 
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Figure 3b. Stock Market Indices (Prices) 
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Figure 4a. Stock Market Indices (Returns) 
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Figure 4b. Stock Market Indices (Returns) 
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Notes: Figure displays the annualized oil volatility as estimated from the DCC-GARCH model 




The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is apolitical and economic union of the Arab states 
that was founded in May 1981 among the six countries of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The GCC states show significant homogeneity among them 
on various geopolitical, macroeconomic and institutional aspects (IMF, 2005). At first the 
six countries share the same language and history. All GCC countries are large oil and gas 
exporters and participate in the OPEC. Most notably, Saudi Arabia is the single largest 
exporter of oil worldwide. With regards to the economic structure, all GCC members 
maintain long-standing fixed exchange rates to the US dollar with Kuwait being the only 
exception after switching to an undisclosed basket of currencies in May 2007. 
Furthermore, all GCC states have generally low inflation rates compared to other 
developing countries (IMF, 2005).  
The over-reliance on oil exports as the main driver of economic growth has led to 
significant revenues of the GCC countries in the past, notably the late 1970s and early 
1980s with the two oil crises. However, the temporary growth could not be sustained once 
oil prices reverted to normal levels. Ever since, the GCC states have embarked on a series 
of structural reforms to reduce their exposure to the volatile energy prices; thus achieving 
a sustainable path to economic growth. In this regard, some countries have taken 
significant steps towards income diversification with Bahrain, which has established itself 
as a financial hub in the region offering exquisite products such as Islamic finance. 
Tourism and transportation are also promoted. The UAE have diversified into tourism, 
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manufacturing and financial services (IMF 2012d). Although Kuwait recently has 
engaged with financial services, its dependence on oil remains high. Saudi Arabia, by far 
the largest economy in the region (469.4 USD billion - 44.3% of GCC total), has the huge 
revenues from energy related products (89.3% of total revenue in 2008); construction and 
manufacturing are increasingly important as revenue sources (IMF, 2011a). As a result of 
this diversification process, non-oil sectors in the GCC have been expanding at 7.3% 
yearly, while the non-oil GDP represented 65% of total GDP in 2008, up from about 56-
58% in the early90’s. Economic growth is no longer entirely energy related. An important 
stress test for the oil exporters worldwide, including the GCC has been the remarkable oil 
price increase (around 150 USD/barrel) in the period around the Global Financial Crisis, 
namely 2007-2010 coupled with the persistently low oil prices (around 40 USD/barrel). 
The GCC have fared remarkably well and this is mainly attributed to their income 
diversification process that has been taking place since the oil crises of the 1970s and 
1980s. As such, bad policies of the past seem to have been overcome. By contrast, oil-
exporting economies outside the GCC have either not identified their over-reliance on oil 
revenues as a major problem or have not taken successful steps in diversifying their 
income sources (e.g., Venezuela, Nigeria).    
The second chapter of the thesis provides an empirical assessment to how the reliance on 
natural resources, and oil in particular, has affected the economic growth in the period 
1980 – 2014. The sample contains 14 countries that are oil exporters and special mention 
is made to the GCC. The research question is placed within the context of the resource 
curse, which dates back to the early papers of Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997) whereby an 
inverse relationship between oil endowments and economic growth is observed. In our 
analysis we use two resource proxies, the per capita oil reserve and oil rents to ensure 
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robustness of our results. We control for an array of macroeconomic, institutional and 
demographic factors in line with the most recent literature. Hence, we include variables 
such as Tertiary Enrolment, Fertility, Mortality, Consumption, Investment, Trade 
Openness and Democracy – a proxy for the quality of institutions. Our estimation builds 
on the panel random effects and GMM methods that control for endogeneity. We 
augment our analysis using a novel technique in the field, namely classification trees so 
as to categorize the countries into groups in line with the magnitude of their oil curse (or 
oil blessing). Our results support the notion that the oil curse is not a cause of concern for 
the sampled countries, particularly for the GCC. Indeed, a positive link between oil 
abundance and economic growth (i.e., oil blessing) is evidenced in the majority of 
specifications. Even when allowing for different country groups using the classification 
trees, we fail to find any evidence in favour of the resource curse. Indeed, we find 
evidence of oil blessing to various degrees.  
Income diversification in the GCC has favoured the expansion of the finance sector with 
Bahrain and the UAE quickly achieving status of well-reputed financial hubs in the 
region (IMF, 2010). Still the financial sector in the GCC is largely bank dominated, with 
a few domestic players dominating the market. Most of the banks operate on a deposit-
taking/loan-making business model without any specialisation on securities trading. 
Complex financial and debt instruments are also not in line with the Islamic Law 
(Shariah), the relevance of which may be evidenced through the expansion of the Islamic 
banking industry that accounts for almost 30-40% in terms of total banking assets in the 
GCC (EY, 2015). The GCC is therefore characterised by a large degree of financial 
exclusion from the world capital markets (Al-Hassan, Khamis and Oulidi, 2010). 
However, the expansion of the finance industry over the recent years has somewhat 
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ameliorated the situation with many of the GCC states opening up their stock markets to 
foreign investors; albeit with certain quotas. Hence, the GCC has been on a steady path to 
integration with global capital markets. 
The third chapter of the thesis examines whether the rise of the financial services in the 
GCC have increased the integration with global capital market. In particular, whether the 
increased integration has led to increased vulnerability of these economies through 
imported financial contagion in light of the global financial crisis of 2007-2010. Given 
the relative importance of oil price volatility for these economies we modify the original 
financial contagion framework of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) to our needs by allowing 
the oil volatility to act as a transmission channel. We use daily price data for the stock 
markets of the GCC and several other oil exporting economies for completeness over the 
period 2004 – 2015. The examined period spans over periods of calm markets, global 
financial crisis and the recent period of prolonged low oil prices. Our methodological 
approach builds on the popular multivariate dynamic conditional correlation models 
(DCC-GARCH) to estimate the conditional correlations which are then regressed on the 
phases of the Global Financial Crisis to identify financial contagion as per the Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002) definition. Our findings show that all GCC stock markets show statistical 
evidence of financial contagion, with Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia being those that were 
affected more severely as evidenced by the higher change in the correlation levels. This 
may be plausibly related to the relationship of these economies to oil production, where 
Saudi Arabia is the largest economy in the region and largest exporter of oil. Abu Dhabi, 
the ruling emirate of the UAE, is the one more heavily dependent on oil exports. By 
contrast, Kuwait has been the least affected, since financial contagion is only verified at 
the 10% significance level. The response to the global financial crisis of the Kuwaiti 
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government has been the timeliest and efficient, as the IMF (2009) have noted, which 
could in part explain the lack of statistical evidence of financial contagion in this case.  
The remaining non-GCC oil exporters, there is no verification of do not verify financial 
contagion. In fact, some even show evidence of de-contagion, a process where following 
a crisis, correlation with the rest of the world drops. The low development of a financial 
industry in these countries and their reliance on external funds (e.g., FDI) whose flows 
were decreased following the GFC could explain, in part, this finding.  
In sum, the measures that the GCC have taken with respect to diversifying their income 
away from oil and gas sectors haves paid off. Specifically, we document that oil reliance 
for UAE, a country whose two largest emirates are collectively dependent on oil exports 
and financial services and tourism, shows a countercyclical behaviour, with Abu Dhabi 
being affected by oil volatility during a crisis but at the same time Dubai not being 
affected. In addition, Saudi Arabia maintains the same level of exposure to oil volatility 
across the different phases of the country, and this is an important finding for further 
planning and stabilization of the economy against future crisis events. Most importantly, 
the income diversification process of the GCC has render its economic growth sustainable 
and less dependent on oil; however, the expansion of the financial sector facilitates the 
transmission of economic shocks from other parts of the world and could destabilise the 
economy if not proper and timely steps are taken. 
We believe that higher frequency macroeconomic data would be desirable as it would 
enable us to track more accurately the government regulations and policy changes to the 
reliance on oil revenues; hence oil curse. Currently, as the oil curse models build on a 
relatively large array of macroeconomic variables, the limiting degrees of freedom require 
the use of a fairly large time span, without being able to split the sample timewise as we 
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would have liked. Directions for future research include the collection and analysis of 
higher frequency macroeconomic data and the analysis of the macroeconomic reliance on 
oil with the stock market development and stability. In other words, how the volatility of 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Literature Review Table 
Authors Sample Period Methodology 
Curse / 
Blessing Dependent variable Resource proxy 
Sachs and 
Warner                 
(1995) 
97 developing countries (Not 
included: Bahrain- Iraq- 








Curse Real per capita growth 
rate of GDP per 
annum 
Ratio of primary export in 
GDP 
Sachs and 
Warner                
(1997) 
83 developing countries (Not 
included: Bahrain- Iraq- 








Curse Growth rate per capita Share of natural resourcesexport in GDP 
Gylfason                          
(2001) 






Real per capita GNP 
growth 
Share of natural capital in 
national wealth 
Sachs and 
Warner                
(2001) 
Panel of developing countries 







Curse Real growth per capita Share of natural resourcesexport in GDP 
Lederman and 
Maloney               
(2003) 






GDP per capita 
growth rate 
Resource exports over GDP    
Share of natural resources 
exports in total exports 
Neumayer      
(2004) 
97 developing countries  
(OPEC included) 
1970 - 
1998 OLS Curse Genuine income 
Share of exports of primary 
products 
Stijns                               
(2005) 
29 countries had average 
growth rates above 2 per cent 
for the period 1970–1989 
1970 - 
1999 OLS Blessing 
Average growth rate
of GDP per capita Natural resource reserves 
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Mehlum et al.                          
(2006) 
42 Resource rich countries 
(Included: Nigeria, Algeria, 





Average growth rate 
of real GDP per 
capita 
Share of primary exports in 
GNP 
Dietz et al.                              
(2007) 
115 Resource rich countries 






Curse Gross and genuine saving 
Share of exports of fuel and 
mineral products in total 
exports 
Brunnchweiler                 
(2008) 
84 Resource rich countries 





2SLS Blessing Income growth 
Per capita mineral           
Total natural resource 
abundance 
Brunnchweiler 
& Bulte (2008) 
80 Mineral endowed and 
exporting countries (Ecuador 
and Venezuela included) 
1970 - 
1989 2SLS, 3SLS Blessing 
Average natural 
resource (Mineral) 
exports over GDP 
Total natural capital and 
mineral resource assets per 
capita 
Alexeev and 
Conrad  (2009) 
OPEC members and major 
non-OPEC oil producers 
1970 - 
2000 2SLS Blessing GDP per capita Oil as a ratio of GDP 
Boyce and 
Emery              
(2011) 





Curse Real per capita income Natural resource exports 
James & 
Aadland                 
(2011) 
United states counties (3092 
counties) 
1980 - 
2005 GLS Curse 
 Annual growth in per 
capita personal 
income  
Percent earnings from 
agriculture, fishing, forestry 
and mining industries 
Collier and 






Curse Real GDP per capita Resource-export prices 
Boos & Holm-
Muller   (2013) 









growth rate of GDP 
per capita
Genuine savings 









Real gross regional 
product (GRP) per 
capita growth rate 
Energy (Agriculture) 
production as a share of 
GRP
Share of primary exports in 
GRP 
Escobar and Le 
Chaffotec
(2015) 




Blessing Per capita GDP Oil reserves 
Smith                               
(2015) 
OECD and non-OECD 
countries (Algeria, Ecuador, 






Blessing Per capita GDP 
Natural resource (oil, gas, 
and diamond) discoveries 
since 1950 












140 countries (Iraq, Qatar, 
Libya, and Nigeria not 
included) 
1995 - 
2009 Panel data Curse 
Public spending on 
education as a 
percentage of GDP 
Share of natural capital in 
total national wealth 
